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ABSTRACT 
Military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) played an important part in United 
States strategy during the first two decades of the Cold War.  From 1947 to 1963, the US 
provided billions of dollars in military weapons, equipment, and supplies to its allies, in 
an attempt to strengthen them against real and perceived communist threats.  The 
advisors managed the delivery of this materiel and trained combat and support troops in 
dozens of nations.  In some cases, the advisors provided direct guidance to allies at war 
The armed forces committed thousands of officers to the advisory effort.  
The advisory groups, for a variety of reasons, achieved only mixed success.  The 
advisors received very limited advisory training, served short tours of duty, and could 
rarely speak the native language of the host military.  There were strict financial and 
time limitations of military assistance.  Lastly, the advisors themselves emphasized 
training that reflected resource-intense  American warfare, inappropriate for many of its 
allies.  Though assistance and advising strengthened several allies and helped others 
defeat communist enemies, no recipient of aid was able to provide for its own defense 
without US support, and the advisory mission to South Vietnam ended in disaster. 
This work uses previously unpublished primary documents from several archives 
to show how the advisors worked with and trained foreign militaries around the world.  
It also examines the training and lives of the advisors themselves, as they lived in 
cultures much different than their own and reflected on their experiences. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
MILITARY ADVISORS IN THREE VIGNETTES 
Brigadier General Frank Cam and his Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG) had a number of objectives in Portugal.  A 1951 agreement granted the Iberian 
country American military aid, including hardware and training, so that the nation could 
better meet its defense obligations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Cam, 
whose advisors administered the aid and conducted training, intended to convert the 
Portuguese Air Force (PAF) from propeller-driven aircraft to jets.  However, the general 
found serious problems with the PAF, reporting in 1952 that it was “a most negligent 
organization with reference to ground safety.”  Pilots damaged wingtips while taxiing 
and injured themselves when they recklessly jumped out of their cockpits before the 
plane came to a complete stop on the tarmac.  Maintenance crews smoked in the 
hangars, and started fires when they dropped cigarette butts onto gasoline-stained floors.  
They had no specialized training to put those fires out.  Before any flight training or 
operational planning could begin, MAAG Portugal would have to teach the PAF to not 
damage itself by accident.1 
1 “Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, with Annexes, between the United States of America and 
Portugal,” 5 Jan 1951, Military Assistance Bilaterals, 
http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll11/id/1099/rec/20 (hereafter 
Military Assistance Bilaterals) and 114.Brigadier General Frank Cam, “Monthly Activities Report #18, 
July 1952,” 7 Aug 1952, Folder (hereafter F) 319.1 Monthly Activity Reports, Jul-Dec 1952, MAAG 
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In 1954, air force Lieutenant Colonel James Muri served in the advisory group 
for Belgium.  Assistance to Belgium, which included aid to Luxembourg, had begun in 
1950 as a part of the American commitment to European security.  The assistance 
package included military supplies and advisors to train the Belgian and Luxembourger 
troops.  The advisors lived in Brussels where they interacted with the Belgian 
population, sometimes in unpredictable ways.  In September, Muri invited a salesman 
into his home to discuss buying a rug.  Over the course of the sales pitch, Muri and his 
wife began to suspect the man was selling stolen rugs and decided against a purchase.  
The salesman became irate and Muri asked him to leave.  After storming out, he 
reappeared at their doorstep a moment later, with a knife plainly visible in his jacket.  
When Muri confronted him, the man went for his knife and Muri grabbed a nearby chair 
to use as a weapon.  Muri fought off his attacker and ran down to the street in time to get 
his license plates as he sped away.  He reported the incident to the Belgian police, who 
later caught and arrested the man, a career criminal wanted for similar incidents.2 
Near the beginning of US assistance and training for the Republic of Vietnam, 
Lieutenant General Michael O’Daniel met with Vietnamese Brigadier General Nguyen 
Van Vy to discuss different aspects of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.  O’Daniel 
urged that the Vietnamese reduce their troops from a proposed 200,000 but Vy worried 
that the Viet Minh, with Chinese support, could invade and defeat a smaller force.  
Portugal, Box 9, Entry (hereafter E) 244, Record Group (hereafter G) 334, National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, MD (hereafter NARA). 
2 “Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and Belgium,”22 Mar 
1950, Military Assistance Bilaterals, and Lieutenant Colonel James P. Muri, “Statement,” 8 Sep 1954, F 
Auto Accidents, Investigations, Etc., MAAG Belgium-Luxembourg, Box 46, E 86, RG 334, NARA. 
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O’Daniel suggested that “numbers alone” were not the answer and that the ARVN 
needed more training and experience with large formations before they could support a 
bigger army.  The topic of discussion then shifted to political matters in South Vietnam.  
Vy was furious that a mutinous army unit avoided punishment because of political 
connections to President Ngo Diem.  Twice in the conversation, O’Daniel urged Vy to 
not “blow a fuze [sic].”  Vy responded, in English, “I have no intention of blowing any 
fuzes.”3 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS IN THE COLD WAR 
These vignettes display the variety of experiences had by American military 
advisors during the Cold War.  The advisors played a key role in the United States’ 
military assistance policy, which provided large amounts of military equipment and 
supplies to American allies.  US policy makers, across three presidential administrations, 
used military assistance to support Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.  The 
objective of assistance was to bolster allied defenses against the perceived Soviet threat, 
make them more secure against internal strife, and strengthen alliances.  American 
policy makers believed improving allied security would also improve US security while 
preventing the need to deploy American ground forces.  A major objective of military 
aid was to make its recipients “self sufficient” and able to maintain their defenses 
3
 “Minutes of Conference at MAAG,” 29 Nov 54, MAAG Vietnam, United States Army Heritage and 
Education Center, Carlisle, PA (hereafter USAHEC). 
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without continuing support.  The advisory groups’ experiences show that self sufficiency 
was in most cases difficult to achieve. 
Assistance began in Europe, when President Harry S. Truman provided aid to the 
Greeks, who were involved in a war with communist guerrillas.  It later spread to the 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, then expanding their forces to meet 
the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.  Truman also extended support to 
the Middle East and Asia, arming the Turkish, Iranians, South Koreans and Nationalist 
Chinese, as well as the the French in Indochina.  President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
reduced military aid to Europe, but expanded support of Middle Eastern and Asian 
nations.  Military assistance began drawing to a close during John F. Kennedy’s 
administration, but continued in smaller amounts to many nations and increased 
dramatically to South Vietnam.   
Military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) implemented military assistance.  
They administered the aid, oversaw its delivery, and reviewed its use in allied military 
hands.  In some of the missions, advisors also trained foreign troops, reformed their 
military education centers, and even helped reorganize the host nation’s armed forces.  
In rare instances, the advisors also helped guide military operations.  The advisors tried 
to behave as “soldier diplomats,” who not only trained allied forces but also represented 
the United States as ideal citizens.  They dealt with greatly varying allied armed forces.  
Some were quite modern and possessed mechanized armies and air forces.  Others, like 
Ethiopia and Libya, had small militaries, with few if any modern weapons, or very large 
armies with antiquated equipment, as in Turkey.  The advisors trained Europeans, who 
5 
enjoyed high levels of education, and Asian and Middle Eastern forces, whose enlisted 
men were sometimes illiterate.  The MAAGs operated in Middle Eastern deserts, Asian 
jungles, and European countryside.  They worked out of urban office space, isolated 
blockhouses, and in the camps of armies at war, training allied soldiers on equipment as 
varied as submarines, recoilless rifles, and typewriters.  
This dissertation is the first general examination of the MAAGs during the early 
years of the Cold War, approximately 1945 to 1965.  It uses case studies of numerous 
MAAG missions around the world to demonstrate what the advisors did in the field, how 
they interacted with foreign militaries and governments, and how their actions 
contributed to United States strategy and foreign policy.  It explores the individual and 
collective experiences of MAAG personnel, providing new insight into a unique 
community of “global” Americans who perceived, interacted with, and were influenced 
by foreign cultures.  It also examines the selection, training, and education of American 
advisors, and how those advisors reflected on their experiences and suggested changes to 
the system.  
Previous studies of US military assistance fall into two categories: general works 
that discuss military assistance as an element of American foreign policy, and case 
studies of individual advisory groups.  In the first group is Chester J. Pach’s Arming the 
Free World,  a survey of US military aid in the early years of the Cold War from the 
perspective of Washington.  Pach argued that fear of communist expansion influenced 
US aid, which primarily intended to hold up the morale of allied countries under the 
threat of communist uprisings and/or invasions.  This made the “giving of military aid 
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more important than the specific purposes to which the aid was put.”  Furthermore, 
military assistance was useful for “preparing for a possible war, securing customers for 
American armaments industries, checking the spread of Soviet influence, and cultivating 
foreign goodwill.”4    Lawrence S. Kaplan’s A Community of Interests examined the 
critical role of military assistance in the development of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.5  In the case of Vietnam, Kathryn Statler’s Replacing France, Mark 
Atwood Lawrence’s Assuming the Burden, and Seth Jacobs’ Cold War Mandarin all 
include examination of the various ways that the United States used military assistance 
to support the French and Republic of Vietnam.6  William H. Mott’s two-part study of 
US military assistance abroad assessed what made particular missions successful and 
others not.7  References to other important studies regarding aid to Iran, Turkey, 
Ethiopia, Thailand, and elsewhere are addressed in relevant chapters later in this work.  
Books such as Donald Stoker’s Military Advising and Assistance and Louis A. Picard’s 
and Terry F. Buss’s A Fragile Balance provide overviews of military assistance and 
4 Chester J. Pach, Arming the Free World (Chapel Hill: the University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 5 
and 230. 
5 Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951 
(Washginton, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1980). 
6 Seth Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950-
1963 (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006); Mark Atwood Lawrence, Assuming the 
Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 2005); Kathryn Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam 
(Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2007).  
7 William H. Mott IV, United States Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1999) and United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 2002).  
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individual studies of missions throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.8  Robert Ramsey’s 
Advising Indigenous Forces examines general aspects of advising during American 
involvement in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.9  
There are relatively few major works on specific MAAG operations.  Ronald 
Spector’s Advise and Support covered American military assistance to both the French 
and the South Vietnamese governments, concluding it failed because of the Republic of 
Vietnam’s dysfunction.  In Rearming the Phoenix, Andrew Birtle studied the American 
effort to rebuild the West German army in the mid-1950s.  The mission was mired in 
political difficulty, but the Americans succeeded in supplying the Bundeswehr with 
enough weaponry and equipment to make it a viable force.  Bryan Gibby’s The Will to 
Win is an account of the Korean Military Advisory Group’s (KMAG) efforts to train and 
develop the Republic of Korea Army during the 1950-1953 war.  Gibby made used 
KMAG’s records to argue the success of the Republic of Korea’s armed forces on the 
battlefield was crucial to the survival of the Republic of Korea, and the Americans in 
KMAG were central in training those armed forces.  
8 Picard, Louis A. and Terry F Buss. A Fragile Balance: Re-examining the History of Foreign Aid, 
Security, and Diplomacy (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 2009) and Donald Stoker, ed., Military 
Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007 (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
9 Robert D. Ramsey III, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). 
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Therefore, the relationship between KMAG and the Korean forces was of enormous 
importance in the history of the Korean War.10   
 This dissertation argues that the military assistance advisory groups played an 
important role during the Cold War.  For almost two decades, they managed the delivery 
of billions of dollars of equipment to foreign allies.   They trained combat and support 
troops in dozens of nations and provided strategic, operational, and even tactical 
guidance to several allies at war, in Greece, Korea and Vietnam.  The army, marine 
corps, navy, and air force committed thousands of officers to the advisory effort, during 
a time when all the services experienced enormous change and technical challenges.  
The study also shows the human side of the advisory mission: how the advisors were 
trained, what they thought of their place in the Cold War, and their personal experiences 
as guests in foreign lands and trainers of foreign soldiers.   
Overall, the dissertation demonstrates that the advisory groups, for a variety of 
reasons, had limited success in training and equipping allies of the United States.  This 
was in part due to the limitations of military assistance.  Regardless of how hard advisors 
worked, they could only achieve so much with the limited resources of military 
assistance and the defense budgets of client nations.  But some of the failures were due 
to the advisors themselves, who emphasized training that reflected American military 
traditions inappropriate to the client nation. The MAAGs trained allied forces to use 
                                                 
10 Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years: The U.S. Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: 
Center for Military History Publishing, 1983); Andrew J. Birtle, Rearming the Phoenix: US Military 
Assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950-1960 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1991); Bryan 
R. Gibby, The Will to Win: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1946-1953 (Tuscaloosa: The University 
of Alabama Press, 2012).  
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heavy weapons, mechanized transportation, and jet aircraft.  Such a techno-centric style 
of warfare was very difficult for economically poorer and undereducated forces, 
especially in the Third World, to adopt.  Some American advisors, like General James A. 
Van Fleet, argued that the US should have provided training and assistance suited to 
their allies’ inherent strengths, but such advisors were an exception to the rule. 
Including this introduction, the dissertation is organized into six chapters.  
Chapter Two examines the origins of the military assistance program, which began with 
aid to Greece in 1947.  It shows that military assistance started as an ad hoc measure and 
remained a confused system, relying on yearly budget allocations and the coordination 
of several departments of the US government.  It argues that the goals of assistance—
self sufficient allied militaries, capable of managing their own forces without significant 
US support—greatly exceeded the limited means of assistance.  The chapter also 
examines how the services assigned and trained officers and enlisted men for advisory 
work, and what some of those officers thought of the advisory effort.  Until 1958, there 
was not a formal school for training advisors.  Nevertheless, the advisors saw themselves 
as important parts of the Cold War effort and as effective trainers. 
Chapter 3 examines the MAAGs in Europe, from 1947 to 1960, showing that the 
advisors worked with allied forces to improve their tactical and logistical abilities and 
better contribute to the defense of Europe.  The chapter uses case studies of Greece, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, and some additional material on France and Germany, 
to illustrate MAAG activities, successes, and failures.   Ultimately, the advisory effort in 
Europe was a partial success.  Limitations to the assistance budget, and the failure of 
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European countries to commit more resources to their defense, prevented the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization from contributing as many divisions and air wings to 
European defense as originally planned.  However, the quality of the European forces 
improved, in part due to the training done by the MAAGs. 
Chapter 4 studies advisory missions in the non-European “Third World,” with 
examination of aid to Turkey, Iran, Libya, Ethiopia, the Republic of China (Taiwan), 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand.  Whereas military assistance in Europe 
primarily intended to deter Soviet aggression, assistance in the Third World also 
included security against internal revolt.  The United States committed less military 
assistance to the Third World than to Europe, but advisory groups still worked in large, 
important missions.  In most of the Third World countries, the advisors tried to create 
“little American armies” of heavily armed, mechanized troops, but this decision made 
those forces unable to support themselves without major US assistance.  Many advisors 
worried that Third World armed forces were too involved in their nations’ domestic 
politics.  
Chapter 5 discusses the advisory mission to Vietnam, beginning with the First 
Indochina War (1946-1954), when MAAG Indochina primarily oversaw logistical 
support for the French.  It then shifts to the advisory mission for the Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN).  It shows that from 1950 nearly through to the introduction of US 
combat forces in 1965, the American advisors were highly optimistic of first France, and 
then the Republic of Vietnam’s, ability to defeat communist forces.  The advisors 
emphasized conventional warfare and only belatedly attempted training the Vietnamese 
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to defeat the communist insurgency in the south.  However, the chapter also shows that 
not all the American advisors were committed to the conventional model, and that some 
argued for drastic change to the ARVN even before the rise of the communist insurgents.  
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion. 
This work makes use of several terms.  It generally refers to the advisory groups 
as “MAAGs,” though the exact titles varied from nation to nation.  “Military assistance” 
refers to the myriad of programs which provided military hardware, low-interest loans, 
or grants to allied countries to improve their defensive abilities and internal security.  It 
uses the inexact term “Third World” to collectively refer to countries outside of Europe, 
the United States, and the Soviet Union.  
This dissertation relies heavily on primary sources from several archives.  The 
National Archives in College Park, MD Record Group 334, Records of Interservice 
Agencies, include monthly activity reports, compiled by the army, navy, and air force 
members of each MAAG, and MAAG yearly summaries, often written by unit 
historians.  The Muir S. Fairchild Research Center and the Air Force Historical Research 
Agency, at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, AL, include the papers of Major 
General August Kissner, who served as MAAG Spain’s commander from 1953 to 1958.  
The archives there also include papers written by Air Force students with insight on 
military advising.  The US Army Heritage and Education Center and Military History 
Institute at Carlisle, PA, possesses a wealth of primary documents about the armed 
forces generally and the army specifically.  This work uses many of the archive’s student 
papers and several collections of personal papers.  Lastly, the dissertation uses the 
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General James A. Van Fleet Papers from the George C. Marshall Research Library, at 
the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, VA.  Van Fleet led the advisory mission to 
Greece, commanded United Nations forces in Korea (and thus oversaw KMAG), and, 
after retirement, conducted a review of advisory missions in East Asia on behest of 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower.  
Since the September 11th attacks in 2001, the United States has embarked on a 
variety of training and advisory missions around the world.  Modern training and 
assistance missions remain thorny affairs, full of difficulties that require subtle action by 
advisors and policy makers alike. A study of how the United States has carried out such 
missions in the past—looking closely at failures and successes—can provide both 
warnings and guidance for how modern advising missions should behave. 
This work offers a new examination of American military effort in the Cold War.  
It demonstrates that though the MAAGs worked within the restrictions of military 
assistance, which provided limited funds to achieve large objectives, they still shaped 
foreign militaries, sometimes modelling themselves off the American example in 
organization, tactics, management techniques, and professional and cultural demeanor.  
They prompted creative thinking within the military education apparatus.  They offer a 
valuable source for how US military personnel viewed and interacted with other nations 
and cultures, showing how advisors were strongly anti-communist, genuinely believed in 
the superiority of their own military procedures and standards, and considered 
themselves an important part of US security.  
13 
CHAPTER II 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE, ADVISORY GROUPS, AND TRAINING 
The United States began a decades long program of support for allied armed 
forces when it extended military aid to Turkey and Greece in 1947.  The formal 
apparatus of military assistance was a confused, changing system that relied upon yearly 
budget allocations and coordination between the Office of the President, the 
Departments of Defense and State and the leaders of the uniformed services, as well as 
the actions and decisions of foreign governments.  How the advisory groups were 
organized and trained reflected the disorganized nature of the entire program.  The 
services assigned officers and enlisted men to the advisory groups without much firm 
criteria.  The MAAGs did not always have clear guidance from Washington’s 
policymakers and strategists.  Until 1958, there was not even a formal school for training 
advisors.  The armed services never created a specific training course or military 
occupation specialty for the advisor, outside of some special courses intended for 
Vietnam, even though all the services were involved with the MAAGs for over twenty 
years.  
This introductory chapter examines the general background of military assistance 
during the first two decades of the Cold War.  It also provides a description of the 
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MAAGs, showing how a typical advisory group was organized and how it conducted its 
activities.  The bulk of the chapter examines the training and selection of American 
advisors, and argues that the advisors perceived their mission as an important part of US 
strategy and themselves as both capable trainers and exporters of American ideals. 
THE COLD WAR, THE ARMED FORCES, AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE 
Following the defeat of Germany in 1945, relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union deteriorated rapidly.  American policy makers, influenced by dire 
intelligence reports, perceived the Soviet Union as an aggressive state interested not in 
territorial expansion and exporting international communism.  The Soviets maintained 
strong military forces in East Germany and elsewhere.  War-torn Europe and Asia 
appeared vulnerable to Soviet attack and internal, communist-led upheaval.  It seemed 
that the United States helped defeat fascism only to face an even greater threat of 
communism. 
From the end of World War II through the early 1960s, US foreign policy dealt 
with the perceived threat of the Soviet Union in a multitude of ways.  President Harry S. 
Truman established precedents during his administration that later presidents followed 
with modification.  The “Truman Doctrine” accepted that it was too dangerous to try and 
oust communism from where it already existed, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  
US strategy would instead concentrate on preventing communism from spreading.  This 
eventually evolved into the strategy of containment.  Before the open hostilities of the 
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Korean War, Truman hoped to achieve this mainly through military and economic 
assistance, which would stabilize and strengthen those nations threatened by Soviet 
attack or communist infiltration.  By the end of the 1940s, President Truman also began 
strengthening US forces in in West Germany, to deter Soviet aggression, and responded 
with significant force to the invasion of South Korea in 1950.  President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower continued the policy of containment and added to it massive retaliation, 
essentially hoping to deter the Soviets from aggressive activity by threatening them with 
nuclear annihilation.  Critics argued that massive retaliation was an inflexible strategy 
which did little to prevent smaller threats and did not remove the need for deployment of 
US troops in Japan, South Korea, West Germany, and elsewhere.  Eisenhower kept 
military assistance as a method to combat communism, expanding support from Europe 
to Asia and the Middle East.  President John F. Kennedy inherited Eisenhower’s nuclear 
arsenal but increased spending on conventional forces and replaced much of military 
assistance with economic assistance.  Major assistance continued to Southeast Asia, 
however, where the US entangled itself well into the 1970s.1 
Just as American foreign policy went through considerable changes during the 
Cold War, so too did the armed services.  The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and newly 
independent Air Force all experienced budgetary tumult, changing missions, and 
1 Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold 
War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look 
National Security Policy, 1953-1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold 
War:  A New History  (New York: Penguin, 2006); Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: 
National Security , the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1993); and Arnold A. Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-
1953 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
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overseas commitments.  In the immediate post war, the defense budget fell dramatically 
and demobilization reduced the vast World War II military to a fraction of its former 
size.  Budgets and manpower ceilings increased during the crisis of the Korean War, as 
the Truman administration bolstered conventional forces.  Defense dollars shifted again 
during the Eisenhower presidency, as the fiscal conservative emphasized nuclear 
weaponry over conventional forces.  
While budgets fluctuated so too did missions.  The air force became the primary 
striking force, with intercontinental nuclear-armed bombers intended to destroy military 
and civilian targets in the Soviet Union.  The navy also developed strike ability, 
developing atomic-powered submarines armed with nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles.  
Even the army fixed atomic warheads to missiles and artillery.  The army and marines, 
concerned throughout the 1950s that they were to become security guards for nuclear 
weapon bases, fought in Korea, deployed to Lebanon, and formed the 7th Army in West 
Germany.  All the services shared security duties around the world, in Taiwan, Japan, 
South Korea, Western Europe, far flung Pacific bases, and the continental United 
States.2 
Throughout these years of crisis and change, military assistance remained a 
consistent feature of American Cold War strategy.  The first assistance occurred in 1947, 
2 Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The US Army in Europe, 1951-1962  (Washington, DC: Center of 
Military History, 2015);   Robert Futrell Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the 
United States Air Force, 1907-1964, vol. 1 (Montgomery, AL: Air University, 1971);  Brian Linn, The 
Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Allan R. 
Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United 
States, 1607-2012 (New York: Free Press, 2012); and Ingo Trauchweizer, The Cold War Army: Building 
Deterrence for Limited War (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2008).  
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when Congress appropriated $400 million for Greece and Turkey, which the Americans 
feared was also under threat.3   Aid later spread to the Republic of China and Iran to deal 
with specific threats, and then to Western Europe and finally the rest of Middle East and 
Asia.  The support had great symbolic value, serving as proof to allies that Washington 
would act to ensure their security.  Allies often reciprocated with base rights for US 
forces and general guarantees of alliance and support in the case of general war.  A 
major objective of military assistance was improving American security without directly 
committing American troops.  This was in part due to the terrible state of the armed 
forces in the late 1940s.  Rapid demobilization after WWII left the army and marines 
with only a dozen understrength divisions.  The navy shrank from an 8,000-ship 
behemoth to a fleet of barely a thousand vessels.  Even the newly-independent air force 
had been trimmed to less than forty aircraft groups (from 218 in 1945), only a few of 
those B-29s capable of delivering atomic bombs.4  Improving allies’ strength could 
indirectly increase American security, without the need for major US mobilization.  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) led military assistance planning.  It took 
approximately twenty to twenty four months of planning, debate, and analysis for them 
to submit their recommendations on military aid.  These recommendations went up the 
chain to the secretary of defense, then to the President (also advised by the State 
3 Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1947-1949, vol. 2, History of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 1996), 34 and 11. 
4 Condit, Joint Chiefs, vol. 2, 11.  A “group” was 40-60 aircraft and a division 15-20,000 troops. 
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Department), and finally to congress.5  Congress never approved long term aid packages; 
all were done in yearly increments.  In 1948, the Joint Chiefs prioritized the intended 
recipients of military assistance.  The Low Countries, France, and Britain were “Priority 
1,” with “Substantial” help.  Other European countries, including Greece, Italy, and 
Denmark, were Priority 2 or 3, with “Limited” aid.  Turkey was Priority 2, but other 
Middle Eastern and Asian countries, including Iran, Pakistan, and the Republic of China, 
were Priority 4 and 5. The only Latin American countries to make this list were Mexico 
and Brazil, at Priority 6.6    
After providing aid to Greece and Turkey, President Truman began work on a 
much larger assistance package for Western Europe.  After months of deliberation and 
several rounds of debate and voting, congress passed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act 
of 1949, appropriating $1.314 billion, the significant majority for Western Europe.  The 
remainder went to Greece, Turkey, Iran, South Korea, the Republic of China, and the 
Philippines. However, military planners considered even this amount of money 
insufficient to arm Europe.  Original plans, developed before the passage of the bill, 
were revised.  Service chiefs cut over $100 million in weapons, supplies, and equipment 
intended for NATO to fit the new budget. 7  At no point in the Cold War did military 
assistance receive the budget that the JCS believed it needed.  The president and 
secretary of defense trimmed from the JCS estimates, and congress cut further from that.  
5 Kenneth W. Condit, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955-1956,  vol. 6, History of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 1998), 241. 
6 Condit, Joint Chiefs, vol. 2, 221. 
7 Condit, Joint Chiefs, vol. 2, 232 and 234. 
19 
As will be seen in the coming chapters, funding available for military assistance had 
significant effect on the advisory missions. 
US policy makers believed that the Korean War was a sign that the Soviet Union 
could soon attack the West, President Truman requested additional assistance dollars.  
Congress approved an additional $4 billion, again overwhelmingly destined for Western 
Europe. Assistance climbed again when 1951 the legislature appropriated $5.788 billion 
for military aid in 1951: $4.818 billion to Western Europe, $396 million to the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, $535 million to the Far East (including French 
Indochina, the Republic of China, and Republic of Korea), and a little over $38 million 
to Latin America.8  All of these quantities were still significantly below the suggestions 
of military planners.  
The spike in assistance spending did not continue, however.  In 1952, 
congressional leaders, who had recovered from the shock of the Korean invasion and 
were frustrated by more requests for elevated aid deliveries, cut military assistance from 
the administration’s request of $5.3 billion to $4.2 billion.9  This reduction came at the 
exact time that European nations stalled in their own military armament and expansion, 
as will be shown in Chapter 3.  The changing opinions of congress and the budgetary 
process made long-term assistance planning difficult.  Funding fluctuated for the rest of 
the decade, falling precipitously in FY 1955 and 1956 but increasing slightly by the end 
8
 Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950-1952, vol. 4, History of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 1998), 25 and 45. 
9
 Poole, Joint Chiefs, vol. 4, 61. 
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of the decade: $3.23 billion in Fiscal Year 1954, $1.19 billion in 1955, $1.02 billion in 
1956, and $2.01 billion in 1957.10  The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed these numbers 
were entirely too low to meet the security needs of US partners, but did not propose 
reductions to their own services’ budgets to compensate. 
The assistance budgets were small compared to US expenditures on its own 
armed forces.  The total US defense budget in Fiscal Year 1948 was to be $9.757 billion, 
much greater than any single year of military assistance spending.11  The Korean War 
greatly increased US spending, as the armed forces fought on the peninsula and 
reinforced positions in Europe.  Congress approved a defense budget for Fiscal Year 
1952 of over $60 billion.  For military assistance, FY-1952 saw only $5.18 billion.12  
During the relatively lean years of the Eisenhower administration, defense spending still 
far outstripped assistance funding.  Congress appropriated a defense budget in FY 1959 
of over $39 billion, and foreign military assistance of $1.5 billion.13  Throughout the 
period in question, aid to Latin America was dwarfed by aid to Europe and Asia.  FY 
1952, the largest single year of military assistance, saw almost $6 billion overall but only 
$38 million to Latin America.  By FY 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that all 
10 Condit, Joint Chiefs, vol. 6, 239. 
11 Condit, Joint Chiefs, vol. 2, 34 and 11. 
12
 Poole, Joint Chiefs, vol. 4, 72. 
13 Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1957-1960,  vol. 
7, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 2000), 36 and 73. 
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of Latin America receive $28.7 million.  By comparison, the JCS suggested that 
Denmark receive $38.9 million, and the Netherlands $131.6 million.14 
Though small relative to the defense budget, assistance spending represented 
considerable financial commitment.  Monetary data from the 1940s and 1950s puts 
billion-dollar assistance budgets in perspective.  In 1957, a one-family house in 
Washington, D.C. cost $12,309 in 1947.15  An F-84 fighter jet, a common aircraft 
delivered to allies, cost $212,241 each in 1950.16   
By the time John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, military assistance was 
drawing to a close.  Kennedy argued that international security could be better preserved, 
and US alliances strengthened, by economic and civic aid rather than military aid.  
Military assistance continued at low levels during his time in office, falling to $1.6 
billion in FY 1962 and $1.3 billion in FY 1963.  Furthermore, the assistance budgets for 
some missions, including the Republic of Vietnam, were actually transferred to the 
defense budget. Only in Latin America did Kennedy’s administration increase assistance 
spending, to $55 million, a paltry number compared to other missions. 17 
This spending, however truncated, did ship immense amounts of weaponry to allied 
nations.  For example, by 31 January 1953 American military assistance provided 
14 Condit, Joint Chiefs, vol. 6, 264. 
15 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1960), 166, 168, and 395. 
16 Marcelle S. Knaack, Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems, vol. 1 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978), 31. 
17 Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964, vol. 8, History of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 2011), 219-220, 224, and 228. 
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6,023,410 tons of materiel to its allies, including 22,232 tanks and combat vehicles, 
21,487 pieces of artillery, and 3,211 aircraft.18  This weaponry and equipment bolstered 
allies, whose strength US leaders considered vital.  Allies had practical and symbolic 
value.  They added divisions to fight the Soviets and providing bases for American 
forces, and provided markets to US businesses and added prestige to the American 
cause.  Washington could point to their collection of allies as evidence that their system 
was superior.19  President Truman considered rearmament of European allies important 
enough that he pushed military assistance during an election year, even when he faced a 
greatly strengthened Republican party in congress.  Eisenhower also believed in aid’s 
importance, saying early in his presidency that many American allies, in Europe and 
elsewhere, “‘would certainly have gone Communist had it not been for the money we 
had spent on them in recent years.’”20 
The officers, enlisted men, and civilian employees of the military assistance 
advisory groups oversaw the delivery of this aid and trained allied forces in its use.  
They hoped to not only train allied forces to fight more like Americans, with an 
emphasis on mechanized warfare and efficient logistics, but also wanted to impart to 
those allies American ideals of apolitical military professionalism.  The remainder of this 
chapter examines the general organization and objectives of the military assistance 
18
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the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001), 492. 
23 
advisory groups (MAAGs), how they were trained, and how their members perceived 
their mission and their place within greater US Cold War strategy. 
A TYPICAL MAAG: ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES 
Military assistance advisory groups varied in size, but were typically about fifty 
officers and men, predominantly from the US Army, led by a brigadier or major general, 
usually titled the “chief.”  Most MAAGs were small outfits.  In December 1949, the 
group in Iran had fifty five men, mostly officers.21  In May 1950, MAAG-Denmark had 
thirty eight officers and enlisted, and MAAG-Italy had forty-two.22  Advisory groups 
were headquartered in the ally’s capital city, so that it could be near both the US 
embassy and the host nations’ armed forces headquarters.  Most personnel served a tour 
of one or two years, though chiefs sometimes stayed longer.  MAAGs occasionally 
expanded for a specialized task, such as an accelerated training program. 
The MAAG chief played numerous roles.  He was head advisor to the host 
nation’s military leadership and liaised between them and the military assistance 
apparatus.  He acted as a diplomat, conducting interviews with host nation politicians 
21
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and journalists, and attended significant cultural events and social gatherings.  He also 
led the advisory group’s training of foreign personnel and oversight of incoming 
assistance materiel.  The exact rank of a MAAG chief depended on both the size of the 
group and the relative political importance of the advisory mission.  The MAAG chief to 
France was a lieutenant general; the chief to Ethiopia, on the other hand, was only a 
colonel.  In instances where aid was primarily for the development of an air force, the 
chief was an air force general instead of an army general.  Few groups were led by 
admirals, and fewer still by marine corps generals. 
The advisors themselves were mostly officers and senior noncommissioned 
officers.  The MAAGs tried to assign advisors of roughly equal rank to their 
counterparts.  Therefore, advisors who acted as instructors to enlisted men or 
noncommissioned officers were themselves senior noncommissioned officers; advisors 
assigned to battalion commanders were typically a major or colonel; and so on.  MAAG 
units had many more officers than enlisted men.  
Advisors had heavy workloads and busy schedules.  They visited units in the 
field and led instruction at host military schools, met with their foreign counterparts for 
one-on-one consultation and discussion, and managed huge deliveries of military aid.  
Some missions, like in Turkey and Iran, required long distance travel by air or jeep, to 
train or inspect units at far flung bases.  In these situations, the traveling alone could 
consume entire work days.   One researcher noted, in 1965, that “at any given time, the 
American advisor can be a simple purveyor of technical advice in country or a complex 
soldier-statesman-psychologist figure in another, depending on the conditions.”  Even 
25 
being a “simpler purveyor of technical advice” could prove difficult in developing 
countries, when trying to teach “jet age mechanics to offspring of an ox cart 
civilization.” 23  
A MAAG’s most important objective was to try and create self-sufficiency in the 
allied force.  Guidelines issued by the United States European Command in Germany 
ordered them to direct all their actions toward “practicable assumption of the full burden 
of defense by the host country upon the withdrawal of the MAAG and the termination of 
United States grant aid.”24  MAAG reports regularly mentioned how much their host 
nation contributed to defense, and how far the armed forces were from no longer needing 
major US support.  Self sufficiency was a major US objective, but few aid recipients 
ever achieved it, in part because of the limited budgets for military assistance.  The 
advisors also wanted host nation armed forces to adopt American practices and standards 
of maintenance and logistics.  This was a difficult mission, as few of the world’s 
militaries placed as much emphasis on these factors as did the US.  In most missions, 
battlefield proficiency came third.  The job was complex and demanding, and US 
advisors themselves had relatively little training to accomplish their multifaceted 
missions. 
23
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AD HOC ADVISORS 
Before 1958, the armed forces lacked formal advisory training.  The services 
selected officers for MAAG missions based mainly on availability and assumed that 
professional experience in mobilization, training, and combat served as sufficient 
advisory training.  In the large scale assistance build-ups of the late 1940s and early 
1950s, this ad hoc system worked well enough, thanks in part to the considerable 
military experience of US officers.  One MAAG officer thought that Americans had an 
“aura of invincibility” after two victorious wars which allied militaries respected.25   
Officer selection for MAAG duty was theoretically rigorous.  They could only be 
assigned if they had an unblemished personal record, had never been passed over for 
promotion because they were “not fully qualified,” and were well-educated and 
physically healthy.  The Department of Defense instructed that offices were not to be 
assigned to MAAG as their last tour before retirement, to ensure the selection of 
younger, more vibrant officers, and so that an advisor would not retire on the job.26  
Enlisted men, who primarily performed administrative tasks in the advisory groups, 
needed to be of top quality to handle the enormous office workloads.  One advisorwrote 
in 1960 that MAAG personnel should also be morally upstanding.  Living overseas, 
often without dependents, provided many “opportunities for such practices as immoral 
25
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living and black marketing,” especially in “certain less developed countries.”  To resist 
these temptations, American soldiers needed “temperate and acceptable moral 
standards.”27 
The actual work of advising often required direct training of the host nation’s 
armed forces, preferably by demonstration and example rather than classroom 
instruction.  Major General Lawrence Dewey, chief of the Turkish advisory group in the 
late 1950s, believed that the improvements were made because “my people got out there 
with the Turks and showed them how to do it, showed them what Command Control and 
Staff Supervision was. . . . all the words and pamphlets and papers don’t do any good.”  
Convincing senior officers to use American techniques was the key: “until you sell the 
man at the top; and he has become convinced that that is the right thing to do, all the 
brains and drive and initiative on the part of the small fry do not do any good.”28 
Advisory work was time-consuming and difficult.  One officer, from MAAG-
Vietnam, wrote that “the scope of the advisor’s mission is broad and covers all aspects 
of military operations from the finite detail of administration to the broad tactical 
concept.”  He worked long hours with few breaks, “under little or no command 
supervision,” and in rugged physical conditions.  The advisor interacted with people of a 
different culture, whose outlook and attitude could be much different than an 
American’s.  Such an environment demanded “initiative, self-sufficiency, tact, patience, 
27
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emotional stability, determination, and above all professional military competence.”29 
MAAG competed with other high priority missions to get the kind of officers who could 
fit this high standard. 
Most officers had little or no specialized advisory training when they arrived in 
country.  The majority of advisor training occurred “on the job” and from pamphlets and 
books at the MAAG unit.  Advisors serving with MAAG-Vietnam in the early 1960s 
read “Guidelines for Advisors: Professional Duties and Interests,” which listed many of 
their duties and expectations.  The booklet’s instructions were representative of MAAGs 
around the world.  Beginning with a reminder that the Americans were only advisors and 
had no command authority over the Vietnamese, it urged advisors to spend as much time 
as possible with their units, to respect their customs and culture, and to inspire “initiative 
and inventiveness.”  The advisor was to encourage unit and equipment inspections, take 
note of significant events, and keep records so that later advisors could take advantage of 
their predecessor’s experience, all without appearing arrogant or stepping on the toes of 
a Vietnamese officer.  Advisors should let their counterpart take credit for ideas 
suggested by the advisor. “Always exercise patience in all your dealings with your 
Vietnamese counterpart,” the booklet urged.  “Never expect the job to be done at the 
snap of a finger—and don’t snap your finger.”  Even in poorly managed units, 
Americans should find something to praise, and only criticize in private.  Though the 
booklet mentioned Asian face saving and other “oriental” habits, it also noted that 
“Vietnamese desire appreciation, recognition, and understanding; they seek security and 
29 Norman H. Bykerk,  “MAAG Vietnam—Manacled by Geneva,” 1958, AWCSP, USAHEC. 
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attention; they like to feel important, like to contribute, and like to belong.  In brief, they 
react to these things just as you do.”30 
FORMAL TRAINING OF ADVISORS: THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE INSTITUTE 
The hectic first decade of military assistance, without formal training of advisors 
and uneven personnel selection, resulted by the mid 1950s in a program of assistance 
that varied enormously from country to country, not only in the types of aid administered 
but also in the basic procedures of advising and assistance.  This made it more difficult 
to measure progress and created turn-over problems, not to mention effects on the 
quality of advising.  When officers’ tours ended, they were replaced by new personnel 
unfamiliar with the program’s setup.  Many MAAG personnel also seemed unaware of 
their mission’s political context and its importance to overall American policy. 
The Department of Defense began research on an advisors’ school in 1957 in an 
effort to resolve the problems of inconsistent advisor training.  In November of that year, 
the Department of the Army, tasked with administering the project, contacted retired 
Brigadier General Henry C. Newton to act as a consultant for the school’s creation.  
During his army career, the Illinois general commanded five schools—the Armor Force 
Officer School, the Army Intelligence School, the Armored School, and two institutions 
in postwar Germany—and was widely respected as a military educator.31 
30
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Newton led an exhaustive study, conducting interviews of perspective instructors 
and other experts for four months.  He coordinated the writing of instructional material, 
worked with the three services to determine a yearly student load, contacted civilian 
academics and specialists, and visited numerous military schools and public universities.  
One of Newton’s major decisions was who would actually operate the school.  Because 
it would be used by all the services, it would be difficult to convince any one service to 
operate the facilities and pay the instructors.  Public universities, with lengthy winter and 
summer vacations, did not fit the rhythm of the school’s projected monthly training 
cycle, with classes coming and going year round.  Newton and his superiors chose the 
private think tank American Institute for Research (AIR).  The AIR itself studied 
MAAG operations, had research contracts with the Department of Defense, and its 
offices were near Washington, DC.32 
General Newton, with the help of AIR, created the Military Assistance Institute 
(MAI).  The school officially opened on 2 September, 1958, after months of heavy 
preparation.  Newton and his team worked 12-14 hour days to get the school operational, 
and he described it as “the most time consuming and tiring operation I had ever 
participated in. . . . [I] remarked many times, that [I] would far rather be ‘jumping off in 
an attack’ in combat than what I have been doing.”  He was proud of the work he and his 
32
 “Statement of Brigadier General Henry C. Newton, USAR (RET), Director of the Military Assistance 
Institute, Before the House of Representatives Committee on Post Office and Civil Service Subcommittee 
on Manpower Utilization,” Box 7, Newton Papers, USAHEC. 
31 
“well-knit, dedicated group” had accomplished, and believed they contributed to 
America’s Cold War effort.33 
The school, using office space in the Washington Building of the Arlington 
Towers in Virginia, operated ten classes per fiscal year, with roughly one hundred 
students per class.  Slots in the courses were divided between the services—fifty five for 
the army (who had the largest presence in MAAG missions), fifteen for the navy and 
marine corps, and thirty for the air force.  Slots were sometimes made available to other 
government institutions.  Eleven faculty members, a mix of soldiers and AIR civilians, 
taught the classes.34  Though many considered the MAI an effective institution, it was 
never used as a training center for all advisors.  During the MAI’s operations from 1958 
to 1968, approximately 9,000 advisors completed course work at the institute.35  That 
number was spread over a decade, with less than a thousand graduates annually, and 
represented only a fraction of all advisors.  For example, in December 1958 alone, there 
were more than 7,000 Americans assigned to various MAAG missions around the world, 
a number that remained fairly level into the 1960s (aside from increases in Vietnam).  
The relatively slow rate of graduation, with only a hundred students a month, would 
never have fully trained all the advisors necessary to fill MAAG units.  Nevertheless, 
MAAG officers generally considered the MAI a boon to the advisory mission.  Colonel 
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John Erickson urged that all advisers heading for duty in Vietnam be MAI graduates.36  
Artillery Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Ferguson, writing only a year after the school first 
launched, suggested that the school be expanded so that all MAAG personnel could 
attend.37  Lieutenant Colonel Clayton H. Moore, a Vietnam MAAG advisor, considered 
the school excellent and believed it greatly improved the quality of US advisors.38 
The month-long course at MAI was broken into four parts.  Instructors devoted 
week one to “absorption of factual material,” such as the historical background of MAP 
and the threat of global communism.  Week two featured “Instruction in Advisor 
techniques.”  Week three looked at the organizational and logistical difficulties of “grant 
aid planning,” the analysis and paperwork required to plan US shipments to foreign 
militaries.  The fourth week saw practical exercises, such as role-play.  Throughout the 
program, students reviewed heavy reading loads and listened to guest lecturers. The 
curriculum avoided language instruction, considering it a “service responsibility.”  MAI 
faculty modified their programs of instruction to keep their material up to date and to fit 
the suggestions made by MAAG personnel who communicated with the school after 
their deployments.39  
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MAI instructors wanted to eliminate “bad advisors,” those who did not take their 
job seriously or acted disrespectfully toward allied military forces and foreign cultures.  
In training aids at MAI and in student papers at the Army War College and the Air 
University, students wrote about their experiences with and around poor advisors. 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Thebaud, an advisor in Vietnam, estimated that five to ten 
percent of American advisors were of low quality and did considerable damage to US 
efforts, by way of unbecoming personal conduct and performing substandard work.  He 
wrote that the US could “ill-afford the luxury of sending misfits to Southeast Asia.”40  
Moore, also an advisor in Vietnam, observed numerous MAAG personnel whose 
abilities he thought were “barely acceptable and their overall contribution to the MAAG 
mission was negligible.”41 
One exercise designed to counter bad advising involved an audio recording of 
fictional Major Lemon, an advisor to “Protonia.”  In the recording, Lemon gives a 
briefing to a new MAAG section chief and makes every possible mistake imaginable for 
an advisor.  He drops racist remarks about the Protonians, is ignorant of their military, 
society, and politics, and says of his direct counterpart: “Since all Protonians look alike 
to me, I didn’t recognize him.”  Major Lemon’s apathy, bigotry, lack of record keeping, 
and complaining in the briefing were all based on advisors’ accounts of poor officers 
40
 Ibid. 
41 Moore, “MAAG Duty.” 
34 
overseas.  After listening to the recording, MAI students were to write down everything 
wrong about it and then discuss with their classmates.42   
Another publication available at MAI quoted former students of the program.  
One warned of “MAAGitis,” in which an advisor lost the desire to improve the allied 
military and instead just tried to maintain the status-quo.  Another suggested of some 
advisors that “their prime interest [appeared] to be ‘The Last Party,’ ‘The Next Party,’ 
and when they are going home.”43 
MAAG officers were aware of the “Ugly American” stereotype, and wrote about 
the need to avoid it overseas.  Lieutenant Colonel Thebaud warned that communist 
propaganda in South Vietnam portrayed Americans as boorish, materialistic, and 
bigoted, and if advisors behaved this way, they would confirm the preconceived notions 
of many Vietnamese.44  One to way to avoid this problem was to mingle with the 
population rather than be isolated in American compounds, which MAAG guides 
country guides and orientation brochures actively encouraged. That Americans clustered 
together in their own compounds was all the more obvious since communist advisors 
were ordered to “eat, work and live with their counterparts.”45   
42 “The MAP Advisor,” 1963, USAHEC.  During the presentation, Major Lemon knocks over his maps, 
and his sergeant cannot figure out the projector. 
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SOLDIER DIPLOMATS 
Nearly everyone involved with the advisory and assistance mission, including 
MAI instructors, emphasized the idea of the soldier diplomat.  To be an effective 
advisor, an American had to be equal parts military professional, patient diplomat, and 
amiable colleague.  A “spirit of friendliness” was necessary.46  Advisors had to be 
extremely careful with their advice.  Though many soldiers in allied nations appreciated 
honesty from their American advisors, and wanted to improve their own military 
capabilities, Americans could not afford to appear arrogant.  Strained relations between 
an advisor and his counterpart could threaten an entire MAAG mission. 
This was a delicate balance to strike.  One essay, by Lieutenant Colonel John R. 
Vitek (formerly an advisor of the Nationalist Chinese and the Thais) instructed MAI 
students to learn their counterpart’s habits and personality because he was “the only 
person who can effectively implement your planned program.”  Americans needed to 
give advice carefully, because it could be construed as implied criticism or even 
arrogance.  Advisors had to develop a strong rapport with their counterpart before real 
advisory work could commence.   Understanding the allied nation’s culture was of 
utmost importance and received heavy attention in MAI coursework: “How do you 
convince a Moslem that it is necessary to plan ahead when it is his belief that ‘Allah will 
provide’?  How do you convince senior military officers in a country where ‘face’ is a 
factor, that it is no disgrace to attend a course of instruction where the instructors are 
46
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junior in rank.”  Vitek suggested, as a common courtesy, that an advisor not visit his 
counterpart’s units without his knowledge, and warned that poor advising would leave 
“bitterness and frustrations” for both parties.47  Another advisor reminded his readers, 
though, that however cordial the advisor’s relationship was with his counterpart the 
advisor must “not close his eyes to [military] deficiencies because of friendship.”48 
An advisor’s role as a soldier-diplomat extended beyond his time training and 
advising.  He had to be on his best behavior represent of the United States at dinner 
parties, state events, and when off-duty.   Advisors were warned against being pulled 
into political arguments with foreign nationals.  MAI students read an essay called “How 
to Get Along with People,” which gave tips for how advisors could face anti-American 
attitudes abroad.  “Don’t argue,” the essay suggested, because a heated argument would 
only serve to make Americans appear impetuous and combative.  Instead of flatly 
disagreeing, an advisor should reply with, “Yes, but . . .” to try and soften the blow of 
his disagreement.  It was also important to try and determine if the critic of US policy 
was trying to draw the advisor into an emotional argument to make a scene.  The essay 
ended with sample discussions, showing advisors possible ways to answer difficult 
questions from foreigners, reminding the advisor that winning the argument was not 
really necessary: “You have accomplished much if you leave the impression that there is 
47
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something in the United States point of view, and that Americans are tolerant, broad-
minded and can get along with people.”49 
Many MAAG officers were both aware of and sensitive to the delicacy of their 
relationship with allied militaries.  Time and again, MAAG personnel and MAI 
instructors repeated the need to be diplomatic with allied forces—suggesting advisors 
commonly failed to do so.  A MAI teaching aid listed important attributes for advisors, 
and almost all of them related to tact: advisors had to understand they could not direct 
action, only advise; that “patience is a mandatory attribute;” to “follow-up, but don’t 
harass” about issues with the counterpart; and to present new ideas as suggestions.50  
Thebaud, writing about Vietnam, noted the need for a “high tolerance for failure and 
frustration” and the ability to retain “buoyance and resourcefulness”.51  Soldier-
diplomacy could continue even after a MAAG officer’s tour ended.  Moore suggested 
that former advisors maintain contact with allied counterparts by letter writing.  This 
could help cement long-term friendships between the United States and its allies.52 
Being a soldier-diplomat also included respect of the local culture and customs.  
Though some advisors were critical of Americans in this regard, it seems that at least in 
Thailand, the MAAG worked to observe national events.  For example, the MAAG 
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observed both US and Thai holidays, including what the Americans called “Buddhist 
Lent” and the King’s birthday.53  In 1958, a MAAG memorandum reminded Americans 
of an official two week mourning period for death of the “head” of Buddhism in 
Thailand, His Holiness Kromluang Vajirananavamsa.   The memo reported that 
Americans could still have dinners together, but they should avoid social events out of 
respect for the fallen patriarch.54 
THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM 
A capable soldier-diplomat’s efforts were meaningless if his interlocutor could 
not understand English.  MAAG personnel agreed that language training or lack thereof 
was extremely important to military assistance and advising.  Some argued, however, 
that it was both infeasible and unnecessary to extensively train American soldiers in 
language and believed that interpreters and native speakers of English were the best 
ways for MAAG personnel to advise and train indigenous forces.  Others proposed a 
major expansion of language training—for the services to expand their language schools, 
for the Department of Defense to pay for personnel to go to universities and private 
institutions for intense instruction, and for such language training to be both mandatory 
and beneficial to an officer’s military career.  
53
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The armed forces’ language problems were due to the historic isolation of US 
forces.  For most of American history, the military’s primary objective had been 
continental defense.  Coupled with a lack of international alliances, this meant there had 
been no professional reason to learn foreign languages.  Language training services 
available to military personnel were quite small.  The US Army Language School, for 
example, trained only 200 officers a year.  Though most officers had experienced some 
language education in college, and Americans generally took language classes in 
secondary school, this education rarely produced fluency, and was limited French, 
Spanish, and German.55  It appears from the historical record if any MAAG officers 
were children of immigrants (or recent immigrants themselves), they did not bring any 
foreign language proficiency with them. 
MAAG personnel almost universally understood language ability as important.  
A learning aid from the Military Assistance Institute claimed language skill as a 
“definite asset.”56  Lieutenant Colonel Moore called American language deficiencies “an 
extreme hindrance and obstacle.”57  An article in Military Review, a journal published by 
the Army’s Command and General Staff College, described language skill as a 
“sidearm.”58  
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Inability to communicate in the host nation’s language restricted MAAG officers 
to either working with English-speaking military counterparts, who were rare outside 
Western Europe, or to working through an interpreter.  Using interpreters was fraught 
with difficultly.  MAAG officers worried about wasted time and lost intent when 
interpreters could not translate an American idiom or misrepresented the advisor’s tone.  
Though a few MAAG officers considered interpreters sufficient, most thought of them 
only as an alternative to no communication—one called interpreters a “poor crutch” best 
fixed by better American language training.59  Some commented on the tendency of 
Asian interpreters to heavily modify the conversation, changing both what the adviser 
and advisee said to “save face” and avoid potential embarrassment.60  
Former MAAG officers proposed a number of measures to improve language 
training.  Some suggested increased enrollment at the service language schools.  Most 
preferred to incentivize language education rather than dictate its requirement, mainly 
through bonuses.  Army engineer William P. Jones suggested financial compensation for 
those who took on the more challenging languages, such as Arabic or Vietnamese, a 
policy followed in the British, Spanish, and Canadian militaries and the Central 
Intelligence Agency.  Though language was more easily learned at a young age, Jones 
suspected that many American officers used their age as an excuse to not learn.  He 
59
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argued that if languages could be “taught successfully to the blind, the insane, and low-
IQ prisoners,” surely they could be taught to middle-aged majors and colonels.  Against 
the argument that a major institution like the army could not abruptly improve its 
language deficiency, he countered that the State Department had faced the same problem 
and greatly alleviated it in only a few years.61  
Some MAAG officers suggested that language training include an adviser’s 
dependents.  “The foreign vocabulary needed by a wife is far different than that required 
of her husband,” wrote Army Lieutenant Colonel Thomas G. Ferguson.  She needed to 
communicate in situations such as hospital trips (for “when her baby is born”), help with 
shopping, directions for domestic help, and “niceties” for entertaining.62  Lieutenant 
Colonel Edward McGregor, whose 1960 paper riffed on The Ugly American, suggested 
the wives of servicemen audit unclassified MAI courses and lectures, because the “pretty 
American” could be an asset to US prestige.63 
Some officers argued against expanded language training.  It was better for locals 
to learn English, argued Colonel Bykerk, because the size of the American military, its 
many international deployments, and the expenses involved in training a MAAG officer 
to speak a foreign language were simply too great.64  The same MAI training aid that 
considered language training “a definite asset” quoted another officer as saying 
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“Language is not necessary, but nice to know.”  Writers often repeated the desire that the 
host country learn English, and that understanding those English speakers was itself a 
challenge.65  This passive attitude served the armed forces in previous years, when the 
locals had “obliged by learning sufficient English.”66   
 
LONGER TOURS, OR A NEW CAREER PATH? 
 
 One way to alleviate the problems of language proficiency and learning the art of 
advising was to extend the length of advisor tours.  Most MAAG tours were one or two 
years long, which many felt was too short.  Bykerk argued that twelve month “hardship” 
tours (without dependents) were, in fact, several weeks shorter than a year, because they 
included the time spent leaving and returning to the continental United States.  He 
suggested not counting those transit times, eliminating the “CONUS to CONUS” effect 
and giving an advisor those extra weeks.67  Another former advisor argued that the “one-
time” system, where most officers only advised once in their career, was a waste of 
training and needed amendment.68  Other advisors went much further, suggesting a three 
year tour with dependents.69   
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Making military advising a career specialty could help many of the advisors’ 
problems.  One writer argued that the limitations of creating the career field, that it 
would tie down capable officers and possibly slow their promotion, was outweighed by 
the importance of the advisory mission.70  Another suggested that only officers with at 
least eight years experience qualify for MAAG positions, and that advising be integrated 
into the career pattern of their branches.71  A writer for Military Review argued that 
being an advisor could improve an officer’s career rather than be an “‘Undesirable Tour 
of Duty.’”  He described advising with the Koreans as a “postgraduate  course” for 
officers, where they could participate in planning, training, and logistical management in 
a way they could not in the US or elsewhere.  The Korean forces were “young, 
impressionable, and receptive” and gave an American officer plenty of opportunity to 
gain valuable military experience.72 
Air Force Lieutenant Colonel John Harris probably went furthest with his 
recommendations.  Harris, who had spent five years with the Spanish and Turkish 
MAAGs, wrote a 1962 thesis about military assistance for the Air University.  The study 
included a section on the “MAP Quasi Career Specialty,” in which Harris proposed 
requirements for advisors.  The services were to only appoint the “very best” officers, 
with at least ten to twelve years of staff and leadership experience.  They would be 
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retained in the advisory specialty for ten years.  Such personnel should be rewarded 
professionally, with rapid advancement and promotion, to encourage other talented 
officers to apply.  Drastic measures were necessary, he argued, because of how hard it 
was to find good advisors, and the types of abilities they needed: “He must be able to 
train, plan, program, instruct and implement the guidance and simultaneously develop 
and maintain amiable personal and professional relations with host country personnel.  
He must be the type of individual that can quickly sense any change in the host country 
atmosphere that could jeopardize the program.”   Indeed, such people must have been 
limited in number, and needed to be carefully husbanded by the program.73 
ANTI-COMMUNISM 
MAAG officers who wrote about their experiences clearly believed in the threat 
of world communism.  “The Military Assisatnce Program is a principal means of 
meeting the Communist challenge,” wrote Moore, “and the Military Assistance 
Advisory Groups are primary operating agencies for the implementation of the overall 
program.”74  MAAG personnel were acutely aware of the similar advisory programs 
conducted by their communist opponents.  Moore worried about the “extra ace” of 
language ability possessed by the enemy in Vietnam, and Colonel Christian Hanburger 
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warned against the danger of communist propaganda in third world countries, where 
most bookstores were “communist run.”  Hanburger also argued that while communist 
training methods were technically and tactically inferior to those used by the US, they 
were much better at indoctrinating Asian units into their cause.75   
MAI instructors trained MAAG personnel on the enemy’s intentions, lecturing 
on communist strategy, tactics, and objectives.  Readings on Communist efforts against 
allied countries and how MAAG personnel should prepare to face these “formidable 
challenges.”76  One assignment, “Notes on Communism,” provided advisors with ready-
made responses to provocative questions about the nature of the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and US strategy.  It presented hypothetical questions which could 
potentially be asked of an American, from a critical and possibly anti-US interlocutor.  
The document presented carefully worded answers that, mostly, were neither 
inflammatory nor apologetic.  The answers presented almost always made some mention 
of American freedoms and economic and scientific prowess, and some denigration of 
communist characteristics.  For example: 
Q: Do Americans really want peace? 
A: We do.  Short of liberty itself, peace is foremost in the minds of all 
Americans. . . . No nation need fear aggression by the United States. . . . 
Q: Why does the US maintain a ring of bases around the Soviet bloc? 
A:  Until the communist-bloc countries can be trusted not to seek 
domination over other peoples, our defense must be as broad as the 
dimensions of that threat. 
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Q: Why are you Americans so afraid of the communists? 
A: ‘Afraid’ is hardly an accurate description.  Americans have never been 
afraid of opposing evil.  We feel that communism is a monstrous, evil 
thing, living on hatred and trying to destroy religion and morality, and the 
high ideals for which mankind has been striving for centuries.77   
These aspects of MAI training emphasized the indoctrination of American 
advisors, to ensure they were aware of US objectives and intentions around the world.  
The advisor selection process did not include indoctrination as a factor.  Potential 
advisors did not have to answer questionnaires about communism or American 
objectives.  Colonel Norman H. Bykerk, who served with MAAG Vietnam, argued in 
1958 that American advisors were not only ignorant of their host country’s history and 
political situation, they were also “almost totally unaware of US interest in the area, the 
magnitude of the money being spent and the responsibility of a MAAG with respect to 
both.”  Some even took on the attitude of occupiers rather than allies.78  Lieutenant 
Colonel Thebaud, an Army advisor in Vietnam, noted that the writings of Vo Nguyen 
Giap, Che Guvera, and Mao Zedong “all stress the importance of exemplary conduct in 
relations with the population.”79   
77 “Notes on Communism,” Box 7, Newton Papers, USAHEC.  The 38-page Q&A collection is a great 
example of American anti-communist thought and would make fantastic reading for undergraduates. 
78 Bykerk, “MAAG Vietnam.” 
79 Thebaud, “MAAG Adviser.” 
47 
CONCLUSION: WORTHY MEN ON A WORTHY MISSION? 
American advisors during the Cold War believed in the efficacy of their mission 
and considered it an important part of US strategy.  At least in the case of the Army War 
College and the Air University, no former MAAG officer expressed doubt that MAAGs 
effectively performed a crucial mission.  They maintained the MAAGs played “a vital 
role in keeping free nations free and keeping them oriented toward the West.”80  Harry 
McNamara, a US Army advisor, argued that military assistance spending was a 
“bargain,” with dollars spent on allied countries generating more security than 
equivalent amounts spent on US forces.  The strategy’s symbolism was important, too.  
Military assistance showed allies that the US was “closely linked” to them, and not 
likely to evaporate at the first sign of trouble.81    
The advisors acknowledged that the system was imperfect, especially with 
American shortcomings in language and the lack of formal advisor training.  Many 
advisors also criticized military assistance budgeting.  Lieutenant Colonel Elmer E. 
Twining argued that the entire strategy of military assistance needed to be redesigned 
and made into a “continuing policy of the United States.”  Unpredictable, annual budgets 
caused confusion and threw off complex training schedules.  An advisory group would 
have to wait to train a tank unit until its vehicles arrived, for example, but needed to send 
its officers to training in the United States or West Germany months before.  This could 
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lead to wasted time if the timing of the officers’ trip or tanks’ arrival was off.  Host 
nations sought prestigious heavy weapons and advanced equipment, like jets and tanks, 
but Twining argued that they really needed more spare parts and basic equipment.  Long 
term budgeting could help solve some of these problems.82 Colonel Perry B. Priest, 
agreeing that that assistance planning was disorganized and slow, argued for three-year 
budgets.  Priest also hoped that the president would provide firmer, clearer leadership on 
assistance programing.83   Lieutenant Colonel John C. Honea also criticized the 
budgetary process.  Congress’s annual renewal of military assistance was a “major 
impediment to obtaining maximum benefits from the program” because it made long-
range defense plans and delivery shipments impossible.  He suggested five year budget 
plans.84   
Many MAAG officers perceived themselves not as managers of aid shipments, 
but as trainers and role models who made a significant contribution to American 
security.  The orientation booklet for the advisory group in the United Kingdom told new 
members of the unit that as a member of the MAAG, “you have a direct role in the effort 
of the United States to maintain and defend world peace.”85   William Dufault, an air 
force officer, argued in 1961 that “no other aspect of military assistance so nearly 
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provides the weapons for the ideological conflict as does the military assistance training 
program.”86  Colonel George D. Patterson believed that military assistance strengthened 
American allies and “contributed to the defense and general welfare of the United 
States.”87  Some advisors considered themselves directly responsible for their allies.  
Bykerk wrote that  a “unit is but a mirror of the advisor’s capabilities,” and quoted 
MAAG-Vietnam Chief General Samuel T. Williams: “‘I can look at a Vietnamese unit 
for ten minutes and be able to determine to a great extent the efficiency and competence 
of the unit advisor.’”88   
The realism of these assertions is questionable, considering the brief tours of 
duty, language problems, and the sheer scale of the American effort.  Advisory groups 
worked to modernize small militaries and make them capable of waging war in the 
American style, with heavy weapons, advanced technology, and resource-intense 
logistics.  They did this will little specialized training, few personnel, and on short 
schedules.  Nevertheless, the advisors believed that with their know-how they could 
accomplish their missions and help improve American and international security during 
the Cold War.  In war-torn Greece, where the national government battled communist 
guerrillas, the MAAGs got their first test.  
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CHAPTER III 
MAAGS IN EUROPE 
Military assistance advisory groups played an important role in United States 
strategy in Europe during the first decade of the Cold War.  In Greece, Lieutenant 
General James A. Van Fleet and the advisory group improved the Greek armed forces 
through training programs and operational and strategic advice.  For members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, including France, Denmark, and the Netherlands, MAAGs 
oversaw aid deliveries, trained Europeans on US equipment, and helped to modernize 
the tactical and logistical capabilities of small states.  The advisors delivered huge 
amounts of aid to the West Germans and imparted to them the American emphasis on 
maintenance and logistics.  In Spain, they helped bring the air force into the jet age.  
Though the NATO nations did not deploy the number of divisions and air wings that war 
plans called for, the improved capabilities of their armed forces raised their morale, 
contributed to deterrence against a Soviet attack, and reduced the need for American 
ground forces in Europe.  The advisors and their training programs contributed to this 
improvement.  However, military assistance to Europe did not remove the perceived 
need for American forces in Europe, nor did it create self-sufficient NATO forces. 
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ASSISTANCE BEGINS IN EUROPE: GREECE 
For economic, geopolitical, and cultural reasons United States foreign and 
defense policy prioritized Western European security.  American policymakers believed 
that an economically sound and militarily safe Europe directly increased US security.  
However, in the years directly after World War II, Europe seemed anything but secure.  
Infrastructure had been shattered by invasions, occupation, and bombing.  Fragile 
economies could not support basic consumer needs, let alone military spending.  
Washington worried that such internal weakness invited infiltration or outright attack by 
the Soviet Union, who held Eastern Europe. The Soviets blocked free elections in Poland 
and consolidated their economic and military grip on Eastern Europe.  A series of war 
scares in 1946 and 1947—over Turkey, Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin supply 
corridor—contributed to dire US intelligence estimates, including George Kennan’s 
“Long Telegram” and NSC-68, which expected aggressive Soviet policies. 89  
Europe appeared threatened by communist parties, especially in France and Italy, 
and open war raged in Greece, where miserable economic and human conditions gave 
communist forces plenty of political fodder.  Despite the massive Marshall Plan, which 
provided huge support to Europe from 1948 to 1952, Europe still appeared in great 
danger.  In 1947, President Harry S. Truman gained Congressional approval to provide 
military aid to nations under supposed threat of communist attack.  This included 
military support of the Greeks, then engaged in a civil war against communist guerrillas.  
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Congress allocated $300 million to Greece alone.  This money included provisions for 
an advisory group and military materiel for Greece.90 
Britain had been the Greek’s benefactor in the aftermath of WWII, and until 
1947, provided the Greek armed forces with materiel and support to fight the 
communists.  However, depleted British resources made it impossible for them to 
continue doing so, as the increasing severity of the insurgency consumed military 
materiel and threatened the fragile, unrecovered nation.  Greek forces, with inadequate 
training and ambivalent leadership, retreated to the major population centers, leaving the 
mountains and rural areas to the guerrillas.  The communist troops launched large 
attacks against towns and key roads, and formed into battalion and brigade-sized units 
complete with mortars and artillery.91  Aside from the political damage of a communist 
victory in Greece, the US worried that such a victory would also isolate Turkey and 
leave it vulnerable to Soviet intimidation or even invasion.  
Military support to Greece went to combat operations, not preparation for future 
threats as would be the case in other European assistance missions.  The Americans 
pushed for the Greeks to train effective, aggressive leaders at every level.  US assistance 
in Greece had an immediate, demonstrable effect—US materiel and expertise helped the 
Greek National Army (GNA) to defeat the communist guerrillas.  Further, the leader of 
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the MAAG for most of the war, General James A. Van Fleet, behaved as the ideal 
soldier-diplomat and enjoyed popularity amongst the Greeks.  However, American 
support was only one part of the guerrillas’ defeat, and the Greek armed forces retained a 
number of key problems by the end of the war. 
From the beginning of the military assistance program, the Americans 
emphasized the need for aggressive action on the battlefield.  General William G. 
Livesay took command of the advisory mission in June 1947, with the objective of 
monitoring US aid and training the Greeks in its use.  He found problems greater than 
mere lack of training.  Months of indecisive fighting exhausted and demoralized the 
army.  They did not press home attacks and allowed guerrilla units to escape destruction. 
The armed forces lacked civilian support.  Disorganized air operations achieved few 
effective combat sorties.  Worst of all, wrote Livesay, army officers were “afraid to take 
the initiative” and lacked “offensive spirit.”  An “air of gloom” pervaded the entire 
military establishment.  When asked by Greek defense ministers for his military opinion 
of the situation, Livesay suggested that they improve training, concentrate their forces to 
destroy the guerrillas, and sack bad officers.92   
On 6 February, 1948, Army Major General James A. Van Fleet took command of 
the advisory mission.  He acted as commander of the United States Army Group, 
American Mission to Greece and as Director of Joint United States Military Advisory 
Planning Group, Greece (JUSMAPG or JUSMAG), which together blended the missions 
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of a traditional MAAG with that of specific training and direct operational advising.  
Overall, Van Fleet continued the policy of Livesay—training up the Greeks, urging them 
to replace bad officers, and above all to continuously press the guerrillas.  In his first 
week, he met with the Greek high command, US and British diplomatic figures, the 
GNA Inspector General, and the King and Queen, with whom Van Fleet developed a 
strong rapport.  He spent his second week in the field, visiting the headquarters of three 
army corps, three division headquarters, and one Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) 
base.93 
Van Fleet continued at this pace for the rest of his nearly two years in Greece.  
He had considerable experience training and leading troops.  In addition to seeing 
plentiful combat in both world wars, he spent much of the interwar period as a Reserve 
Officer Training Corps instructor and as an instructor at the Army Infantry School.  His 
many letters conveyed his opinions of the Greek forces and the war.  Writing to 
Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer in April 1948, he praised the typical Greek 
soldier and the high command, but criticized the brigade, battalion, and company grade 
officers, who needed “considerable improvement.”94  In a letter to Lieutenant General 
Courtney Hodges, Van Fleet described the hard fighting in the mountains and noted the 
army’s lack of aggressiveness and inability to overwhelm guerrilla defenses in a timely 
manner.  The Greeks relied too much on firepower.  Van Fleet believed the GNA only 
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needed light infantry weapons to accomplish most of its battlefield objectives, but that 
would require “good infantry and good small unit leadership,” which they lacked.95   
Van Fleet and his MAAG, advising down to the brigade and sometimes battalion level, 
worked constantly with the Greeks, encouraging aggressive action.  The general often 
lived on or near the front, riding a mule alongside mountain troops or conducting dusty 
road marches in the height of summer.96 
Van Fleet also advised at the highest levels.  In early 1948, while still settling in 
to his new position, he worked as operational advisor to the Greek Commander and 
Chief of Staff, General Dimitrios Yiadjis.  They visited the front together in March, Van 
Fleet hoping to improve the Greek general’s confidence.  He later successfully 
campaigned to keep Yiadjis in his position, feeling that his removal—urged by some 
Greek commanders—was too soon, and that stability in the command structure was 
best.97  This illustrated Van Fleet’s strong influence on Greek leadership and decision 
making. 
Though Van Fleet wanted “to stick to my own knitting—the operations,” he 
committed considerable time to the diplomatic side of his mission.  “This is certainly a 
war that has to be fought with a great deal of protocol,” he wrote to General Wedemeyer, 
then on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  “My time is taken up many times over with meetings 
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and conferences that go on incessantly.”98  Luncheons, meetings, and briefings with 
Greek ministers and other officials filled his schedule.  Though he may have preferred 
the military side of his job, he appears to have conducted diplomacy with aplomb.  He 
spoke on Greek radio, met with reporters, and regularly held court with the King of 
Greece.  In letters to Army colleagues, the general remarked that there was “enough 
work here to keep half a dozen directors busy twenty four hours a day,” but found the 
effort “extremely interesting and quite made to order for me.”99  
Van Fleet also enjoyed popularity with some of the Greek population.  “Ban 
Flit,” as they often pronounced his name, attended patriotic and religious events, visited 
hospitals and orphanages, and engaged the population more like a philanthropic celebrity 
than a general from a foreign power. 100  He used exaggerated, romantic language in his 
public speeches and the letters he shared with Greek officials and civilians.  He made 
constant reference to Greece’s ancient heritage as a defender of Western civilization, its 
bravery and suffering during World War II, and the hard work its army and people 
performed to modernize their nation and defeat the communist guerrillas.  Van Fleet 
never referred to the conflict as a civil war. In a Radio Athens broadcast, he called it 
“Greeks against Communists.”101   
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Some Greeks saw Van Fleet as a savior as a man whose position and fondness 
for the Greek people might help them in times of need.  In 1948, a wife wrote to Van 
Fleet for help getting her conscripted husband back home, to help take care of the 
family.102  Other families hoped for a higher pension for their son, killed in battle with 
the communists, or for transfers so that a son could serve closer to home.103  Van Fleet 
responded to these letters by reminding their writers he had no authority to make specific 
decisions for the military, but that he would forward the letters to the relevant GNA 
departments. 
Some Greeks even sought Van Fleet’s help in immigrating to the United States, 
writing passionate letters to get family members cleared for travel.  Van Fleet usually 
responded in the same way to these letters as he did to those about the Greek military, 
citing his lack of authority on the matter, but he vouched for some who had connection 
to his office.  He wrote to the American Consul General on behalf of a civilian named 
Liskos, asking the embassy to consider his case “under some exceptional circumstances 
such as compassionate reasons or other just cause which will give him a priority for 
entry into the United States”.104  Greeks showed their fondness through gifts.  Van Fleet 
received a vase from a woman, and wrote a thank you note in classic “Ban Flit” prose: 
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““The vase is exquisite—beautiful—marvelous.  I treasure it very, very much because it 
is Greek . . . I love to admire the beautiful shape.  It is restful and peaceful to look at.”105 
The guerrillas made reference to Van Fleet in their own propaganda broadcasts.   
In the fall of 1949, as the war waned, a radio broadcast by the communists referred to 
Van Fleet as the “super-general” and reported that he dealt with communist prisoners 
held by the GNA.  “He personally interrogates them, and gives the necessary ‘unwritten’ 
orders to the monarchofascist ‘lap dogs’ . . . to send the prisoners either to the 
reformatory schools or to the firing squads.”106   
While Van Fleet advised at the highest levels, lower ranking Americans worked 
to improve the Greek National Army and Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF).  In the 
army, advisors plucked an infantry platoon from each Greek division, called 
“demonstration platoons,” and trained it intensively for a month, before sending it back 
to become the core of a training mission in its division.  This began improving the 
tactical abilities of the GNA, creating the “good infantry” Van Fleet hoped for in his 
1948 letter to General Hodges.  At the operational and strategic level, advisors pushed 
for constant attacks against guerrilla bases.  Van Fleet also used his influence on the 
Greek high command, suggesting the removal of reluctant or incompetent Greek 
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officers.  Due in part to these processes, over 1948 and 1949 the GNA grew into a more 
effective force for destroying the guerrillas.107 
The fight of the 518th Battalion provided a notable example of the GNA’s 
improvement.  In August 1949, the unit held the town of Tsouka, which protected the 
flank of their parent division.  The guerrillas, hoping to outflank the division, attacked 
Tsouka with considerable forces and pounded the 518th with infantry assaults and 
mortars.  While the battalion held out, the rest of their division continued its own attack, 
despite having guerrilla forces threatening its rear area.  The 518th fought without 
requesting artillery support—the battalion’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Krista, 
knew his division needed the artillery was for their main attack.  Only a year earlier, 
Greek troops in a similar position would not even attack lightly armed communist 
infantry without artillery support.108 
While the GNA improved, the Americans also worked with the Royal Hellenic 
Air Force.  The advisors’ first assessments of the RHAF were gloomy at best.  The 
RHAF’s problems “begin and end with personnel and personalities,” claimed a summary 
report from 1948.  The undereducated Greek population produced few with the technical 
skills necessary to support an air force.  Political instability hurt indoctrination and 
motivation.  Tensions between politically liberal career RHAF officers and conservative 
reservists harmed unit cohesion and training.  More air force personnel were lost to 
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politically motivated dismissals than to guerrilla anti-aircraft fire.  Short enlistments 
meant a constant and heavy training load.  Low pay, shoddy housing, and unappetizing 
food further hurt morale.  Senior officers lacked organizational and management ability, 
including the “common sense rules of attaining efficient group activity through 
management and leadership.”  All of this resulted in weak tactical performance, 
especially in the realm of close air support, the RHAF’s primary role in the war against 
the communist forces. Though the American advisors believed they could change 
individual RHAF officers, who were “definitely friendly and receptive to suggestions,” 
the RHAF seemed too flawed an institution to fix in the short term.109   
The advisors used a variety of approaches to improve the RHAF.  Most 
important was the training of personnel at United Kingdom and US schools.  By the end 
of 1949, hundreds of pilots, ground crews, and cadets graduated from these programs 
and returned to the RHAF to serve as instructors. 110  Some of courses were lengthy, 
including a ten week warrant officer course in Colorado and six month enlisted course in 
Texas.111  American personnel also formed special training units in Greece to direct 
instruction on US-issue dive bombers. 112   
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These steps helped drive considerable RHAF improvement in 1949 and 1950.  In 
several major battles in 1949, the RHAF contributed to significant guerilla defeats.  
During a battle around Florina in February and March, the air force successfully massed 
aircraft from several distant bases.  Despite inclement weather, they flew 131 offensive 
sorties, dropped twenty seven tons of bombs, and fired 170 rockets.  After helping to 
defeat the guerrilla attack, the Greeks shifted to bombing guerrilla reserves.  Air strikes 
inflicted heavy losses.113  At the major government victory in the Vitsi/Grammos area in 
August, the RHAF flew 132 sorties per day, a record.  During the same period in the 
previous year, they only managed 52.114  Indeed, the RHAF achieved vastly more sorties 
overall, improving from 1,825 sorties from December 1947-May 1948 to 4,333 sorties in 
December 1948-May 1949.115   
On the surface, the mission to Greece had considerable success.  Invigorated 
Greek army forces pressed the guerrillas, who lost their safe havens in Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria, and the communist forces collapsed by 1950.  It also provided the Americans 
with experience in facing communist insurgencies.  General Van Fleet clearly learned 
several key aspects of guerrilla warfare.  He observed that guerrillas needed international 
support—in the case of Greece, bases in Albania and Yugoslavia.  Guerrillas needed 
civilian informants for intelligence; if civilians could be turned, the guerrillas would lose 
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their advantages in intelligence gathering.  Van Fleet argued that advising and assistance 
worked well, with American (and British) expertise and supplies supporting Greek 
military muscle.  The guerrillas’ advantages—constant harassment, discipline, 
leadership, surprise, night attack, and intelligence gathering—were all successfully 
dismantled once the Greek National Army became an effective force and started 
applying constant pressure against the guerrillas.  Though Van believed that the “science 
of warfare, like all phases of social organization, is dynamic,” and that there were too 
many variables for one lesson to apply perfectly elsewhere, the lessons of the Greek war 
were nevertheless useful to future American endeavors.116   
However, the Greek war ultimately proved a poor model for the US.  The Greek 
communists made a critical mistake in the late 1940s: they sought open battle against the 
Greek National Army, launching full scale assaults against towns and defending hilltops 
and mountainsides throughout the country.  The US did not actually learn much about 
fighting against an insurgency embedded in the population.  The GNA had not fought a 
classic counter-insurgency, but rather a series of fast-moving actions and small, set-piece 
battles.  They had not occupied towns for long periods of time, negotiated with local 
politicians, or even really dealt with the socio-economic problems that had allowed the 
communists to flourish in the first place.  
Further, General Van Fleet and others emphasized the improvements to the GNA 
and their own successes in training and advising but mostly ignored the critical loss of 
communist safe havens, when Yugoslavia closed its border.  With nowhere left to 
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regroup and rearm, the guerrillas were easy pickings.  In hindsight, the Greek war was 
an easy test.    
Furthermore, the success of advice and aid in Greece was deceptive.  Not all the 
improvements in the Greek military were permanent or even completed.  For example, 
the RHAF’s tactical improvements in 1949 concealed continuing problems with how the 
Greeks managed their logistics. They were short on trained maintenance crews and had 
not created any career incentive for officers to study logistics.  There was also no 
delegation of authority and a lack of initiative among junior officers.117   The crisis 
atmosphere of 1947 and 1948, with the GNA on their heels and guerrilla forces holding 
significant portions of Greece, drove the MAAG to focus on tactical training and 
operational advice.  These made the armed forces better at fighting, but were conducted 
in lieu of logistical and organizational reform.  This left the GNA and RHAF with 
antiquated logistics and largely unable to sustain itself without US aid.  It also did little 
to “Americanize” their armed forces, which remained closely connected with Greek 
politics. 
 
THE  NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND MILITARY AID TO 
WESTERN EUROPE 
 
 While civil war raged in Greece, the air of emergency in the rest of Europe grew 
throughout 1947-1949.  In this tense climate, several nations of Western Europe sought 
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collective defense as security against potential Soviet attack.  The Western European 
Union formed in 1948, led by France and Britain.  The WEU hoped for stronger 
American commitment to the continent’s security, in the form of both US forces 
stationed in Europe and American military assistance.  In April 1949, the United States 
joined Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), a peacetime military alliance committed to collective defense of the west.  
The US made several commitments to the defense of Europe, including the 
creation of a field army in Germany.  European Command (EUCOM), the inheritor of 
postwar occupation duties, was initially an unimpressive force, mostly police and light 
armored cavalry of the US Constabulary.  It included a single combat division.  With the 
establishment of NATO in 1949, US strategy dictated holding a line somewhere in 
Western Europe—preferably along the Rhine, more likely along the Meuse, and possibly 
as far west as the Pyrenees—while American bombers based in the UK and Italy 
pounded Soviet targets.  The Soviet detonation of an atomic weapon in 1949, and the 
start of the Korean War in June 1950, alarmed President Truman and the American 
military leadership.  They began programs to improve the defenses of Western Europe, 
which they believed was the real Soviet objective.  EUCOM activated the 7th Army and 
by 1952 the force grew to four Army divisions, heavy with armor, artillery, and over 
252,000 troops.118  
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Though 7th Army eventually grew into an impressive force, no sustainable 
number of American divisions and air wings could successfully defend Europe alone.  In 
1952, the Soviet armies and their allies numbered 6.5 million troops.  Most dangerous of 
all was the Group of Occupation Forces in Germany, a tank-heavy battle array of twenty 
two Soviet divisions.  This force could triple in size within a few weeks of 
mobilization.119   
American planners and NATO leaders hoped that military aid could bridge this 
gap in forces by increasing the size and modernity of Western European armed forces, 
especially with deliveries of tanks, heavy artillery, and jets.  The most important aspect 
of military assistance to Europe, in the minds of US policy makers, was its benefit to 
European morale.  The US needed to prove its commitment to Western Europe after 
WWII.  For the first year of NATO, the US committed over $1 billion in military aid.  
For the rest of the decade, arms for Europe barely dropped below $1 billion a year, and 
regularly soared above that mark.120 
The Americans placed most of their hopes for European defense in the early 
1950s on France.  In 1950, the French armed forces consisted of only six divisions and 
300 aircraft.  A series of NATO conferences ultimately agreed upon a large French 
ground force of 29 divisions and an air force of 2,000 planes.  In the first three years of 
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assistance to Europe, the US spent nearly $2 billion on the French armed forces.121  Most 
of this money went toward the army. 
Though the French did not develop their forces nearly as quickly as the 
Americans hoped, eventually driving the US to deploy more forces to Europe and seek 
unilateral armament of West Germany, the French armed forces were high quality and 
could quickly take advantage of US aid and training assistance.  The French Army was 
generally superior to other European forces, in terms of both combat potential and 
logistics, and the American advisors reported positively on their units.  The 29th Infantry 
Division had “an aggressive energetic attitude in their approach to problems of training 
and the maintenance of equipment.”122  The 28th Mountain- and the 4th Infantry Division 
both maintained excellent standards of repair on their equipment, encouraging because 
the 4th was an “M-Day” unit, meaning it was to ready to fight on the first day of 
mobilization.123  Support units also did well, with functioning ammunition depots at 
several locations.124   
French military schools were probably the best in Europe, with an officer school 
at St Cyr and numerous other specialty courses.  Army Captain Michael Hogan visited 
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three French training centers in the summer of 1954: the Airborne School, the Parachute 
Maintenance Depot, and the Combat Training Center.  He found excellent facilities and 
instructors at all three institutions.  At the Airborne School, “The student is not coddled 
in any way. . . . Emphasis is placed on instructing the good men and not pushing the 
weaklings.”125  MAAG France even led an effort to create an official liaison between the 
French army and the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.  Major 
General T. E. de Shazo, the advisory group’s commander, noted the value of such an 
exchange, for both sharing tactical concepts and creating connections between the two 
armed forces.  General James M Gavin, then Army Assistant Chief of Staff, approved 
the measure later that year.126 
The efficient and aggressive French Army displayed some of the most advanced 
abilities observed by MAAG personnel.  In March 1954, Colonel Holman D. Hoover 
visited the French 21st Infantry Division in Algeria, where it participated in a large war 
game.  30,000 troops, 300 tanks, and 2,500 wheeled vehicles worked with naval forces.  
The training featured an amphibious assault and simulated atomic weapons.  Though the 
defending “blue” force botched its use of atomics, inflicting two devastating instances of 
simulated friendly fire, Hoover was impressed by French technical and tactical skill.  
The attacking “red” force aggressively established its bridgehead and moved inland.  
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French soldiers and officers took the exercise very seriously, displaying their training 
and effective field maintenance.127   
Though US strategists hoped that France would provide the bulk of Europe’s 
forces, they also spent considerable resources arming and training the smaller countries 
of Northwest Europe. From Fiscal Year 1950 through 1953, the US spent over $1 billion 
on military aid to Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and the Netherlands.128  Money to 
the “Benelux” countries and Denmark paid for tanks, trucks, artillery, small arms, jets, 
naval vessels, facilities, and training.  The missions to Denmark and the Netherlands 
were typical of the early advisory experience with NATO countries: the Americans 
worked to modernize the host armed forces through the injection of US equipment, 
weaponry, logistical management, and training methods.  The two countries presented 
similar obstacles to the advisory effort.  Both suffered serious damage during World War 
II. Their armed forces, dismantled by the Germans, were rebuilt in the British image.
Neither country participated in collective defense with great enthusiasm.  Throughout 
the first half of the decade, they fell short of their force commitments.  The MAAGs 
attempted to solve or at least alleviate these problems by encouraging realistic training, 
improvements in logistics, and continuous pressure on the commanders of the Danish 
and Dutch forces. 
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DENMARK 
In the years immediately after World War II, Denmark was firmly in Britain’s 
orbit.  Britain liberated Denmark in May 1945.  They were close trading partners, with a 
majority of Denmark’s imports to and exports from Britain.  The Danish armed forces 
were remodeled after the British system, and trained with British units and instructors.  
However, Danish leaders gradually shifted their alliance to the United States, who was 
economically and militarily far more powerful than Britain.129  The Danes, along with 
Iceland and Norway, turned away from the traditional cooperation of the Scandinavian 
countries by joining US-led NATO.130 
Denmark was a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and signed 
an assistance agreement with the United States on 27 January 1950.131  The United 
States began providing military aid to the Danes as part of the general buildup of NATO 
and by 1953 Denmark received $153.6 million as part of the arrangement.132  Aid came 
in the form of heavy weapons, tanks, jets, and general military equipment.  It also 
included an advisory group.  Several aspects of the mission made it difficult for the 
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advisory group to achieve its objectives, but the mission achieved some notable 
successes by 1954. 
For the first eighteen months of the assistance effort, aid deliveries fell seriously 
behind schedule. Air Force Brigadier General Ralph Snavely, MAAG Chief from 1950 
to 1953, worried that Danish resolve to participate in European defense could deteriorate 
without faster aid deliveries. 133  Shortages also hampered the advisors themselves.  For 
much of 1950, the advisory group was only about 60% of its authorized strength, with 38 
personnel of all ranks.  General Snavely reported a general lack of guidance from his 
superiors about his mission’s objectives and felt burdened by administrative tasks.134  
These problems of late deliveries, including shortages of training manuals, prevented 
advisor-directed training of Danish forces in 1950, and slowed training throughout 
1951.135  The situation finally improved in late 1951.   
The state of Denmark’s armed forces also presented a problem.  They had been 
dismantled by the German occupation and in terms of equipment and weaponry, General 
Snavely described the Danes as having an “empty cupboard” which they hoped US 
assistance could fill. 136  Danish troops possessed little tactical experience, a problem 
revealed during training maneuvers in 1950.  In August, MAAG Army observers noted a 
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“lack of realism” in daylight movements: Danish troops stayed in the open and massed 
their vehicles bumper-to-bumper, leaving them vulnerable to enemy air or artillery 
attack.137  A year later, the situation barely improved. The army’s slow training and wide 
distribution across the country precluded, as Snavely reported,  “the possibility of the 
Danish Army offering any serious prolonged resistance to invasion by an aggressor.”138  
The Royal Danish Air Force (RDAF) lacked technically trained maintenance personnel, 
which slowed maintenance of aircraft and hampered airbase management.  To rectify the 
problem, the MAAG conducted training missions in country and arranged for RDAF 
servicemen to attend air force schools in the continental US.139   
MAAG-Denmark worried about the Danes’ willingness to fight.  Throughout 
1950-1953, Snavely reported on the Danes’ reluctance to contribute substantially to 
NATO.  The Danes’ short, twelve month enlistments, low military pay, communist 
agitation in the country’s cities, and the government’s refusal to allow NATO use of 
Danish airfields during peacetime created a “period of inertia” that Snavely worried 
would prevent long-term improvement to the armed forces and impede European 
defense.  The Danes also seemed unenthused about the prospect of military assistance 
and their participation in NATO.  In May 1950, when aid shipments first arrived, the 
Danish press gave little coverage, there was no public fanfare, and the government 
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barely announced the event.140  The MAAG also worried about Danish communists.  In 
a September 1950 report, the Army Section believed it unwise to “send Danish 
personnel to US schools in the ZI [Continental United States] or EUCOM [European 
Command] about whom any question of ideological leanings has been raised even 
though [that] individual has been cleared.”  This concern may have also been leveled at 
German collaborators.141  
Though Americans had concerns over ideologically questionable Danes, they did 
arrange for many to train at schools in the United States, beginning in the summer of 
1950, and continued throughout the decade.  As in other advisory missions, the 
personnel trained in the US became instructors in host nation schools and training 
centers upon their return.  These “ZI-Trained” Danes were invaluable to the training 
effort.  However, a 1951 report noted older officers, who had not traveled to the US, 
sometimes “hampered” the younger officers, by transferring them to other units or 
blocking attempted reforms and reorganizations.142   
The advisors also encountered resistance from the Danish government and 
public.  General Snavely considered it politically impossible for the Danes to extend 
their short, one year enlistment periods, as evidenced by the Parliament’s several failed 
attempts to do so. Without longer enlistments, the Americans worried that the Danes 
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could barely field a single standing division.143  Danish politicians and military leaders 
refused to deploy more of their troops in the Schleswig-Holstein region, where they 
could protect NATO’s northern flank.  MAAG was also frustrated by the slow decision 
making processes of the Danish armed forces.144  Air Force Colonel Herschel Green, 
head of the Air Force section, worried that the Danes would not improve without facing 
an immediate reason to do so: “From past experience it has been found that little 
planning or action can be expected from the RDAF, and the Defense Ministry as well, 
prior to a problem becoming reality.”145   
Despite problems, the MAAG had some grounds for optimism.  The increasing 
pace of aid deliveries in late 1951 improved military morale and public interest in 
military affairs.  Beginning in 1951, the Danes started conversion to the American 
system of logistical management.146  The government could be relied upon to keep the 
promises it made, in terms of mobilization and training goals.147  Training of Danish 
personnel in the US and improved aid deliveries resulted in significant progress by 
December 1953.  The mission’s new chief, Air Force Brigadier General Thomas C. 
Darcy, claimed that the Danish Army had achieved “reasonable effectiveness” thanks to 
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aid and training.  The army also planned to open a number of specialty schools in 1955, 
including courses for infantry, tanks, artillery, and engineers.  The Royal Danish Air 
Force became a modern air force, with six jet fighter squadrons.  RDAF personnel 
improved their maintenance and logistical standards, according to Darcy, by observation 
and training with USAF units elsewhere in Europe.148   
From 1950 to 1953, MAAG-Denmark reported mixed results.  They had helped 
improve the army to “reasonable effectiveness” and overseen the development of a jet-
fighter air force.  However, foul-ups in delivery had slowed their progress, and, more 
importantly, the Danes still could only deploy limited forces into the field.  They could 
not, in 1954, meaningfully contribute to NATO.  Denmark was not the only scene of 
military aid disappointment in Europe.  In the nearby Netherlands, NATO development 
also stalled. 
 
THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Following the devastation of World War II and the perceived threat of the Soviet 
Union, the Netherlands government and armed forces concluded that membership in 
NATO provided their best hope for security.  The allure of military and economic 
assistance even convinced the Dutch to abandon fighting for their colonies in Indonesia.  
This costly military intervention following World War II, in open defiance of a United 
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Nations resolution, ultimately pushed the US to threaten aid suspension.  The Dutch 
bowed to the pressure and left Indonesia that year.149  In 1950, the Netherlands signed a 
military aid agreement with the United States.150   
They initially pledged three divisions to the Western European Union and later 
NATO, one active and two in reserve.  Dutch naval forces would be limited to 
minesweepers and patrol craft, which disappointed the navy but fit into overall NATO 
plans.  The Dutch wanted their ground force commitments ready by the end of 1951, but 
a variety of problems, including budgetary limitations, twelve-month enlistments, and 
mismanagement by the military and government officials, prevented this.  General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, the newly-appointed NATO supreme commander, visited the 
Netherlands in January 1951 and was disappointed in the Dutch forces, reporting them 
as understrength and without any sense of urgency. The negative report by Eisenhower 
and increasing US pressure to send forces to Korea convinced the Dutch to increase their 
NATO commitment to five divisions.151  
Relations with the US were strained after the war in Indonesia and the Dutch 
believed they could improve them by proving their value as a NATO ally.  Government 
officials and military planners also hoped that by being a proactive member of the 
alliance, they could achieve a significant military objective: moving the defensive line of 
149
 Cornelis W. A.  J. van Dijk, “The American Political Intervention in the Conflict in the Dutch East 
Indies, 1945-1949,” (master’s thesis, CGSC, 2009). 
150
 “Agreement between the United States of America and the Netherlands,” 27 Jan 1950, Military 
Assistance Bilaterals. 
151 Remco van Ingen, “The Dutch Perspective on NATO Development during the Korean War,” (master’s 
theisis, CGSC, 2012), 85-95. 
76 
NATO eastward from the Meuse-Rhine river line—where NATO commanders planned 
to fight—to the Rhine-Ijssel river line, which would protect more of the Netherlands.  
The Dutch army wanted an array of territorial troops, mainly assigned to defending the 
Netherlands itself, and a competently trained and well equipped force that could fight 
anywhere as part of NATO.  Interestingly, the Dutch saw little use for their pool of 
experienced Indonesia veterans.  The Netherlands General Staff believed their bush-
fighting experience was inappropriate for open war against the Soviets.152   
As the US increased its flow of aid to Europe in response to the Korean War, the 
Netherlands received over $293 million in FY 1952-1953 alone.  MAAG Netherlands 
diligently trained the armed forces on American equipment, modern tactics, and US 
supply management techniques.  Despite Holland’s small size and limited armed forces, 
some Americans believed it could be successfully defended against a Soviet attack.  Its 
unusual geography, with below-sea-level polder and many canals and bridges, made 
offensive mechanized operations difficult.  During World War II even the Allies, with 
their massive logistical abilities and great mobility, were frustrated by soft ground and 
blown bridges.  American planners believed that a competent Dutch military could do to 
the Soviets what the Germans did to the British and Canadians.153 
The Americans faced difficulty helping to create a “competent” Dutch military.  
Rear Admiral Carey Jones, commander of MAAG-Netherlands, delivered a barrage of 
bad news in January and February 1952.  Depot personnel, inadequately trained to 
152 Ibid. 
153
 A. E.  Harris, “Regional Survey:  The Netherlands and Belgium,” (oral presentation, CGSC, 1946). 
77 
unpack heavy equipment, damaged a shipment of Sherman tanks.  Dutch technicians 
tried tinkering with American radios, though “they have neither the proper tools nor 
‘know how’ to accomplish this.”  The army’s schools, except for its infantry course, 
were not up to US standards.  The naval air arm, equipped with old British aircraft but 
no spare parts to maintain them, could not train at all until more US aircraft arrived.  The 
Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNAF) only recently received new F-84 fighter jets, and 
required “continuous on-the-spot advice and assistance.”  The air force’s antiquated 
logistical system could not handle the influx of new parts and aircraft, and two jet 
crashes crippled one Dutch pilot and killed another. Shoddy maintenance standards also 
plagued the ground forces, especially in the tank units.154  Dutch infantry neglected their 
weapons and did not maintain their transport vehicles.155 
Ammunition restrictions and high safety standards limited Dutch army training 
throughout 1952.  The high command refused to release munitions from their war 
reserve, giving units little opportunity to become better acquainted with their new 
weapons.156  The MAAG army section also complained that high safety standards 
reduced “the effectiveness of the training.  In the case of overhead artillery firing, the 
minimum distance of the impact area from the troops is 1000 yards.  The participants 
cannot even see the bursts.”  The Americans, who wanted “combat firing and battle 
154
 Rear Admiral J. Cary Jones, “Report of Activities, January 1952,” 9 Feb1952, F Reports-JAN 52, 
MAAG-Netherlands, Box 41, E 209, RG 334, NARA. 
155
 Jones, “Report of Activities, February 1952,” 10 March 1952, F Reports—FEB 52, MAAG-
Netherlands, Box 41, E 209, RG 334 NARA. 
156 Jones, “Report of Activities, January 1952,” 9 Feb 1952. 
78 
indoctrination” for their allies, worried that too much safety in training was a bad 
thing.157 
While the army trained, the RNAF underwent a difficult transition from 
propellers to jets.  Pilot training, an inherently dangerous activity, cost the Dutch several 
pilots and numerous F-84s, with four pilots killed in 1952 out of only a few dozen in the 
program.  Inexperience with jet aircraft was part of the problem, but even seasoned 
pilots could be lost.  In February, a Dutch pilot trained on jet aircraft in the United States 
crashed and died while attempting acrobatics. Heavy aircraft attrition slowed training—
of the 19 aircraft delivered by February, four were lost to accidents.158  Not until 
December did F-84s arrive in significant numbers.  The influx of new aircraft clogged 
the RNAF’s underdeveloped logistical system and delayed final delivery of the jets to 
their units.  During the unusually cold winter of that year, maintenance crews worked 
slowly in unheated hangars, whose worn-out furnaces awaited replacement.159 
When not working, advisors’ personal experiences and living conditions in the 
Netherlands were typical for Americans in Northwest Europe.  Most MAAG personnel 
lived in the Hague, where they rented furnished apartments.  Heating was expensive in 
high-ceilinged Dutch homes, which lacked weather stripping.  Dependents went to 
Dutch schools, which the advisory group rated highly; children in grades 1-8 could also 
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attend an American school in country.160  They enjoyed amicable relationships with the 
Dutch.  The Netherlands MAAG noted “when they invite you to ‘drop in for a cup of 
coffee’ they really mean it. . . [if you offer the same,] your new Dutch friends will 
probably show up some Sunday afternoon.” The group’s country guide, provided to new 
personnel upon arrival, suggested against trying to change the local culture.  As is 
“common with the rest of Europe, Holland has its caste lines,” the country guide warned, 
and Americans should not interfere with or fight such social mores.  Because “we 
Americans enjoy more financial prestige and scientific and mechanical know-how than 
many European nations,” personnel were not to flaunt their wealth or technical skills.161  
How US advisors, who trained allied forces on advanced equipment, were to not flaunt 
their technical skills is unclear. 
Despite the slow start, the Dutch forces eventually adjusted to US training and 
equipment.  MAAG complaints about vehicle and equipment maintenance dropped 
sharply as the year progressed.  Dutch infantry units which had dirty weapons and 
broken down vehicles in 1952 were “surprisingly impressive” a year later, when MAAG 
advisors reviewed more Dutch units in May 1953.  Tank units greatly improved their 
maintenance standards and sometimes trained alongside British Army of the Rhine 
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forces.162  By the end of 1953, the aircraft units also improved and, by the American 
estimate, completed their conversion to the F-84.163 
As in other advisory missions, the Americans credited their success with US 
material aid and the training of host nation instructors in US-run schools.  Major material 
deliveries flowed into the Netherlands throughout 1952, including over 67,000 rifles and 
carbines, 104 guns and howitzers of 105mm caliber or greater, 160 81mm mortars, and 
nearly 2,500 new-model bazookas.164  From 1950 to 1952, over 1,000 Dutch officers and 
technicians trained at schools in the US and in EUCOM’s facilities in Germany.  They 
served as instructors in Dutch units, passing on American training techniques.165   
The armed forces of the Netherlands, like those in Denmark, certainly improved 
in the early 1950s.  However, the Dutch and other European members of NATO did not 
develop forces large enough to fulfill the strategic requirements of earlier agreements, 
which frustrated US policy makers.  The failure of the European Defense Community 
and slow development of Western European NATO forces in part drove the United 
States to unilaterally seek additional European allies, in West Germany and Spain.  
MAAGs would be busy in both countries. 
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SUPPORT OF SPAIN AND GERMANY 
By 1954, European contributions to NATO fell well short of earlier agreements 
for a 90-division force.  Instead, only about 63 divisions were ready, 40 of those “D+30” 
divisions unavailable at the beginning of a war.  This force level remained mostly 
stagnant in 1954.  As part of President Eisenhower’s cost-saving “New Look,” military 
assistance levels also fell in that year.  The US placed increasing pressure on the 
European nations to pick up the slack in defense spending.166     
American plans for the rearmament of West Germany caused conflict between 
the US and its NATO partners.  Washington considered rearming the West Germans 
before the Korean War, but hoped that the nascent European Defense Community would 
include Germany.  However the EDC collapsed in 1954, as the French, wary of a 
rearmed Germany, voted down the organization.  The failure of the EDC combined with 
the generally slow mobilization of the NATO countries drove the US to rearm Germany 
through NATO and the US Army in Europe (USAREUR).   The Americans and 
Germans envisioned a tank-heavy force of twelve divisions and several brigades.  Such a 
force could theoretically allow forward defense in Germany and bridge the gap between 
NATO potential and reality.  
Delays in coordinating aid and supplies pushed MAAG-Germany’s activation to 
December 1955.  The group worked alongside the GTAG, the Germany Training 
Assistance Group, which coordinated mobile training teams and on-the-job training 
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visits by German units with American units of EUCOM.  The advisors were mostly 
drawn directly from the USAREUR.167  Though the German troops took to tactical 
training very quickly, they did not take as easily to American standards and practices of 
field maintenance. The new German army benefited from the services of experienced 
veterans, but the officer class was essentially uninterested in technical minutia and did 
not acknowledge the importance of regular repair and inspection.  The advisors spent 
most for their energy training the Germans in the logistical and managerial techniques 
used by the US Army.168 
Over time, German officers overcame their own “indifference, or just plain 
stubbornness” and began to value equipment maintenance.  In the area of technical 
work—mundane but vital to a mechanized army’s effectiveness—US advising did very 
well with the Germans.  Along with improved maintenance, the German armed forces 
seemed to take on a number of liberal characteristics.  The German army had strict rules 
that protected the rights of soldiers, so much so that some advisors even worried that it 
was too democratic for its own good. US military personnel avoided discussions of 
“democratizing” the German army, considering those subjects either the purview of the 
State Department or German internal politics.169 
Military assistance made the addition of West Germany to NATO possible, and 
the Bundeswehr’s divisions strengthened the allies’ limited order of battle.  The West 
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Germans rearmed quickly in part because the assistance apparatus already existed in 
Europe.170  The United States also took steps outside of NATO when it approached 
Spain in 1953.  
SPAIN 
US strategists saw military value in Spain, for airbases and as a staging area 
should France fall to Soviet attack.  But to the rest of Europe, Spain was a pariah state 
with a fascist government and pro-German neutrality during the war.  It was politically 
infeasible to make Spain part of NATO.  Instead, US dealt directly with the country.  
After two years of tough negotiating, they reached an aid-for-bases agreement in May 
1953.  $465 million bought airbase and flyover rights; around $350 million of that aid 
was for military purposes, including training of Spanish forces by the US.171  
The advisory aspect of the mission to Spain was quite similar to other operations 
in Europe.  MAAG-Spain formally activated on 1 November, 1953.  The advisors found 
a weak economy, including underdeveloped agriculture, little industry, and limited 
access to electricity.  The armed forces fielded outdated weapons and equipment.  
Nevertheless, the advisors also found reason to be optimistic.  National morale, noted a 
1954 briefing, was “good primarily because the Spanish people are extremely proud.”  
Though their equipment was old and of “extreme heterogeneity,” Spanish troops, unlike 
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some other European forces, practiced regular maintenance.  The army was “fanatically 
loyal” to the regime.  The Americans also considered the country politically reliable.  
Spain prided itself, according to a US report, on being the first European country to 
resist communist attack during its 1930s civil war.  In that conflict, the reported 
continued, Americans had actually been on the wrong side of history, supporting “the 
Abraham Lincoln Brigade which fought with the communist forces.”  This interpretation 
of recent Iberian history reflected the American anti-communist mood of the 1950s and 
shows that American support of authoritarian governments occurred in Europe as it did 
in Asia and Africa.172  
MAAG-Spain had more limited objectives than some other missions in Europe.  
Because the Spanish practiced standards of equipment maintenance that the Americans 
respected, the advisors did not have to try and hammer home this routine as they did in 
missions elsewhere around the world.  Furthermore, the aid-for-bases deal came with 
concessions from the US, which included specific goals for each branch of the Spanish 
armed forces.173  They planned to motorize the army and modernize its anti-aircraft 
weaponry.  The navy would develop its anti-submarine abilities and coastal defenses 
while the air force converted to jets.  The Americans intended the program to make 
Spanish forces “effective in a defensive role.”174 
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The Americans lauded the army’s education system, especially after US material 
aid improved the various schools’ facilities.  A 1959 visit to the Infantry Academy in 
Toledo found well maintained facilities and course instruction.  The school’s instructors 
requested recoilless rifles, so that the trainees could practice anti-tank tactics. Colonel 
John D. Byrne, the visiting advisor, agreed with the instructors and passed the request up 
the chain.  Byrne was equally impressed with the NCO Academy. Colonel Frank G. 
Forrest, a former instructor of mountain operations at Fort Greely, Alaska, visited the 
Spanish Mountain Warfare School in 1959.  He suggested better winter rations and 
equipment but was pleased with the school overall.175   
Training and assistance to the army quickly took effect.  A 1958 visit to the Anti-
aircraft Artillery Battalion-Balearic Islands found the unit well trained and 
professional.176  The 13th Field Artillery Regiment’s equipment and weapons were in 
“excellent condition,” and the First Region Artillery Maintenance Park used US stock 
control procedures.  Brigadier General Royal Reynolds, Jr. was “very favorably 
impressed” by the 61st Infantry Regiment’s exercises and training.177 
The Americans also hoped to modernize the Spanish Navy, primarily for use as 
an anti-submarine force.  The US delivered several destroyers for use as training ships.  
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Maneuvers with these “loan destroyers” impressed the advisors, conducting mock 
submarine patrols and practicing radio communications.178  By 1961, the Spanish Navy 
operated US destroyers, and coordinated with the Spanish Air Force to perform search 
and rescue missions at sea.179   
MAAG’s biggest project in Spain was modernizing the Spanish Air Force (SAF), 
fielded a polyglot mix of WWII-era planes, based on antiquated airfields.  They lacked 
practical flight training and experience with larger air operations.180  As in many other 
assistance missions outside of Europe, the group assisted the SAF in training on new jets 
and helped them develop their airfields and logistical system.  They used the usual mix 
of methods: educational instruction, unit visits and inspections, and sent many Spanish 
personnel to training facilities elsewhere in Europe and in the US.  The SAF received F-
86 fighter jets and by the end of 1955 over 400 SAF ground personnel had received 
technical training in the US.  These ground crews acted as training cadres in Spain.181  
Making Spanish airbases capable of handling jet traffic required much work, with long 
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waits for steel planks to reinforce tarmacs.182  One airbase lacked mechanical sweepers, 
necessary to keep runways clear of small debris that could endanger a jet’s takeoff or 
landing.  The MAAG borrowed one sweeper from a USAF base in France, and later 
acquired sweepers formally through the assistance program.183   
Once Spain received jets and improved their airfields, training commenced on 
the new aircraft and the logistics required to support them.  The Spanish quickly made 
“great strides” toward modernization and asked that more advisors be assigned to the 
SAF for training.184  Training accidents were higher than the American norm, but 
MAAG-Spain considered the rate acceptable because of the SAF’s overall inexperience 
with jets.  The Americans and Spanish worked to translate training manuals and also 
trained the SAF on USAF logistical techniques.185  In 1961, they commenced training 
with new Sidewinder missiles.186  Spain quickly put its new air abilities to use, sending 
military aircraft on sea rescue missions, where they performed well.187  Many US 
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planners argued that military aid could do more for a nation than just increase its military 
security, and the use of military aircraft for rescue and relief operations was one such 
benefit. 
Spain made wide use of training facilities available elsewhere in Europe.  Army 
troops personnel regularly trained in Germany and Italy.188  Many also traveled to the 
US, for various training and observation assignments.  Navy personnel visited the US in 
1961, for example, undergoing sonar training at Key West, Florida; visiting civilian and 
naval shipyards across the country; and attending the Naval Command course at the 
Navy War College in Rhode Island.189    
The American mission enjoyed publicity in Spain, with productive relations 
between MAAG and the Spanish officer corps and positive coverage from the press.190  
Regular meetings between American and Spanish officers occurred every month, in 
which they followed up on reports, organized inspection visits, developed procurement 
plans, and socialized.  When disagreements arose, the Americans and Spanish easily 
came to terms.  In a 1959 meeting between Major John Klinck and a Spanish major 
general, the latter complained about the age of equipment received by Spain.  Klinck 
mollified him by explaining that the worldwide demands of the assistance program 
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meant that the US only had so much gear and weaponry to provide.  Satisfied, the 
general moved on and the meeting continued without incident—an excellent example of 
diplomacy by a low-ranking American soldier.191   
Contemporary sources credited much of the success in Spain to Air Force Major 
General August Kissner, who commanded the Joint US Military Group (which oversaw 
the Spanish bases) and the MAAG from 1952 to 1958.  The ambassador to Spain 
described Kissner as “one of our greatest living soldier-statesmen,” who “sees quickly, 
speaks softly, and acts quietly.”  He spoke Spanish and affected a careful, respectful 
relationship with the host government and military.192  The Stars and Stripes called him 
an able “administrator-diplomat,” who “‘combined the qualities of a first rate diplomat 
with those of an able executive.’”  Kissner brought previous diplomatic experience with 
him, having worked with the Portuguese during negotiations over bases in the Azores.193  
He had daily meetings, luncheons, and dinners with officials and was popular with the 
elite. He regularly played tennis with Spanish officers.  A bachelor, flirtatious daughters 
of dignitaries pursued him at parties and formal events.194  He was in many respects like 
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Van Fleet, personally diplomatic and highly competent, though he lacked Van Fleet’s 
fondness for purple prose. 
 Advisors and their families mostly lived in Madrid, where their comparatively 
high salaries allowed them to hire domestic help.  To guide personnel and dependents 
through managing maids, cooks, and drivers, MAAG-Spain regularly updated “Standard 
Operating Procedure #18: Suggestions Concerning Domestic Employees.” “They will 
respond warmly to your kindness,” warned SOP #18, but, “like human beings all over 
the world, they will be quick to take advantage of laxness in discipline. . . . Americans 
who have had experience with Latin domestics know they must be treated with dignity 
and respect, but that nothing will ruin them more quickly than will familiarity.”  
Americans were also not to “deliberately steal trained servants from each other or from 
our Spanish hosts by offering them higher salaries.”195 
 MAAG-Spain issued lengthy guidelines on Spanish social mores.  The guide 
encouraged officers to make “social calls” as a means of introduction: a serviceman’s 
wife would telephone the wife of a Spanish official the American expected to work with 
and arranged visits over coffee or food.  Americans going to parties, official or 
otherwise, were not to overstay their welcome: they should leave 30 minutes after coffee 
(if at lunch), or one hour after orange juice and whiskey (if at dinner).  No one was to 
leave a party before the ranking official left.  Americans were to make an effort to 
mingle with the Spanish and not “huddle” with other Americans.  The guide warned 
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strongly against smoking during a meal, an American habit Europeans found distasteful.  
“Wait until the cigarettes are passed,” the guide instructed.  “They usually are at the end 
of a meal.  If they are not, don’t smoke.”196 
The advisory group also emphasized creating a good impression of Americans 
when driving.  Major Glen R. Best, USAF released a bulletin to his personnel in 1957, 
reminding them that they should “observe Spanish traffic laws at all times. . . . exercise 
great care to avoid criticism of the handling of American official vehicles, and [be] 
courteous to pedestrians and other drivers.”  Drivers of American vehicles, American or 
locally hired, were to be cleanly shaven, with combed hair, shined shoes, and clean 
fingernails. In the case of a car accident, they were to render aid to any injured and 
remain at the scene.  Staying with the vehicle was intended to both to protect US 
property and to show the locals that Americans did not “hit and run,” regardless of 
whose fault the accident was.197 
US policy makers and MAAG personnel considered the mission to Spain a 
success. For relatively small cost, the US gained use of important airbases and helped 
modernize the Spanish military.  Strong leadership by General Kissner established good 
relations with the Spanish, which advisors and their Spanish counterparts maintained 
through regular and productive interaction.  The mission to Spain reflected several 
aspects of US policy in the Cold War.  Though Spain had few ties to the US, had limited 
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trade value for American businesses, was controlled by an authoritarian government, and 
neither shared a border with a communist nation nor hosted a communist insurgency, the 
US nevertheless supported it with military assistance in order to gain base rights.  This 
furthered American strategic goals in the Atlantic and Europe.  
A DECADE OF MAAGS IN EUROPE 
American Cold War strategy changed during the presidency of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower.  Eisenhower believed that strengthening the US economy would ensure its 
security, and decided nuclear armament was the most cost effective way to deter the 
Soviet Union from aggression in Europe and elsewhere.  High-yield bombs, carried by 
heavy bombers based in the US and around the world, provided massive bombardment 
of the Soviet Union should a general war begin.  Lower yield weapons, used by all 
services of the US armed forces, bolstered tactical abilities and, theoretically, made up 
for the outnumbered ground forces of NATO. 
The New Look strategy, as well as congressional wariness of further aid 
spending, reduced funding for military assistance from its peak in 1952-1954.  In Fiscal 
Year 1954, for example, the US spent $3.23 billion on assistance programs, mostly for 
European armed forces, but in FY 1955, Congress only appropriated $1.192 billion—a 
drop of around 60%.198  The aid that did go to Europe was also spread over more 
countries, now including Spain and West Germany.  An increasingly large slice of the 
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military assistance pie went to the Middle East and Asia, and by the end of the 1950s, 
more American military aid went to the “Third World” than to Europe.   Nevertheless, 
the Americans remained committed.  Just under a billion dollars a year continued 
flowing into the continent for the remainder of the decade, primarily to modernize allied 
air forces with new jets, radar, and missiles, but also to provide the NATO countries 
with nuclear capability by stationing tactical American weapons on the continent and 
providing some weapons to their allies.199     
By the beginning of the 1960s, the Americans believed that military assistance to 
Europe had been at least partly successful.  NATO’s strength never reached its desired 
levels, in part because the European states were slow to mobilize and provide the 
manpower and additional funds to supplement US aid.  Despite billions of dollars of 
assistance, the US 7th Army remained in Germany, even after the New Look provided 
the field forces with a nuclear punch.  However, assistance had its victories, in large part 
due to the training efforts of the MAAGs and the contributions of the European forces.  
A communist rebellion had been defeated in Greece.  NATO forces, including France 
and Germany but also the smaller members whose divisions cumulatively strengthened 
the alliance, developed greatly from their mostly moribund postwar state.  Danish and 
Dutch pilots flew US-made jets, Europeans studied in American military schools, and 
the importance of maintenance and efficient logistics had been imparted to several of the 
NATO armed forces, if incompletely.  Most significantly, assistance showed the NATO 
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powers the depth of American commitment to European security, and the advisors, along 
with the 7th Army and EUCOM, provided the human face of this commitment.   
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CHAPTER IV 
THIRD WORLD ADVISORY MISSIONS 
The United States centered its strategic attention on Europe, but policy makers 
also worried that the Soviet Union would encroach upon the “Third World,” the mostly 
unindustrialized, underdeveloped nations of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.  The US 
used military assistance as a major component of its strategy to build up Third World 
nations against the perceived communist threat.  Military assistance to the Third World 
never reached the overall spending seen in Europe, but it still represented a major 
commitment by the US.  Assistance included advisors, who worked with host nations’ 
armed forces to organize aid delivery, train troops, and develop military institutions.  
The advisors’ work played an important role in US foreign policy and military strategy. 
This chapter examines the role of American military advising and assistance in 
the Middle East and Asia.  It shows that US advisors faced an uphill struggle with Third 
World armed forces that lacked established military institutions.  The advisors tried to 
create allied forces capable of mechanized warfare as understood by the Americans, 
which those forces could not, in the short term, support without major US assistance.  It 
also reveals that the desires of advisory groups, to create educated officer corps divorced 
from politics as per the American ideal, sometimes contradicted the objective of US 
foreign policy to support nations strategically and politically useful to the United States.  
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Overall, the advisors were restricted by conditions beyond their control, time and 
resources, and within their control, including their ideas of warfare and methods of 
training. 
THE MIDDLE EAST 
During the 1950s, United States policy makers believed the Middle East had 
considerable strategic value because of its oil reserves and its position between Asia and 
Europe.  Increasing Soviet activity in the region made Washington more and more 
concerned of the Middle East turning away from the West.  The US combatted Soviet 
encroachment by supporting pro-Western, anti-communist governments in the region.  
This began with President Harry S. Truman’s support of Iran and Turkey and expanded 
dramatically during the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. 200   
As historians have noted, American strategy in the Middle East encountered 
several major obstacles.  The image of the US as the white supporter of the former 
colonial powers undermined the official American anti-colonial message.  Washington’s 
support of Israel was a constant source of friction.  Perhaps most difficult of all was the 
region’s fractious nature.  Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan openly distrusted one another.  The 
Arab states, like Egypt and Iraq, moved toward the growing movement of Arab 
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nationalism, which the United States worried would place them in the neutralist or 
Soviet camp.  Furthermore, numerous Middle Eastern nations dealt with internal revolts. 
From the Americans’ perspective, they were only a military coup or rural rebellion away 
from changing leadership and international affiliation.  From 1949 to 1958, pro-western 
regimes in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq all fell to coups and uprisings, replaced by nationalistic 
governments which leaned toward the Soviet Union.  Despite the creation of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, to provide more aid to Middle Eastern governments facing 
potential internal strife, Arab nations continued their slide away from the US. 
In the Middle East and Asia the US also directly encountered the complex forces 
of decolonization, which began during World War I and accelerated after World War II.  
The United States viewed these new nations with a mix of idealistic optimism—
reflecting traditional American anti-colonial sentiment—and pragmatic geopolitics. 
Washington claimed they wanted these new nations to follow ideals of free enterprise 
and democratic government, and not succumb to Soviet influence.  However, in many 
instances American political leaders acted as a conservative force in the developing 
world.  They did not demand the immediate withdrawal of European empires, wanting 
Third World markets and resources to remain available to recovering European and 
Japanese economies.  American covert action unseated leftist leaders and backed 
conservatives.   US policies supported authoritarian, military-backed regimes out of fear 
that young democracies could too easily come under control of the communists.  These 
new countries, however, were not passive recipients of foreign aid or puppets to great 
power rivalry.  They manipulated great power interests, often playing their former 
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imperial overlords against the Soviets and the United States.  They pursued their own 
political objectives, sometimes greatly at odds with US policy.201   
For most of the 1950s, the US made these varied political and military objectives 
in the third world distinctly secondary to their objectives in Europe.  The United States 
spent $10.19 billion on aid to Greece, Turkey, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia from 
1950-1959, but spent $12.5 billion on to Western Europe alone.202  For the first four 
years of the decade, over 79% of aid went to Europe.203  Most support delivered outside 
of Europe occurred in the latter portion of the decade.  By the end of the 1950s, as the 
Eisenhower administration reduced Truman’s heavy spending and completed 
rearmament projects in the West, aid shifted to the Third World—in Fiscal Year 1959, 
for example, the US delivered $1.384 billion outside of Europe, and $927 million to 
Europe.204  The number of MAAG personnel also conveyed the new US emphasis on the 
Third World.  In 1958, there were 6,893 United States military personnel assigned to 
MAAGs all around the world.  Only 614 were stationed in Europe: 19 were in Latin 
America, 669 were spread across Japan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Libya; and the 
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remainder were in Iran, Southeast Asia, and East Asia.  In Europe, only West Germany 
still had a MAAG in the triple digits, with 185 advisors.  The biggest missions were 
Vietnam (692), the Republic of China (1,641), and South Korea (1,656).205  
This section examines four advisory missions in Africa and the Middle East: 
Turkey, Iran, Libya, and Ethiopia.  Turkey controlled vital exits from the Black Sea and 
supported the “strategic flank” of Europe.  In Iran, Washington primarily wanted to 
maintain a friendly, stable government.  They supported the Iranians in the development 
of their internal security forces and conventional capabilities.  The assistance mission to 
Libya lacked great strategic importance, but reflected American concerns about Arab 
nationalism and regional strife.  The US operated in Ethiopia in exchange for base rights, 
and the MAAG mission there had the dubious distinction of being the least pleasant 
peace time advisory mission of the Cold War.  
TURKEY 
Before World War I, the United States had few interests in Turkey.  The Great 
War replaced the Ottoman Empire with a nationalist, modernizing government founded 
by politically active soldiers.  The US Senate did not recognize the new Turkey until 
1927, by which time US-Turkish relations slowly evolved.  Secondary diplomatic agents 
and private individuals increased contact between the two nations.  The first Turkish 
ambassadors to the United States, popular with the American press, helped dispel the 
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“Terrible Turk” myth, which by the late 1930s had given way to the “New Turk,” a 
hard-working and trustworthy nationalist.  Improved interwar relations prepared the way 
for post-war cooperation the United States and Turkey. 206 
After WWII, Turkish leaders looked to the United States for support.  A 
combination of Turkish politicking, Soviet aggression, and American strategic interests 
brought the nations together in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  The United States grew 
worried of Soviet intentions toward Turkey, and officially backed the Turks when the 
Soviets demanded access to the Straits in 1946.  Concerns over the Greek civil war also 
encouraged American involvement in the region.  Turkey’s geographic position shielded 
Middle Eastern oilfields.  The nation also controlled the Black Sea exits, a vital strategic 
interest for the Soviet Union.207  If a Soviet attack came, the Turks would likely have 
their hands full.  The Americans estimated Soviet objectives as the straits between the 
Mediterranean and the Black Sea and the main Mediterranean ports.  A simultaneous 
attack from east and west would put tremendous pressure on the Turkish ground 
forces.208  As with many nations, Turkey also sought military assistance for its own 
purposes and objectives.  The US wanted to support Turkey as part of the global struggle 
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against communism, but the Turks desired improved security against all their 
neighbors—foremost the Soviets, but also Greece, the Arab nations, and Iran.209  
As part of the Truman Doctrine, the US started military assistance to Turkey in 
1947.  It was a massive undertaking.  Turkey had large numbers of troops, proven brave 
in previous wars, but they had old weapons, underdeveloped logistics and roads, and 
practiced obsolete tactics.  The United States supplied the Turks with modern weaponry 
intended for mechanized battles, and the advisors and specialists to train the Turks on the 
new equipment and methods.  The American aid operation in Turkey succeeded in that it 
partly modernized the military and strengthened ties between the two nations.  But the 
mission frustrated the advisors, because the Turkish military’s deep institutional 
problems could not be fixed in the short term. 
The advisory group began its work in 1948, as the Joint American Military 
Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT).  The mission grew to about 350 prsonnel by the 
end of the year, including army, navy, air force, and a road/highway development 
section.  The group added an engineering section later.  The mission’s largest component 
was the Turkish-US Army Group (TUSAG).210  As in other missions, JAMMAT 
personnel managed the delivery of incoming materiel and worked with the Turks to 
determine what equipment and weapons they wanted versus what the United States 
could provide.  They assessed Turkish military abilities and facilities. Most significantly, 
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they trained troops in the use of American equipment and military techniques.  Army 
missions ran the gamut, from preparing the ports for incoming materiel to training 
courses on US weapons like the 81mm mortar and 3-inch anti-tank gun.211  The air force 
advisors directed development of airbases, logistics, and pilot training.  The navy 
conducted mine warfare, submarine and surface training.212  
The Americans found a panoply of problems in the Turkish armed forces.  The 
General Staff excessively centralized authority, which slowed decision making and 
dissuaded personal initiative among the junior officers.  Turkish officers had little 
professional training or education.213  The reserve officer training system, one 1951 
American report declared, was “merely a device to exempt sons of upper class families 
from ordinary soldier duties.”  The enlisted men were under-educated and lacked 
technical skills.214  Short on critical specialists like technicians and mechanics, the army 
could not use more advanced gear, including new radios and range finders.  The air force 
advisors examined Turkish airfields and found them “scarcely usable.”215  When the 
Americans arrived in 1948, they observed that Turkish Armed Forces had no concept of 
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the logistics needed to support a modern force.216  Tuberculosis further degraded their 
armed forces, with 1% or more of some units infected with the “active” form of the 
disease, almost seven times the US rate.217  Even language required modification—
advisors dealing with radar and communications added around 300 technical words to 
Turkish.218 
The Americans hoped to modernize the Turkish armed forces with training, 
education, and improved equipment.  Training took the form of classroom instruction, 
Turkish personnel education in the US, and field exercises.  In May 1948, the Army 
group started numerous courses, for radar operators, tank gunners, tank mechanics, and 
more, and began practice with US-made weapons.219  The Turks selected some of their 
more exceptional officers for training in the United States.  One of the first batches of 
these men returned to Turkey in July 1948 and became instructors themselves.220  By 
December 1948, some 3,000 Turks had graduated from the US-directed facilities.221  
This rate increased as the years progressed.  They were generally quite receptive to the 
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training methods, reorganizing their infantry school to mirror the US school.  The 
advisors took this as a sign of the confidence in American practices.222 
The Turkish Motor School was a mundane but important aspect of the advisory 
mission.  Driving was not a common civilian skill in 1940s Turkey, so the armed forces 
were desperately short of drivers.  The US provided funding and training materials for 
the Motor School, and suggested in 1949 that it move to a new location, where better 
weather conditions allowed more training.223  By the end of 1949, the availability of 
drivers had improved enough that the school shifted emphasis to training instructors 
only.  This was indicated progress for the Turkish armed forces, as mechanized forces 
were impossible without enough drivers.  As will be seen, however, the driving school 
ran into trouble later. 
As training continued, US materiel flooded into Turkey.  JAMMAT’s army 
section spent its first weeks assessing ports and preparing the way for the military aid.224  
The Turks processed the incoming materiel more efficiently than the Americans 
expected.  The Americans tripled the scheduled aid shipments from 10,000 metric tons 
per month to 30,000.  The shipments included reams of manuals, training aids, and 
lesson plans, but the language barrier complicated their use.225  Translating this wealth of 
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information became a bottleneck in the training schedule.  Even by 1949, TUSAG 
personnel called the translating section “swamped.”226   The Americans simultaneously 
urged that the Turks replace their “antiquated” record keeping with the “flexible 
American system of stock record cards.”227   
While the army trained for land warfare, advisors worked to modernize the 
Turkish Air Force (TAF).  They began a six month program to strengthen runways and 
replace makeshift shacks with air-traffic control towers.  While working on the airfields, 
shipments of US-made aircraft arrived, mainly P-47 fighters and C-47 transports, and 
pilot and ground crew training commenced.228  They also introduced the Turks to the use 
of training films, which the USAF had found highly effective.229  Training included 
courses on aircraft armament, ground vehicles, meteorology, and firefighting.230  As 
early as July 1948, the TAF began large-unit training with its new American aircraft, 
successfully conducting an exercise involving both P-47 fighters and A-26 bombers.  
Batches of Turkish pilots traveled to West Germany where they flew with American 
fighter groups.231 Logistically, the Turkish Air Force groaned under the weight of 
American equipment and new airfields.  With twice as many aircraft as before and three 
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times as many flight hours, their maintenance backlog quickly snarled.232  However, 
with better training and more modern aircraft, the TAF’s accident rate dropped almost 
by half, down from 3.3 accidents per 1000 flight hours in 1947, to 1.9 per 1000 in 
1949.233  
The navy group trained for submarines, minelaying/sweeping, and destroyers, 
which reflected the US objective of holding the Black Sea exits through the Bosporus 
and Dardanelles.   Beginning in February 1948, they helped coordinate Turkish sailors’ 
trips to the US for training at continental facilities.234  As in the army and air force, the 
advisors developed school courses for almost all aspects of the Turkish navy.  The Fleet 
Schools program, as it became known, included torpedo maintenance, minesweeping, 
electronics, gunnery, and navigation.235   
The Americans emphasized submarine operations, delivering four boats to the 
Turkish Navy.  The USN temporarily assigned 102 submarine crew to the mission, 
creating a Submarine Instruction Unit that rigorously taught the Turkish sailors for 
twenty two weeks.  This created a well-prepared nucleus of submarine crews.236  The 
trainers helped the Turks begin their own submarine school and acquired some fifty 
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training films, covering subjects as varied as Torpedo Control Spreads, Shallow Water 
Diving, and Sex Hygiene.237  The Navy also conducted surface exercises, using two US 
destroyers delivered to Turkey in June 1949.  The crew quickly trained on the new 
destroyers after a cadre of twelve officers trained in the US returned to Turkey.238   
As early as mid-1949, the navy mission showed signs of success.  The Turkish 
forces, with the help of their US advisors, developed effective training plans and 
followed them closely.   The Americans suggested concentrating facilities in a few 
locations, instead of spreading the across the coast, and the Turks complied.  This sped 
up their schedules and cut down on back-and-forth travel.  The Fleet Schools greatly 
improved the Turkish Navy, because, wrote an advisor in a 1949 report, “the Navy can, 
in the long run, be no better than its trained personnel make it.”239 
Advising in Turkey was physically arduous and time consuming.  In 1954, 
TUSAG attempted one visit to each major unit per month, and spent 60% of their time in 
the field.  They focused their time on “M-Day” units, those intended to fight at or near 
the beginning of hostilities.  Brigadier General Robert Aloe, an army advisor, noted in 
1954 that the advisors managed their trips even in bad weather and on miserable roads.  
“On separate occasions some 9 or 10 team members had to hike distances of 10 to 15 
miles to shelter because of blocked roads,” he wrote, “and have to spend a day or so in 
small isolated villages waiting for roads to be cleared.”  The Americans drove long 
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distances to reach Turkish units, with an average round trip of 700-800 miles.  They 
travelled in pairs of vehicles, in case one broke down, and started the trip on the 
weekend to make maximum use of the workweek.  Easy desk work it was not.240 
For American personnel and their families, living and working in Turkey came 
with challenges.  JAMMAT provided incoming personnel with a country guide, which 
cautioned, "food is the problem close to the hearts of many Americans who live 
abroad.  Obviously, it cannot be expected that an American housewife living in Turkey 
will shop, or cook, or feed her family in the same way she did in the United States."  
Turkish milk was not pasteurized, and the guide warned that "fresh milk must be boiled" 
to be safe.  "Some Americans prefer to mix their own Klim," the station's country guide 
continued, referring to the dried milk substitute.241 
Advisors and their dependents lived in rental units and hotels in the large cities of 
Ankara and Istanbul, relatively modern cities with electricity, phone service, and 
automobiles.  An American dispensary operated in in Ankara, staffed by US doctors and 
nurses.  Servicemen’s families could send their children to an English-speaking school in 
Ankara (kindergarten through 12th grade), take college-level courses at the Robert 
College in Istanbul, and access more limited facilities in several other towns.  JAMMAT 
personnel went to the NCO Club, played tennis at local courts, rode horses (the animals 
and riding gear provided for free by a cavalry regiment in Ankara), skied, or played 
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golf.  Those stationed near the Black Sea, the base of Greek colonies from antiquity, 
could visit Greco-Roman ruins.  Some navy personnel, however, lived further afield, at 
Camp Lockwood, in the rural area of Golcuk.  They lived in in Quonset huts, each 
family allotted half a hut.  Servicemen were warned against bringing dependents to the 
isolated station, which, because of terrain and road conditions, was a five hour journey 
from Istanbul, only 60 miles away. 242 
By 1953, the aid program’s major training and supply management task neared 
its end.  The Turkish Army had, on average, 300,000 troops—but this number fluctuated 
wildly, as the rhythm of conscription shifted their strength every few months.  The Turks 
could not support a force any larger.  The advisors worried about what might happen in 
the case of war.  In 1953, the Turks had four “M-Day” divisions, and eight more 
“M+15” divisions—a small force to face the Russian hordes that American planners 
imagined.243 
The Turks needed to be well trained and ready to face a Soviet assault, but a 
JAMMAT report of large-scale maneuvers in January, 1952 had few positive things to 
say about Turkish progress.  Despite nearly four years of training on logistics and 
maintenance, neither were “fully appreciated” by the Turks.  “Each of the army 
maneuvers,” the US report read, “barely scratched the surface on the tremendous supply 
problems which will face the Turk Ground Forces in war.”  The Turks also made 
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numerous tactical errors: they did not protect their defensive positions with obstacles or 
mines, neglected reconnaissance, and advanced through valleys rather than along ridges.  
Units in the field neglected sanitation and hygiene.  One US observer noted that it took 
too long for the Turks to apply what Americans taught them.244  Such trends continued.  
In 1954, TUSAG noted that smaller Turkish units, which trained together regularly, did 
well; battalions and above need more work to function properly.245 
According to the Americans, the Turks’ institutional problems were simply too 
deep for a few years of advising to fix.  They had “no concept of maintenance and 
supply techniques necessary to support a modern force,” bemoaned the writer of one 
report.246  The army neglected staffing one of its most important schools, the Motor 
Transport School, leaving it short scores of personnel.  This undid much of that school’s 
success only a year earlier and introduced more bottlenecks into the Turkish logistical 
system.  The advisors did manage to dissuade the Turks from sinking personnel and 
resources into a 2-year advanced college, arguing that they should focus on staff courses 
and other fundamentals before moving on to higher level institutions.247  Their army 
often sent unqualified officers to school courses.  Some students were so frequently 
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tardy that their Turkish superiors had to take disciplinary measures.248  Even by the end 
of the 1950s, the Turkish armed forces had a long way to go to become a modern, 
mechanized force.  According to a former advisor, writing in 1959, the Turks still had 
problems meeting their objectives of border defense, with limited ability to deter Soviet 
aggression.  “Self sustaining” Turkish forces remained elusive, with the nation still in 
need of significant US assistance.249 
 US advisors could only go so far to correct shortcomings.  At a TUSAG 
conference in 1954, Brigadier General Aloe frankly spoke about the frustrations of 
advising, the attitude of American advisors, and the nature of American advisory and 
assistance missions abroad: 
I wish to urge again that we accept the fact that the Turks are a sovereign 
nation.  We don’t command.  They have their own ways.  We try to 
advise according to our tried-and-true methods.  They can’t always 
accept.  Their laws, customs, and traditions interfere.  We try to keep 
them on the path but if they deviate that’s it.  They make the rules. . . . .I 
mention this to show that once they make the decision and it is not too 
completely crazy, that’s the ground rule.250 
 
Despite shortcomings, US advising and equipment had a positive effect on the 
Turkish military.  The advisors reinvigorated a previously stagnant school system.  
Turkish officers trained successfully at US schools and with American units in Germany.  
Large-scale maneuvers showed improvement in the armored brigades and on road 
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marches.251  Turkish infantry—the “most important service” according to the 
Americans—trained hard at the smaller unit level.252  The brigades Turkey sent to fight 
in Korea fought well and earned the respect of the United Nations command.  
This progress and improvement weighed against the continuing problems of the 
Turkish armed forces, similar to those in other developing countries: an officer corps 
resistant to change and lacking in professional education; difficulty in understanding the 
importance of logistics in modern warfare; and a general shortage of technically- and 
mechanically trained personnel.  The advisors contributed to these problems by 
emphasizing and planning for the Turkish armed forces to train and equip themselves 
toward American-style, mechanized warfare. 
IRAN 
While JAMMAT trained in Turkey, the Americans also assisted development in 
Iran, which required forces capable of both internal security and limited external defense 
against the Soviet Union.  US involvement in Iran changed greatly since it began in 
WWII, when the US agreed to provide some training and arms to the Iranian 
government.  Soviet troops remained in Iran well past their deadline to withdraw in 
1946, which the US took as a sign of Stalin’s expansionistic objectives in the region.  
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Iranian maneuvering ousted the Soviets without bloodshed, and the US continued 
military aid to the country, at the same time courting Shah Reza Pahlavi, a pro-Western 
conservative.  As Iranian nationalists agitated to take over the country’s oil reserves in 
the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration used the Central Intelligence Agency to help 
orchestrate a coup and install the Shah as leader of Iran.  Assistance to Iran grew to 
support the Shah’s government, provide security against internal revolt, and deter Soviet 
aggression.  The Shah used US aid to protect himself and his nation from the Soviets, 
weaken British influence on Iran’s oil production, and entrench himself politically.  The 
Eisenhower administration considered it critical to shore up the Iranian regime until oil 
revenue picked up and improved their economy.253  By the end of the 1950s, Iran 
received $500 million in aid, much of it for military purposes.254  The political side of 
the mission to Iran—maintaining the Shah—overshadowed the advisors’ efforts to train 
up the Iranian armed forces, making those training objectives mostly secondary.255 
US military aid to Iran began amidst the first wave of assistance missions after 
World War II, with a 1947 package of $25 million, in the form of credit for discounted 
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US equipment.256   Advisors, including Brigadier General Norman Schwartzkopf, had 
worked with the Iranian Gendarmerie in the 1940s.  The mission expanded after WWII 
to include an army training component, known as the US Army Military Mission, or 
ARMISH.  ARMISH grew in 1949 to include the army and air force, with the objective 
of modernizing them for defensive operations against the Soviets, and for maintaining 
internal security and stability.  In 1950, the US established a formal MAAG, making Iran 
an official recipient of US military aid, in the same form as Greece, Turkey, and other 
nations.  The MAAG and ARMISH worked together, mainly guiding the Iranian high 
command and processing US materiel deliveries.257  The Shah wanted improved military 
forces for regional defense and to maintain himself in power.  The advisors believed the 
Shah’s close control of the armed forces limited their combat effectiveness.  However, 
the Shah’s solid hold on power fit US strategic objectives, by providing Iranian bases for 
US aircraft and blocking a potential Soviet route to the Middle East oilfields.  
American advisors in Iran usually either worked with Iranian officials and staff 
in Teheran—a relatively modern city—or deep in the countryside with Field Advisory 
Teams, where they trained Iranian troops stationed nearer the borders with the Soviet 
Union.   Life in the Field Advisory Teams could be primitive.  Colonel James Meyers, 
an ARMISH advisor in 1958, was attached to the Iranian 9th Infantry Division.  His 
“Team House” had a dirt-floor and water filtered through gravel and sand.   Meyers 
described his station as “the boonies” and spent as almost much time hunting game and 
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visiting with mountain shepherds as he did advising and training Iranian troops.258  In 
this respect, the mission in Iran resembled that in Turkey—the Americans traveled long 
distances over rough roads to train troops in arid, mountainous areas.  
Meanwhile, the advisors in bustling Teheran worked out of an office building on 
Roosevelt Avenue, a busy street where Americans had frequent car accidents with 
inexperienced Iranian drivers.259  In one 1950 incident, MAAG Sergeant First Class 
Lewis Castner had an altercation with an Iranian civilian, a Mr. Mahdoub, who blocked 
a busy intersection with his parked car.  It was unclear who threw the first punch, but the 
investigating American officer suspected it was the Castner, provoked by “the natural 
characteristics of Iranians, Mr. Mahdoub in particular, of moving and waving his arms.”  
Castner was “administratively admonished.”  Mr. Mahdoub did not suffered any serious 
injuries and did not press charges against Castner.260   
Beyond dirt-floored team houses in the countryside and car accidents in Teheran, 
daily life for advisors in Iran was similar to other missions in the developing world.  
"You should not expect to find everything you want in a house," advised the Iranian 
MAAG’s country guide (the “Persian Brochure”).  "Settle for a place that meets your 
basic needs and adjust to the drawbacks.”  The brochure suggested that families bring a 
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full set of home tools to affect the “constant repairs” needed in old Iranian housing, and 
keep dogs to help secure their homes.  It provided the contact information for the local 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals shelter.261 
The advisors encountered a number of obstacles to modernizing the Iranian 
military and convincing it to adopt American military standards and practices, including 
old equipment and soldier education.  At the start of US assistance, the Shah’s armed 
forces remained mostly foot and hoof-bound.  For infantry fighting in mountainous 
terrain, mules were quite useful, but for the kind of mobile operations Americans 
envisioned against the Soviets, horse-drawn weapons were a major drawback.  US 
advisors found themselves in the unusual position of gauging horseflesh, suggesting that 
the Iranians improve equine breeding standards.  They praised the veterinary corps, 
however, finding them professional and well organized.262   
Trucks could be imported and replace horses with relative ease, but training 
mechanics to service them and soldiers to drive was another matter.  Around 75% of 
Iranian enlisted personnel could read—a relatively large number, compared to other 
developing countries—but less than 10% had a high school education.  Colonel Vernum 
Stevens, an ARMISH advisor, wrote in 1953 that the “lack of education makes it 
difficult if not impossible to teach the operation of a modern supply system.”263  Sanitary 
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and dietary practices also left much to be desired.  Many Iranian units lacked access to 
clean water—remembering Colonel Meyer’s crude water filtration system with the 9th 
Division—and some units only served the enlisted sweet tea and bread during the day.264   
Colonel Stevens found that the officers were the greatest weakness in the Iranian 
armed forces. Enlisted men suffered harsh discipline, but officers violated orders and 
neglected duties without punishment.  Senior officers never delegated authority, 
“equipment is not issued for fear of loss,” and the army lacked an effective inspection 
system.  The Iranian Air Force did not reward dangerous or difficult work.  For example, 
there was no hazard pay for the Iranian Transport Squadron. These pilots, having already 
flown over 2,000 hours, made the same pay as a desk officer.  The pilots resented this 
system and their morale suffered, “a natural reaction, one which can only be remedied 
by a complete revision of the system.”  Even something as seemingly straightforward as 
prioritizing messages needed overhaul. Low priority messages flooded commanders, 
leaving them unable to quickly reply to urgent messages.  One air force unit briefly fixed 
the problem in 1953, when they transferred another airman to act as the clerk, but as 
soon as he was transferred back, the unit returned to its old habits. Colonel Francis 
Grable, Chief of the USAF Section of the Iranian mission, wrote, “They are obviously 
not interested in changing.”265  
The Iranian high command also interfered with training.  When an air force unit 
suffered two aircraft crashes that claimed three lives, Iranian higher command insisted it 
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was material failure, not pilot error as the Americans argued.  Against the advisors’ 
suggestion, the Iranians grounded the unit for two whole months.  Colonel Grable noted, 
“the Squadron retrogressed and was virtually back where I started, with one exception.  
The morale of the pilots was lower.”266  The Americans struggled to convince the 
Iranians to accelerate their training schedules or affect other organizational changes, and 
decried a lack of “hustle” among their advisees.  Brigadier General Richard Whitney, an 
Army advisor in the early 1960s, wrote in his debriefing that “The pace of all activity in 
Iran, with the exception of automobile driving, is the pace of the aged.”267   
The US advisors proposed improvement of existing military schools and creating 
new ones.  They helped create a Command and General Staff College and a War College 
for the scholarly training of Iranian officers, improved armor and transport schools, and 
began development of new branch schools.268  Other Iranian schools needed much 
improvement, such as the air force Technical School’s crumbling facilities.  Much of the 
Iranian military establishment held schools in low esteem and had to be convinced of 
their utility.269  The US mission also argued for faster promotions, so that American-
trained junior officers could move up in the ranks and increase their influence.  They 
urged the Iranians to write efficiency reports and evaluate officers as a method of 
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improving their quality.  They also pushed for a new law to allow the Iranian Army to 
dismiss ineffective officers and generals.270  Additionally, over 2,000 Iranian officers 
travelled to the US for training at staff colleges.271   
By the end of the decade, Iran’s military, in physical size and armament, was an 
impressive force.  Approximately 170,000 troops formed twelve infantry divisions, 
several air force squadrons, and dozens of naval vessels to patrol the Persian Gulf.  They 
had stockpiled enough military supplies to fight for a month. Their arsenal included 
hundreds of towed artillery pieces, M-41 tanks, and F-84 jets.272  Though the Americans 
questioned the Iranians’ ability to fight a Soviet invasion, the objective of maintaining 
Iran as an ally, and keeping the relatively reliable Shah in power, proceeded well.  A 
1965 report summarized the situation: “No insurmountable obstacles are currently 
foreseen in achievement of US objectives.  This is due to progress made in 
modernization of Iranian Armed Forces and their demonstated [sic] ability during the 
1963 riots in Teheran to maintain internal control.”273   
The US mission to Iran was different than many other assistance missions during 
the Cold War.  Some of the arms provided by the US to Iran were in exchange for 
Iranian oil.  By the early 1960s, the US did not believe Iran was under credible 
communist threat, but continued large scale assistance and advising anyway, to ensure 
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the Shah remained in power.274  The US used assistance to influence the nation’s 
military, civil authorities, and infrastructure.  The MAAG oversaw huge military 
deliveries as the 1960s and 1970s continued, and their role in monitoring this aid was 
more important than their role in attempting to retrain or improve upon the Iranian’s 
military.275  The Shah, protected by his military, remained in power until 1979, when he 
was ousted by a Shiite-led rebellion in part created by his heavy handed use of armed 
forces the MAAG had trained and supplied. 
 
LIBYA AND ETHIOPIA 
 
 US aid to Libya was an unusual case, as Washington suspected no significant 
internal communist threat to the country, nor was Libya especially important to US 
strategic interests.  In 1954, the Libyan government requested US military assistance in 
exchange for base rights, which Washington did not did not immediately grant.  When 
the Libyans briefly turned to Soviet-supported Egypt, the Eisenhower administration 
quickly acted to provide aid, dispatching a survey team to examine Libya’s assistance 
needs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised that a $2.7 million sum be granted to Libya over 
Fiscal Years 1957-1959.276  The Americans hoped to reduce Soviet, Chinese, and other 
anti-American influences and increase stability in the oil-rich but infrastructure-poor 
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country.   Beyond the rule of the aging King Idris, there was little political authority to 
hold together Libya.  Once the King died, the country could succumb to political chaos 
and come under control of neighboring Egypt, whose worrisome nationalistic tendencies 
and openness to the Soviet Union the US wished to counteract.  Washington hoped that, 
by improving the strength of Libya’s armed forces, they could help create an institution 
that would maintain order after Idris’s death and transfer power safely.  The United 
States also wanted base rights, particularly over a base at Wheelus in the northwest 
corner of the country.277   
Libya and the US signed a formal assistance treaty on 30 June 1957.278  MAAG-
Libya activated two months later, their mission to manage delivery of heavy equipment 
and help the Libyans with their logistics.  British advisors conducted tactical training.  
The Libyan armed forces, around 3,000 strong, not only operated a diverse mix of old 
equipment, but also lacked facilities to store supplies and spare parts.  MAAG-Chief 
Colonel Edward Sachs noted the low literacy rate among the enlisted personnel, which 
made filling specialist and technical positions very difficult.  The Libyan forces had 
neither a consistent system of maintenance nor any training standards to speak of.  The 
army had many holidays, a largely illiterate enlisted force, and limited organization 
above the battalion level.279 Sachs estimated the Libyans’ combat effectiveness as 
277
 “Military Assistance Plan, Libya,” 1963, USAHEC. 
278 “Military Assistance Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom of Libya, 30 June 1957,” Military Assistance Bilaterals. 
279
 Colonel Edward Sachs, “US Military Assistance Group, Libya—Quarterly Activity Report,” 31 May 
1958, USAHEC. 
122 
“zero”—it could only assist the police in internal security, and could not defend against 
an external threat.280  Because aid was limited and tactical training of the Libyans 
remained a strictly British mission, MAAG-Libya was a tiny operation of eight officers, 
six enlisted, and one civilian.281 
US assistance and advising to Libya primarily consisted of small deliveries of 
heavy equipment—trucks, artillery, and a few aircraft—and sending Libyan personnel to 
train in the United States.  Libyan pilots trained at Wheelus airbase, where the US had 
base rights and operated air force units.  A 1963 summary of aid and assistance to Libya 
declared that US efforts improved “the effectiveness of the Libyan Army” with abilities 
“equal to other new armies of comparable size.”  Significantly, the Libyans had achieved 
“supply consciousness” and wanted to improve their logistical management along US 
lines.282  US support to Libya continued on this small scale into the 1960s, before ending 
after the military took over the country following King Idris’s death.  It reflected limited 
US engagement in the Arab world, outside of the immediate objectives of the Cold War. 
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ETHIOPIA 
A similar, politically expedient arrangement existed in Ethiopia.  As part of their 
May 1953 agreement, the Ethiopians received military aid for internal security, self-
defense, regional defense, and possible United Nations missions, in exchange for US 
access to a strategic radio relay station in the country.283  The agreement with Ethiopia 
was also an example of  a Third World nation achieving its own objectives in the midst 
of super-power politicking.  The Ethiopians had grown accustomed to US equipment 
that came into the region during World War II, they wanted a new western ally to 
replace Britain, and needed arms and training for potential conflicts with its neighbor 
Somalia.284 
The advisory mission faced significant obstacles in Ethiopia.  Political infighting 
often prevented military reform and even training. In the MAAG’s view, a “general lack 
of experienced, dependable commanders and staff officers” crippled he Ethiopian 
Army.285  Slow-acting officers, who refused to delegate authority, delayed training for 
both the army and navy.286  This left services short of vital personnel.  At one point, the 
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Ethiopians were so in need of a qualified naval officer they even considered hiring a 
Norwegian mercenary who worked in the area.287  Even into the 1960s, Swedes and 
Norwegians occupied key positions in the navy.288  In one instance, the army did not 
want to make use of a MAAG mobile training unit, preferring to keep their training 
centralized near the capital.  The advisors suspected that this was intended to prevent 
politically undesirable officers from taking advantage of the training opportunity.289  
Beyond training, materiel shortages and educational problems hampered development of 
the Ethiopian armed forces.  The army even lacked sufficient mules to transport its 
antiquated artillery.290  
MAAG Ethiopia was a small outfit, with only a few dozen advisors—barely one 
advisor for every 800 host nation troops—and the Americans did not routinely work 
below the division level.291  Most advising, therefore, consisted of consulting the 
Ethiopian senior commanders, who were a difficult sell on American ideas.  They 
refused to implement a suggestion to establish a department of defense, because it could 
upset the balance of power within political factions.292  The MAAG focused on logistics 
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and maintenance, which took time to gain traction among illiterate and mechanically 
untrained enlisted men.  The most important and effective training occurred in the US, 
where Ethiopian officers attended armed forces schools and academies.  Sending foreign 
troops to train in the US was quite common throughout the Cold War, and the “ZI” 
trained troops usually went on to train the rest of their forces in the American style.  
However, in Ethiopia, this usually effective process met difficulties.  Few officers had 
sufficient command of English to train in the US.293  Furthermore, the Ethiopian 
government sometimes blocked passports, making it difficult for officers to apply for US 
travel.294  The advisors could find no particular reason for this, but it was probably due 
to the political affiliations, or lack thereof, of those officers. 
Of all the peacetime advisory missions during the Cold War, Ethiopia may have 
been the most miserable for the MAAG personnel.  Bad diet sapped American morale.  
For diplomatic and budgetary reasons, the MAAG was not allowed to keep a post 
exchange or a commissary and had to either fly in canned goods, or buy their food 
locally—food that failed to meet American safety standards.  The US Ambassador to 
Kenya denied the MAAG’s request to use its own funds to order fresh meat and dairy 
from Kenya (whose food safety laws were similar to the US), out of fear of offending the 
Ethiopian government.  Servicemen were allowed to buy their own duty-free imported 
foods from Kenya, but Colonel Charles P. Howe, chief in 1957-58, noted that the 
already high cost of living prohibited this, especially for MAAG enlisted.  The Ethiopian 
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government also tried denying these duty free imports despite a treaty obligation to do 
so.  This further exasperated the Americans’ financial problems and did little to improve 
US-Ethiopian relations.295 
The small MAAG team was also badly overworked.  Colonel Howe complained 
that, despite working evenings and weekends, “backlogs continue to develop and many 
essential matters are not being handled.”  Frequent visitors, including American 
politicians, interrupted work schedules.  When advisor tours ended and MAAG 
personnel departed, it could take weeks to receive replacements, further burdening the 
understaffed unit.  The heavy work load and poor diet literally made the advisors sick; 
the unit had an unusually high disease rate.296  To make matters worse, the mission’s 
position on the periphery of the periphery delayed mail service.297   
A 1963 summary of the US mission in Ethiopia reported mixed results.  In ten 
years, assistance had provided $55 million in weapons, equipment, and training to 
Ethiopia.  At the start of that period, the Ethiopians had no effective military force 
whatsoever; by 1963, their officers had trained in the United States and the army grew to 
25,000 troops in four divisions. The assistance summary considered the small military 
capable of handling the nation’s security threats, primarily internal revolt and minor 
border skirmishes with Somalia.  Most important, the armed forces kept the Emperor in 
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power, shielding him from an attempted coup in 1960.  Washington hoped the presence 
of a strong military would keep the country stable when the Emperor eventually died and 
ensure a smooth transfer of power.298 
This summary seems at odds with what MAAG personnel reported before, in the 
1950s, and after.  In 1966, Colonel Lucas, Chief of MAAG-Ethiopia from 1965-1966, 
described serious problems with the nation’s armed forces.  They were badly short of 
qualified commissioned and noncommissioned officers.  Some units had to operate 
across huge physical areas: the 3rd Division, for example, had a 1,000 mile front, 
supported by only a single dirt road and no wired communications.  Logistically, 
Ethiopian units apparently ignored vehicle maintenance and did not share equipment or 
parts with other units, even ignoring orders to do so.  The army and ministry of defense 
resisted counter insurgency training and refused to undertake civic or public works 
programs.  Lucas had little positive to report during his 1966 debriefing, except that the 
Ethiopian armed forces were, at least, better than their Somalian neighbors.299 
Advice and assistance to Ethiopia was one of the stranger, and more difficult, US 
missions during the Cold War.  The advisors encountered trouble at almost every step 
and experienced limited success in training their host nation’s troops.  The difficulty 
reflected Ethiopia’s complex internal politics, with which the military were closely 
involved.  It must also be noted, however, the mission was a low priority for the United 
States.  From 1953 to 1963, the US only spent $55 million on assistance to Ethiopia—
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during roughly the same time period, Thailand received $200 million.  When other 
MAAGs were led by generals, a colonel led MAAG-Ethiopia.  The Americans suspected 
no significant internal problems for the country, nor was external attack a major threat.  
For US policy makers, military assistance held open access to the radio transmitter 
facilities. This, rather than major improvement of their military, was the important 
objective. 
EAST ASIA 
In the years immediately following World War II, the United States believed that 
East Asia—China, Korea, and Japan, and the islands and sea routes in their vicinity—
would be a source of stability and strength, thanks to China and Japan.  The former was 
to be under control of Chiang Kaishek’s Kuomintang Nationalist Party and provide a 
strong counter to Soviet interests in Asia.  Japan, politically and militarily neutralized, 
could become an economic leader for the region and, hopefully, a huge market for US 
goods.  However, the devastating aftermath of World War II, Japanese imperialism, and 
civil war rapidly undermined US hopes in the region. 
A series of events rewrote US policy in East Asia from 1945 to 1950.  The US-
supported Nationalists were defeated by communist forces and Chiang, whose army and 
government had absorbed billions of dollars of US aid, retreated to the island of Taiwan.  
Many American policy makers would have been happy to leave the Nationalists 
withering on the vine, but in 1950, war broke out in Korea. There, the legacy of Japanese 
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colonialism, antagonistic factions, and Cold War influences led first to guerrilla war and 
then open conflict.  The northerners were supported by the Soviet Union and later by 
Communist China.  The United States and South Korea, leading a United Nations 
coalition, faced the communists in a brutal fight through 1953, when they agreed upon 
an uneasy cease fire.  
War in Asia forced the US to adjust its strategy.  American policy makers 
envisioned a defensive perimeter off the Asian mainland, which first included Japan and 
the Ryuku Islands and later stretched to fit South Korea and Taiwan.  Though the US 
briefly attempted to roll back communist gains by invading North Korea, the costs of 
waging full scale war in Asia proved too great to sustain.  The US planned to encircle 
mainland Asia with naval and air bases, and build up the military forces of its allies in 
the region—Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea—through the use of military assistance and 
the hard work of advisory groups.300 
In Taiwan, the MAAG encountered educational problems that slowed training, 
an aged officer corps, and unusual political conditions.  In Japan, however, advisors 
faced a war-weary and anti-military population, and a Self Defense Force that resembled 
a civil service rather than military organization.  In the Republic of Korea, the advisory 
mission faced a tremendously difficult mission, as they tried to train and reorganize the 
armed forces in midst of active war.  Though the MAAGs had some success training 
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these forces, like in Korea, they encountered the standard problem of assistance and 
advisory missions around the world: the host nations simply could not support the large 
scale armed forces desired by the Americans without continued US support, even in 
peace time. 
TAIWAN 
During World War II, the United States supported the Nationalist Chinese with 
weapons, supplies, and expertise, primarily for use as an ally against the Japanese, but 
also with the strategic objective of creating a major post-war Asian power.  Nationalist 
forces remained mostly unable or unwilling to fight the Japanese, but the US continued 
providing large amounts of military aid after the war.  Chiang Kaishek and the 
Nationalists pushed north against the Chinese Communists, but soon met with military 
and political disaster.  In April 1948, Congress approved an emergency package, which 
the Nationalists spent on military hardware and supplies.  The emergency aid had little 
effect, as military defeats and domestic upheaval sent the Nationalist forces retreating to 
the south.  Chiang’s government and hundreds of thousands of troops withdrew to 
Taiwan (Formosa) in December 1949.  
The United States, frustrated by nearly a decade of failure in China, cut off aid 
until the crisis of the Korean War, when the Truman administration again began to 
supply military and economic assistance to the Republic of China (RC) and its armed 
forces.  The United States based aircraft on the island and supported Taiwan with naval 
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forces, to shield the island from mainland invasion.  From 1951 to 1965, the United 
States spent approximately $2.5 billion on Taiwanese military aid, almost twice as much 
as it spent on economic aid.  Military assistance peaked at the beginning, with $375.2 
million spent from 1951-1954.  Military aid ended in 1965; other economic support 
ceased when the US opened formal diplomatic ties with Communist China in the 
1970s.301 
The US advisory experience with the RC began in World War II, as the 
Nationalists fought against the Japanese.  The mission withdrew after the war, but 
returned in 1948 when the Nationalists met with disaster against the communists.  
Initially, they were only to advise on organizational matters and establish schools.  They 
gradually took on training roles, and in September 1948, the advisory groups merged 
into the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of China 
(JUSMAG China).  They provided technical assistance and training guidance, but did 
not advise on operational or strategic matters, and were ordered to stay away from 
combat areas.  For their part, the American commanders—including General Albert C. 
Wedemeyer, who had replaced General Joseph Stillwell during the war, and JUSMAG 
Director and Army Group Chief Major General David Barr—knew from experience that 
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the Chinese officers were unlikely to accept American advice, and worried that they 
would deflect blame onto the Americans if combat operations went awry.  JUSMAG 
China kept a hands-off approach.302 
JUSMAG China was short lived.  Communist counter-attacks in the north 
devastated the Nationalist forces, and the offensives carried southward, seizing 
important Nationalist strongholds.  JUSMAG’s operations were formally suspended in 
March 1949 and the advisors withdrew.  Chiang’s government retreated to Taiwan in 
December 1949.  Major General Barr, in his final report, argued that the Nationalists had 
over extended themselves in the drive north.  They refused to retreat when prudent to do 
so, their armed forces did not work together cohesively, and the American advisors were 
too few and could not give direct operational advice.303  
As Chiang and the Nationalists ensconced themselves on Taiwan, Washington 
considered its options.  Though they did not want the island to fall to the communists, 
because of its position astride shipping routes and the island’s value to the Japanese 
economy, policymakers were also tired of throwing dollars into the money pit of the 
Nationalist Chinese government.   For the first months of 1950, therefore, the Truman 
administration and Congress agreed upon limited economic aid for Taiwan, but no 
military aid.304  The communist invasion of South Korea shifted US attitudes, however.  
Just as it triggered major spending on NATO countries, it also resulted in increased aid 
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to Asia.  In 1951, the Americans extended military assistance to Taiwan, to “maintain its 
internal security or its legitimate self-defense” and perform as part of the US defensive 
perimeter around Asia.305  JUSMAG also reactivated. 
Communist Chinese action against Quemoy and Matsu, small islands in the strait 
between Taiwan and the mainland, drove the US to establish a formal mutual defense 
treaty in December 1954 which provided the Nationalists with long-term military aid 
and support from the United States.  Military assistance played as much a psychological 
role as it did a practical one: the Nationalist Chinese could now rely upon the same kind 
of alliance as enjoyed by South Korea, Japan, and Europe.  The agreement quickly came 
into play, during later crises with the Communists over control of islands between the 
mainland and Taiwan, as the United States pledged naval support in case of a communist 
attack. 306
As in other advisory missions, the Americans trained the Nationalist armed 
forces through a combination of direct instruction, schools, and education in the 
continental US.  By 1954, the Nationalists had sent many students to the US for training; 
MAAG-Taiwan had reorganized military schools along American lines, and high-
ranking Chinese were sent on 3-week “special orientation courses” in the US, where 
they visited military installations.307  
305
 “Agreement effected by exchange of noted at Taipei, 30 Jan to 9 Feb 1951,” Military Assistance 
Bilaterals. 
306 Hsiao-Ting Lin, “U.S.-Taiwan Diplomacy Revisited: Chiang Kai-shek, Baituan, and the 1954 Mutual 
Defense Pact,” Diplomatic History 37 (April 2013): 971-994. 
307 “Comments by United States Military Assistance Advisory Groups.” 
134 
An unusual situation in Taiwan complicated the American mission.  A small 
force of Japanese officers, known as the Baituan, remained with the Nationalists well 
into the 1960s.  They trained officers and generals separately from the MAAG, and 
influenced the army’s culture.  They even helped direct operational planning.  Chiang 
used the Japanese trainers to keep the Nationalists from being fully indoctrinated by the 
Americans, and to weaken his subordinates, some of whom were quite popular with the 
Americans.  The Baituan also helped plan offensive operations against the mainland, 
which the US vehemently opposed.308 
Early reports on the Nationalists’ progress revealed mixed results.  A MAAG-
Taiwan report, generated in 1954, showed American efforts in a positive light.  US aid 
has reorganized and rearmed NGRC armed forces and standardized their heterogeneous 
mix of Russian, Japanese, German, and American weapons.  Though the Chinese did not 
maintain their equipment as well as the Americans would have liked, the advisors 
acknowledged the low education of most Chinese troops and their lack of basic 
mechanical knowledge.  The advisors trained down to the battalion level, and had 
convinced the Ministry of National Defense to adopt US doctrines.  Overall, MAAG-
Taiwan believed that “There has been a tremendous improvement in the combat 
efficiency of the NGRC Armed Forces, particularly in the last six months.  Essential to 
this improvement has been the receipt of military defense assistance from mid-1951 to 
the present.”309 
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Other observers were less optimistic about the Nationalists’ progress, however.  
In 1954, President Eisenhower asked retired General James A. Van Fleet to review US 
assistance missions in Asia.  He found numerous problems in Taiwan. According to Van 
Fleet, the armed forces needed a functioning replacement system, improved unit 
training, better leaders and logistical competency.  The armed forces were top-heavy, 
with three times as many officers, relative to enlisted men, as the US.  Military rations 
were short on healthy vitamins and protein.  Many troops had foot injuries, due to bad 
diet and cheap shoes.  Training exercises lacked realism and units were too dispersed to 
allow large unit maneuvers.  They fielded tanks and other armored vehicles, but Van 
Fleet believed such equipment was beyond the RC’s ability to maintain.  Even by the 
summer of 1954, the time of Van Fleet’s fact-finding mission, “not a single division” in 
the NGRC was at full strength.  Furthermore, many Nationalist officers and senior 
enlisted were too old to fight effectively.  Van Fleet urged that they begin inducting and 
training native-born Taiwanese.310 
One area where the Nationalist forces showed great potential was indoctrination.  
Though often a weak point for nonwestern countries, the RC Armed Forces General 
Political Department served to indoctrinate Chinese and native Taiwanese recruits on the 
objectives and defining characteristics of the Nationalist government, and on the nature 
of the primary foe, the Communist Chinese.  Though some Americans were 
uncomfortable with the notion of political officers in the armed forces, equating them to 
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the Red Army’s commissars, Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Barber, the MAAG-Taiwan 
Assistant Chief of Staff, considered them a valuable asset.  They helped improve the 
military’s morale and made their reason for being—the defense of Taiwan against 
communist attack—clear to the regular enlisted.    Further, the General Political 
Department was the main instrument in improving the armed forces’ greatest weakness: 
poor education.  The Department established literacy courses in army barracks.  In 1949, 
21.8% of troops were totally illiterate, but this rate had plummeted to .26% by 1951.  
General education levels also improved; 30% of Chinese troops had a junior high school 
education or higher in 1951, compared to 22% in 1949.311 
The NGRC armed forces had, by the latter half of the decade, improved their 
military capabilities, thanks in no small part to their MAAG advisors, but still fell short 
in several key areas.  They could defend the island, with US naval and air support, but 
could not project power elsewhere.  Considering the RC’s aggressive policies toward the 
mainland, this could have actually been a blessing to US policy.  Use of artillery 
remained problematic, and morale, despite the attempts by the General Political 
Department to improve it through education and entertainment, was low among enlisted 
and junior officers.  MAAG-Taiwan believed the troops would make an enemy attack on 
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the island “costly to an invading force,” but the Chinese armed forces remained heavily 
reliant upon US aid and support.312   
 
JAPAN 
 
The United States wanted Japan as a staging area for conflicts on mainland Asia, 
and as a long-term bulwark against communist expansion in Asia.  Japan was part of the 
“defense perimeter” that the invasion of Korea had threatened to penetrate.  Its proximity 
to the Soviet Union and China put it in potential danger of communist attack. 
The United States dominated postwar Japan.  They led the effort to democratize 
the island nation, prevent the rise of an influential communist party, rehabilitate the 
economy, and demilitarize the island nation.  Though Americans and Japanese often 
shared positive individual relationships, the occupiers held stereotypical ideas about 
Asians: that the Japanese were followers, accustomed to top-down leadership, good at 
imitating and copying, but weak original thinkers.  The Japanese were an “obedient 
herd” Americans could shape in their own image. 313   
Japan’s post-war constitution, developed by General Douglas MacArthur’s 
occupation government, reflected US and European legal concepts.  It was designed to 
undo the power of Japan’s family houses and deconstruct its military forces.  It 
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introduced some liberal reforms to Japanese society and government.  However, it did 
little to weaken Japan’s conservative political leaders and corporations.  Though the 
United States controlled postwar Japan, the Japanese themselves conducted much of the 
day-to-day running of the country, and retained many elements of their culture and 
system of government.314 
Strategically, the United States saw Japan as base area for military operations in 
Asia.  Early war plans for bombardment of the Soviet Union included the use of 
Okinawan and Japanese bases.  Before the Korean War, American planners barely 
entertained the notion of rebuilding Japanese military forces, believing instead that 
defense of the islands remained an American task, though General MacArthur did 
propose the creation of a Japanese constabulary.315  The potential of an independent, 
neutral Japan defusing US-Soviet tensions in Asia appealed to the State Department, and 
for much of 1949 and early 1950, the Americans considered a final peace treaty and 
removal of most US forces from Japan.316   
The invasion of Korea solidified American intentions for using the island as a 
base.  In early 1951, as the 8th Army in Korea beat a hasty retreat from Chinese attack, 
the US first floated the idea of creating Japanese defense forces.  This would allow some 
US forces to withdraw and improve Japanese internal security.  In August 1951, the US 
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signed a formal peace treaty which ended occupation and granted Japanese 
independence.  The treaty came with exclusive base rights for the United States.  In 
barely two years, the US moved from disarming Japan and advocating its neutrality, to 
seeking Japan as an ally against the Soviet Union.317 
Despite the Japanese constitution, which denounced war, Japan began some 
rearmament as soon as the Korean War began.  The Japanese National Police Reserve 
grew from 30,000 in 1950 to 110,000 men by 1952, and the US removed restrictions on 
equipment and provided support for training programs.  The Americans and Japanese 
also began a coastal defense navy and a defensive air force.318  The US envisioned a 
large ground force of 10-15 divisions and robust air and naval forces, but the limitations 
of defense budgets and anti-military public opinion in Japan, reduced this to six army 
divisions and considerably smaller air and naval forces.  Military Assistance Advisory 
Group, Japan, activated in March 1954.319 
In 1954, Japan formally established the Japanese Self Defense Forces.  The JSDF 
consisted of the ground, naval, and air forces, all oriented toward defensive operations of 
the Japanese archipelago.  The MAAG coordinated with the Japanese, to provide 
material and training support, as in other assistance missions.  The Americans worried of 
invasion or aerial attack, but also considered blockade-by-submarine a major threat to 
Japan, reflecting their own operations in World War II.  Thus, the advisors prioritized 
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the development of the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self Defense 
Force (ASDF) over the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF).320   A strengthened Japan 
could contribute to the defense of the North Pacific and resist internal problems, such as 
a communist or leftist take-over of the government.  It was vital to American strategy 
that Japan remain a safe, secure staging area off the Asian mainland, for American 
ground troops and air forces.321 
MAAG-Japan worried about Japan’s willingness to contribute to its own 
defense.322  Postwar Japan erased much of the militarism of the 1930s and 1940s.  
MAAG advisors, well into the 1960s, worried the Japanese felt “little sense of civic 
responsibility,” and instead created a “fiction” they no longer needed a military.  The 
Japanese government also failed to consult the public while creating or maintaining the 
SDF, which added to the controversy of the JSDF’s very existence since the cataclysm 
of WWII.323   
MAAG-Japan’s tasks were mainly managerial, focused on supply shipments and 
handling requests of US materiel.  The mission did include a strong, political aspect, 
however: the advisors met with Japanese leaders to convince them of the need to 
develop their defense forces.  This would make them more secure, the Americans 
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argued, and free up US forces for operations elsewhere.  The advisors conducted this 
mission carefully, so as to avoid infringing upon the Japanese leadership so soon after 
their independence from US occupation.324   
The Americans enjoyed good relations with the Japanese, with “no real or 
apparent problems involved in carrying out the MAAG mission.”  The Americans had a 
“very close relationship and a feeling of mutual understanding” with the JSDF.  The 
MAAG had “excellent” personnel, many of whom underwent a month of orientation at 
the Military Assistance Institute. Officers also attended a 6-week Japanese language 
course once in Japan.  MAAG personnel viewed Japan as that elusive good duty, with 
fine housing, interesting local sights, and a prestigious status among the Japanese.325  In 
1954, there were 762 American advisors; by 1960, the mission shrank to 210, as most 
deliveries of US equipment were accomplished.326  
By 1964, the JSDF had made some progress toward becoming an effective force.  
The MSDF and ASDF had plenty of aircraft, ships, and high quality personnel.  Despite 
Japan’s demonstrated ability at naval warfare, however, they required considerable start 
up work.  Japanese maritime industry, damaged in the war, could not immediately 
produce new ships, and unlike the United States, which could draw on a large pool of 
experienced naval officers, many of Japan’s remaining veterans were too old to serve.  
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In a strange twist of history, American and Japanese sailors now worked and trained 
together.327 
The GSDF struggled to train and develop.  There were few training spaces 
available in crowded Japan.   All three of the services struggled keeping the best 
personnel, but the GSDF experienced the hardest time doing so.  Japan’s industry, 
growing at a phenomenal rate in the 1960s, drew away educated technicians and 
managers.  Furthermore, the JSDF operated more like a civil service than a military.  
Personnel could resign at any time and were subject to neither military courts nor strict 
secrecy laws.328  The ground forces also displayed lackluster performance while on 
maneuvers.329 
The SDF frequently deployed for disaster relief during earthquakes and 
typhoons, both common in Japan.   They also loaned manpower and expertise to many 
construction projects, especially those in rural areas that Japan developed in the 1960s.  
They built roads, flood controls, communication centers, play grounds, and new schools.  
Construction and disaster relief did contribute to the assistance program’s economic and 
social development objective, though perhaps more directly than intended.330  The 
Americans worried that such operations distracted the SDF from its combat training. 
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By the mid-1960s, the Americans reported a mixed assessment of the JSDF.  On 
the one hand, the force was “friendly to the US, loyal to the present government and 
does not appear to be influenced by leftist pressures.”  However, after ten years of 
training and supplying, the JSDF remained “incapable, acting alone, of defending Japan 
against direct military aggression.”  Japan relied on the US because the “small size of 
her military forces, insufficient quantities of modern weapons and munitions, lack of 
battlefield or strategic mobility, inexperience in the command and control of joint 
operations, inadequate logistic support capability and the extremely low percentage of 
national income which has been spent in support of her military establishment.”331 
The Americans nevertheless considered MAAG-Japan’s mission a success.  
Assistance and training created a system of gradual military build-up and improvement.  
The JSDF freed up at least some US forces from direct defense of the island.  Assistance 
primed industry, putting Japanese to work repairing and handling military equipment.  
The MAAG also exerted influence on defense planning and politics, which made it 
easier to tie Japanese forces into overall American strategy.  Whatever the weaknesses of 
the JSDF—inadequate personnel, high turnover, low supply levels, no large-scale 
training, a general population uninterested in military affairs—they remained “one of the 
most stable and politically conservative forces in present-day Japan.  Assistance and 
advising, at minimum cost to the US, has made possible the development in Japan of a 
major positive source of Free World strength in the Far East.”332 
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SOUTH KOREA 
The training and advisory effort in South Korea was one of the great military 
successes of the Cold War, and has been covered extensively by Bryan R. Gibby in The 
Will to Win.  Gibby argued that the American Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) 
was vital in creating a combat effective Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and  that the 
ROKA was instrumental in the negotiated settlement of 1953—therefore, KMAG was 
vital to the entire war effort. 
KMAG’s mission in Korea was quite different than other MAAGs, in that the 
advisors found themselves in open battle and were part of the command structure of an 
American-led combat force.  Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, who took 
command of the theater in 1951, played a prominent role in KMAG and the development 
of the ROKA.  Though the ROKA remained incomplete at the end of hostilities in 
1953—unable to logistically support itself and lacking in air- and naval forces—and had 
greater support from the US than other advisory missions, the ROKA probably 
progressed further and faster than any other advisory mission, and in more difficult 
circumstances.. 
KMAG was born during the confused US occupation of South Korea following 
WWII.  American leaders, unfamiliar with Korean customs, politics, or needs, 
mishandled economic programs, dismissed the Koreans as inexperienced natives, and 
kept Japanese-installed leaders in power.  Korean agitation for more local autonomy led 
to the establishment of a Korean Constabulary, the first step toward an army for the new 
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nation.  Early recruitment problems for the Constabulary were eventually solved and by 
1949, the organization effectively fought bandits, political malcontents, and a growing 
communist insurgency in the south.333  The Constabulary evolved into the Republic of 
Korea Army (ROKA) and by the spring of 1950, they had defeated communist 
insurgency, in part thanks to effective combat training by their KMAG advisors.
The ROKA could maintain internal security against guerrillas, agitators, and 
bandits, but collapsed during the 1950 North Korean invasion.  KMAG trained the 
ROKA to defeat an insurgency, not a major conventional attack, which was far beyond 
the abilities of the nascent army.  Their enemy, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), was 
well trained, led by a developed cadre of officers, and heavily armed.  That the first 
American reinforcements in Korea also fared poorly reflected the capabilities of the 
North Koreans.  As the ROKA forces disintegrated during the retreat from the 38th 
Parallel, some KMAG officers actually led South Korean and died in the fighting.  The 
South Koreans, now part of the United Nations Command 8th Army, managed to regroup 
around the Pusan Perimeter, along with the newly arrived American units.  The advisors 
helped coordinate US artillery and air support.  The ROKA not only regrouped during 
the Pusan battles, but even earned respect from the American commanders in the area.  
That respect was short lived, however, because the Koreans suffered another catastrophe 
later that year against the newly arrived Chinese forces.  Again, the ROKA’s shaky 
foundation—no real officer corps, inadequately trained troops, weak logistics—were 
their downfall.  Many KMAG personnel were killed or captured alongside their ROKA 
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allies during the winter of 1950-51, and the Chinese pounded Korean units well into 
1951.334 
KMAG and the ROKA benefited from the arrival of a new overall commander in 
the theater in 1951.  Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet replaced Lieutenant General 
Matthew B. Ridgway as commander of the UN forces.  Invigorating the ROKA was one 
of Van Fleet’s missions in Korea.  Major General J. Lawton Collins, then Army Chief of 
Staff, hoped that Van Fleet could do for the Koreans what he had done for the Greeks 
and develop an effective school system and military leadership.335  Unlike Douglas 
MacArthur, who had written off the ROKA early in the war, or Walton Walker, who lost 
interest in the South Koreans after the breakout from Pusan, Van Fleet had big plans to 
train and develop them.  The advisors would use schools, basic training, and field 
training of large units to improve the ROKA’s combat abilities, and guide and assist 
their frontline operations. The Americans would also improve the Korean officer corps, 
still inexperienced and under-trained. 336  Van Fleet wanted sixty day training cycles for 
ROK divisions, “the same as we did for Greek divisions,” and hoped that new KMAG 
leadership would invigorate the advisory group.337   
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Summer 1951 was a turning point for the ROKA.  The tactical stalemate on the 
frontlines, where Chinese manpower unsuccessfully vied against UN firepower, gave the 
Koreans time to regroup and train.  Units cycled out of the line and went to KMAG’s 
new Field Training Command, where they worked in eight-week increments, developing 
marksmanship, tactical proficiency, control of artillery, communications, and leadership.   
KMAG successfully retrained all ROK units over the remainder of the war, and the 
system vastly improved their abilities.338 
General Van Fleet’s approach to advising the ROK forces reflected his time in 
Greece and his emphasis on the human aspects of training and warfare.  He rejected the 
idea, held by some KMAG officers, that the Koreans were untrainable: “we would not 
accept such statements . . . I insisted that they make an effort even if it failed.  My 
approach was one of confidence and praise to the ROK Leaders much the same as I 
treated the Greek Commanders.”339   He requested several of his Greek hands be 
transferred to assist the KMAG, and credited some of the unit’s improvement to these 
“key personnel.”340 
Van Fleet used public speeches and news interviews as he had in Greece, to 
lavish praise on the ROK and Korea generally.   He described a ROK patrol action as an 
“outstanding performance . . . [with] initiative and aggressive spirit.341   The Korean and 
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Chinese communists were “the same type of enemy” as he had faced in Greece, 
“degenerate, ruthless, never compromising”—but at least in Korea, there was “dirt to dig 
into, while in Greece we had rock foxholes above ground.”342  He visited orphanages in 
Seoul and elsewhere.343  In July 1952, KMAG-Chief Brigadier General C. E. Ryan urged 
Van Fleet to create a program of support for wounded ROK veterans, because it would 
hurt troop morale to see “neglected, disabled veterans” struggling to survive. Van Fleet 
began planning for just such a program.344  When Van Fleet departed Korea in 1952, he 
did so with flair and drama, saying to a massive crowd in Seoul, “I shall not ask you to 
give me back my heart.  I leave it with you.”345 
 When the cease-fire went into effect in 1953, ROKA and KMAG had much to be 
proud of.  ROKA units could plan battles, coordinate artillery fire, manage their own 
personnel, operate as part of a division- or corps-sized force, and had developed the 
cohesion and esprit d’corps to withstand the shock and chaos of battle.  They had come a 
long way from a constabulary force fighting against bandits, guerrillas, and mutineers.  
But the ROKA was still not self-sufficient and relied upon US military aid to function.  
In this way, they were similar to almost every other assistance mission. 
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SOUTHEAST ASIA 
For most of the 1950s, the United States saw Southeast Asia as a secondary 
theater, important to Western and American security because of its value to Japanese and 
European markets, in particular France.  US involvement in the region came about as the 
French war to retain their Indochina colonies spiraled out of control and necessitated, in 
American eyes, the delivery of US hardware and equipment to help defeat communist-
led forces in Vietnam.  If the French withered on the Vietnamese vine, the Americans 
worried, they would either bankrupt themselves or follow through on threats to back out 
of their commitments to European defense.  This led to gradually increasing 
commitment to Vietnam (handled in the next chapter) and Thailand.  Washington 
worried that the communists could make incremental advances in Southeast Asia, using 
either insurgencies to topple weak governments, or conventional invasions, as had 
happened in Korea.  Because the United States initially wished to avoid direct 
involvement, it limited support of Southeast Asian nations to military aid for Thailand, 
Laos, and Cambodia, and support of first France and then the Republic of Vietnam 
forces.346   
Political and military success in the region, outside of Thailand, proved elusive.  
In Laos, Washington wanted to prevent a communist takeover and block land routes 
346 Robert M. Blum, Drawing the Line: The Origin of the American Containment Policy in East Asia (New 
York: Norton, 1982); Gary R. Hess, The United States Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940-1950 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Mark Atwood Lawrence, Assuming the Burden; Alan J. 
Levine, The United States and the Struggle for Southeast Asia, 1945-1975 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999); and Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast 
Asia since World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 
 150 
 
used by the North Vietnamese to infiltrate South Vietnam.  The US provided military 
and economic support to a bewildering series of governments, as coups, counter-coups, 
and coalitions frequently changed the nation’s political landscape.  Beginning in secret, 
with the so-called Programs Evaluation Office, MAAG-Laos officially began in 1961.  
Military assistance to Laos never produced a stable, US-aligned government, and was 
tangled in a web of secret and sometimes illegal arms dealing through the Central 
Intelligence Agency.  In neighboring Cambodia, the United States also provided military 
aid and advisors, but the Cambodian government, hoping to follow a neutralist path,  
opted out of US aid in 1963.347  Aid to South Vietnam lasted more than two decades and 
ended in disaster.  Only in Thailand did the US develop a long term ally. 
 
THAILAND 
 
After World War II, Thailand wanted to return to the international community 
following its wartime alliance with Japan.  Positive relations with the United States—
who were forgiving of Thailand’s dalliance with Japan—and maneuvering by the Thai 
government brought the nations together.  Thailand was an important potential ally to 
the US.  It was strategically placed in the middle of South East Asia, hosted a number of 
natural resources like tin and rubber, and had excellent port facilities.  Further, its rice 
production was not as devastated by the war as Burma’s and Vietnam’s.  Thailand’s 
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leadership remained in flux after the war, as several governments fell in succession, until 
totalitarian dictator Phibun Songkhram—who collaborated with the Japanese and 
orchestrated two coups—seized power in 1947.  Phibun established himself as firmly 
anti-communist and pro-Western.348  Thailand requested US assistance, and, in the 
1950s alone, received approximately $200 million in aid, much of it for the military.  In 
exchange, the Thais proved valuable allies for the US: they recognized the US-backed 
Bao Dai government in Vietnam, refused to recognize Mao’s Communist China, sent 
troops to Korea and Vietnam, and provided extensive bases for US operations across 
Southeast Asia.349 
Military assistance to Thailand formally began on 17 October, 1950.350 The 
objective of American military assistance to Thailand was to create internal security, 
build up Thai forces so they could contribute to regional defense, and slow down an 
external attack.  They also helped develop civil programs to try and prevent a communist 
insurgency in the first place.  Rugged borders, numerous ethnic minorities, and a 
complacent, politically involved officer corps complicated the mission, according to the 
MAAG reports.351   
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MAAG-Thailand encountered strengths and weaknesses within the Thai armed 
forces.  The advisors believed the country’s best asset were its enlisted men, who chief 
Major General W. N. Gilmore described in 1955 as loyal, brave, and “inured to 
hardship.”   They were also politically loyal to the Thai nation and its royal government:  
“The Thai soldier has little understanding of, interest in, or susceptibility to subversion 
and the Communist. . . . He has an innate sense of liberty . . . and in general, is a happy-
go-lucky, cheerful and religious sort of person with quietly patriotic feelings toward king 
and country.”  Furthermore, the advisors encountered numerous junior officers of ability, 
who provided solid leadership up to the battalion level.352 
However, problems training and developing Thai senior officers hampered 
MAAG’s efforts at modernizing and improving the Thai armed forces.  Gilmore 
estimated that 80% of colonels and generals “were incompetent and incapable of 
carrying out their duties.”  They could not plan operations, coordinate logistics, or lead 
their forces.  Despite defensible terrain, brave enlisted men, and some capable junior 
officers, the Thais could probably only offer a few weeks of resistance against an 
invasion.  Gilmore argued that these problems at the top slowed training schedules and 
prevented the development of an effective junior officer corps.353  The Thais resisted 
American efforts to train their senior officers to delegate authority, restrict their own 
personal political activities, and convert to an American system of supply management.  
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In 1958, eight years into American training and assistance, advisor Lieutenant Colonel 
N. F. Browning believed that that Thai military officers “value their positions first as a 
political and economic asset.”354   Considering that Thailand’s history in the 1940s and 
1950s included two coups by military men—by Phibun Songkhram in 1948 and Sarit 
Thanarat in 1957—it is easier to understand why Thai generals involved themselves in 
political matters more closely than the Americans thought appropriate, and why they 
may have preferred a system in which subordinate officers lacked authority to make all 
but the smallest decisions. 
After years of “constant prodding” by MAAG-Thailand, the Thais began to 
improve in American eyes.355  In 1955, Gilmore estimated that the Thais could only 
offer token resistance against an external invasion for about two weeks, had poor 
logistical capabilities, and only showed tactical competency at the small-unit level.356  
But in 1963, a general summary of assistance argued that the army, navy, and air force 
all improved from an “ineffective hodge-podge” of antiquated, disorganized units to a 
“standardized and increasingly effective force.”  It estimated that the Thais could deal 
with plausible internal security threats, and could defend themselves from attack by their 
neighbors (Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Burma).  In the case of major attack, from 
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China or Vietnam, or a large-scale, communist-led insurgency, Thailand could manage 
until US support arrived. 357     
US aid to Thailand was a diplomatic and strategic boon for the United States.  
Thailand was a reliable ally in the region and the bases developed there in the 1950s 
would prove vital during the Vietnam War.  Since the beginning of US aid, the Thai 
armed forces had grown enormously, from 45,000 men in uniform to 120,000. Their 
forces included new M-41 tanks, modern anti-submarine craft, and new airbases. 358  
However, from the perspective of MAAG-Thailand, the mission proved frustrating.  The 
American-perceived problem of overly-political Thai officers never fully resolved, and 
even after over a decade of aid and support, the advisors still only considered Thailand 
capable of limited self-defense. 
CONCLUSIONS: SLOW DEVELOPMENT, LITTLE AMERICAN ARMIES, AND 
POLITICAL OFFICERS 
Though advisory and assistance missions in the Third World came in a wide 
range of types—from aid-for-base-rights operations, as in Ethiopia, to full-scale training 
and modernization programs, as in Turkey—the MAAGs in the Middle East, Africa, and 
Asia encountered a number of similar conditions.  They attempted to train under-
educated troops how to use modern equipment; had to improve and/or work around 
357 “Military Assistance Plan: Thailand.” 
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weakness in infrastructure, such as narrow mountain roads or tiny airfields; and tried to 
ingrain in their host armed forces the importance of logistics and maintenance to the 
American way of war.  
In all cases, development of these forces was slower than policy makers had 
hoped and American advisors on the ground desired.  To train armed forces of the 
Middle East and Asia for modern war, as understood by the Americans, required far 
more than marksmanship or truck driving.  Entire military institutions had to be built up, 
sometimes from nothing.  The MAAGs established schools and arranged training and 
education for foreign personnel in the United States, both of which took time.  As noted 
in Chapter II, American language skills—limited to English and a few European 
languages—further slowed training.  Only by the end of the 1950s were many of the 
recipient nations beginning to show improvement, and they still required considerable 
American support.  
Retired General Van Fleet argued that the problem of self-sustaining allied forces 
in Asia laid with the MAAGs themselves and military assistance policies generally.  As 
detailed earlier, Van Fleet’s 1954 fact-finding mission in Asia examined assistance 
missions throughout the region.  In addition to his specific comments on Japan, Taiwan, 
and Korea, he found overall that: 
To a large extent, the indigenous ground forces of the area are being 
developed in the US image.  [This] fails to evaluate the national 
character, customs, and prevailing socio-economic structure as such 
countries as China and Korea.  In a military sense, the average Asian 
male has the attributes of easy accommodation to and great staying power 
under, extremes of privation; remarkable foot mobility even with heavy 
load; and unquestioning obedience to trusted leaders.  His shortcomings 
include lack of mechanical skill, low level of formal education and 
156 
bewilderment by rapid change.  The design of native forces must be such 
as to maximize on the individual’s attributes while reducing the impact of 
his shortcomings.  This is not the rationale governing the operations of 
the various MAAGs and as a consequence the end product is likely to be 
a costly and ineffectual imitation increasingly dependent on the US, 
rather than a genuinely native force of progressively developing 
effectiveness and independence.359 
Van Fleet was not alone in this criticism of assistance and the MAAGs’ behavior.  
Many advisors, writing later as students at the Army War College, expressed concerns 
for how advisory and assistance missions operated, the clarity of their objectives, and 
what they actually achieved.  Liutenant Colonel Elmer E. Twining warned against the 
habit of creating mirror forces in allied nations.  He acknowledged, though, that the 
speed with which the US set up advisory missions, the fear of possible communist 
assault, and the natural tendency of the American advisors all led to the creation of little 
American armies.360  Colonel George D. Patterson, writing in 1955, advised that the US 
only provide more assistance to those allies with proven ability to use it, and warned that 
the US not rely too much on its assistance-supported allies in the event of a ground 
war.361   
Colonel John D. Hickey, writing about military aid generally and in the Middle 
East specifically, believed the US spent assistance money and conducted advisory 
missions “without any definite measuring stick as to the value or benefit that the United 
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States is receiving for the dollars invested.”  As Van Fleet worried that the assistance 
missions in Asia worked independently, without a coherent plan, Hickey had similar 
concerns for the Middle East.  He asked hard questions: did Middle Eastern recipients of 
aid have the “Ability to continue independence and territorial integrity, identification 
with the Free World, and will and ability to resist communist invasion, subversion and 
pressures . . .   What effect does the presence of groups of American military and 
civilians have on the national political leaders, leaders of opinion and the population in 
general?  What effect does the materiel and training program have on the population?”362 
The problem of creating “little American armies” rather than forces suited to the host 
nations was repeated around the world, especially in developing countries which lacked 
the infrastructure to support such forces.  The advisors’ habit to train what they knew, 
and the assistance program’s habit of foisting advanced equipment onto allied forces 
unready to use it, undermined much of the advisory and assistance mission.  
MAAG advisors were also frustrated that there was very little division between 
domestic politics and military affairs in the developing world, and criticized their host 
nations for choosing officers for political loyalty rather than military ability.  John 
Throckmorton, a former advisor, wrote that political intrigue in Asian nations was 
“vexatious and frustrating.”363  Advisors in Thailand lamented over corrupt generals who 
slowed training, and MAAG-Ethiopia worried that host commanders threatened their 
own national defense as they sought to maintain their fiefdoms.  The advisors, as a 
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whole, worried that officers who cared more about their political connections and 
personal advancement than their jobs as soldiers weakened the defenses of those 
developing nations US policy makers wanted to protect. 
However, US policy makers valued many of these nations for their dictatorial 
leadership, seen then as important against communist influence.  These dictators based 
much of their power on their armed forces, which made their officers’ political loyalty 
vital. Therefore, well connected generals and officers—though perhaps undesirable from 
a military standpoint—were unavoidable and in a way contributed to US and Western 
security, as far as policymakers were concerned.  
Advisors themselves often sometimes admitted this.  MAAG reports openly 
acknowledged the political loyalty of the Iranian, Libyan, Ethiopian, and Thai officers 
and generals.  American officers explicitly argued for the importance of maintaining 
military-supported governments in the developing world, out of fear that weak, fledgling 
democracies could not support themselves in face of communist pressure.   Major Grady 
Smallwood, in 1964, considered the military’s political role important in the Middle East 
and argued that MAAG Chiefs in those countries needed to take an active role 
influencing those leaders.364  Hickey warned that the danger of a military coup in Iran 
could only be removed by better management and indoctrination of the armed forces.365  
The military world was also the political world in many developing nations.  MAAG 
missions missed this mark. 
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Military assistance and advising did gain the US support and allies in the 
developing world.  Turkey, Iran, Libya, and Ethiopia all granted base and airspace rights 
to the US.  In global affairs, American politicians and strategists could point to the many 
recipients of aid and declare them members of the Free World, standing with the US 
against communism.  These nations sometimes provided very real political support, as in 
Thailand.  It confirmed Chester Pach’s theory that the existence of military assistance 
was more important than the uses to which it was put.  In the long term, though, the use 
of military assistance as a way to buy political alliances can also be seen as problematic.  
Military coups continued in Turkey and Thailand.  Ethiopia’s military took over that 
country in 1975, murdered Haile Selassie, accepted military aid from the Soviet Union, 
and went to war with neighboring Somalia.  A nationalistic and religious movement in 
Iran ousted the Shah and froze relations with the US.366 
From a military standpoint, the biggest, most expensive advisory and assistance 
missions in the third world created American-style armed forces unable to support 
themselves without US support because those nations lacked the infrastructure, industrial 
capabilities, and finances to do so—regardless of the amount of training they received.  
Some American advisors, Van Fleet included, understood this problem.  It was not 
something that could be solved quickly.  Nevertheless, the MAAGs continued their 
emphasis on creating mirror armed forces.  There was some suggestion that such an 
approach worked, after all—the ROKA ultimately proved a capable force—and the 
conventional invasion of Korea colored American perceptions.  The allure of having 
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local forces fight advancing communism was powerful.  The next chapter examines this 
strategy in Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER V 
ADVISORS IN VIETNAM 
Assistance to French Indochina and Vietnam was the least successful of US aid 
missions during the Cold War.  After spending billions of dollars and hundreds of 
American lives to shore up France’s war in Vietnam and then support the ineffective 
South Vietnamese government, the US deployed massive American ground forces into 
the region, exactly what military assistance and advising was supposed to prevent.  
This chapter examines the changing role of American advisors in Vietnam, 
beginning with the First Indochina War (1946-1954), when MAAG Indochina was 
primarily a logistical organization, overseeing the shipment of material aid to the French 
forces fighting the Viet Minh.  It then examines the US advisory and assistance mission 
to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).  
It shows that from 1950 nearly through to the introduction of US combat forces in 1965, 
the American advisors were highly optimistic of first France, and then the Republic of 
Vietnam’s, ability to defeat communist and nationalist forces in Vietnam.  The MAAG’s 
habits and opinions reflected the general attitude of advisory missions around the world.  
The advisors believed that the application of American know-how and material aid could 
overcome almost any obstacle.  They focused on logistical management and training 
allied troops to fight more like Americans, with heavy mechanized forces and advanced 
weaponry.    
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The long saga of American involvement in the region featured an advisory and 
assistance aspect for almost entire length.  It began in 1950 with formal support of the 
French war, and ended in 1975 as Democratic Republic of Vietnam forces seized 
Saigon.  The US-Vietnamese period, from 1955 to the end of the war, is well 
documented by a number of works, most of which agree that the US advisory mission 
suffered from a number of key problems.  The advisors, overwhelmingly from the army, 
trained the Vietnamese to fight what historian Andrew Krepinevich called the “Army 
Concept.”  This emphasized large maneuver units, trained and equipped for conventional 
battles against an invading North Vietnamese force.  The American advisors paid little 
attention to counterinsurgency.  Furthermore, MAAG’s leaders and senior advisors were 
clouded by an abundance of optimism, believing that enough US materiel and training 
would solve the South Vietnamese military problems. The advisors, mostly working in 
short tours of duty, without specialized training in advising, counter insurgency, or 
Vietnamese language, culture, and history, in large part remained positive about the grim 
military situation in Vietnam.  Lastly, Vietnam’s government, under President Ngo Dinh 
Diem, was inefficient, corrupt, and lacked legitimacy.  These problems trickled down 
into the military, whose senior leadership involved itself heavily in Vietnamese politics.1 
The historiography’s argument about US advising in Vietnam—that it 
inadequately prepared a dysfunctional army, from a dysfunctional nation, to fight the 
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wrong kind of war—can also be applied to the US experience in French Indochina, in 
the years before the US took the lead in the region.  
FRENCH-INDOCHINA 
MAAG-Indochina had one of the most complex advisory missions of the Cold 
War.  It dealt with an active war, difficult French allies, and Vietnamese allies who 
almost totally lacked an established military tradition and infrastructure.  Their mission 
was mainly one of logistics and observation, but laid the groundwork for later American 
involvement.  MAAG personnel found much about the French effort to criticize, but 
were confident of French victory, right up until France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu.  The 
advisors would express similar optimism in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when they 
directly advised the South Vietnamese forces. 
When the United States began supplying France with military aid, the French had 
already been fighting a vicious colonial war in Indochina for almost four years.  The 
detonation of a Soviet atomic weapon, the “fall” of China to Mao Zedong, and the 
communist invasion of South Korea led the United States to involve itself in the region. 
The military and diplomatic situation in Europe also influenced American decision 
making in Southeast Asia.  US policy makers believed that Western European security 
hinged upon major French involvement in NATO, and they worried that the French 
effort in Indochina threatened their commitments to European defense.  American 
supplies and equipment helped the French maintain a stalemate against the Viet Minh, 
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but could not alone defeat them.  When France suffered a devastating defeat at Dien 
Bien Phu in 1954, they finally went to the negotiating table, granting Laos, Cambodia, 
and North Vietnam independence.2 
The United States’ military mission in Indochina began with 70 men of all ranks 
in September 1950, and grew to 342 by the post-Dien Bien Phu ceasefire in 1954.3  
Command of MAAG belonged to a series of army generals, as the bulk of support sent 
to Vietnam in the 1950s went to ground forces. MAAG chiefs reported to the 
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), who was under the direction of the 
Department of the Navy.4  MAAG’s reports were distributed to the Department of 
Defense, the US ambassador to Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others.  MAAG’s 
mission in Indochina was to monitor the flow of MDAP-supplied US equipment, and to 
make sure that the equipment was used correctly by the French.  They assisted the 
French with specialist personnel and studied French logistical and combat operations, 
documenting their observations with monthly activity reports, estimates of French 
combat effectiveness, and MAAG operational notes.   
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The greater American objective, however, was to foster the creation of a stable, 
independent Vietnam, free of French colonial influence, and the development of armed 
forces capable of supporting that country.  This obviously contradicted the French 
objective of retaining their colony.  The French remained adamantly opposed to US 
advisors training the Vietnamese during the war, relenting only after the defeat at Dien 
Bien Phu.5  Thus, MAAG’s work in Indochina focused on the French, and only 
indirectly on their subordinate Indochinese forces. 
The French forces in Indochina were overstretched, undermanned, and, even with 
American resources, underequipped.  The army numbered around 400,000 men, most of 
those in static garrisons and of unreliable quality.  The air force, with about 8,000 trained 
personnel, could deploy approximately 300 aircraft of all types; most were used to either 
ferry paratroopers and resupply units from the air, or for ground attack missions.  The 
French navy in Indochina used several light carriers and surface ships for “blue water” 
missions, but mainly focused on riverine operations.  Strict laws governed the use of 
conscripts overseas and severely limited France’s available manpower, especially in the 
technically oriented air force.  This obliged them to rely upon dwindling numbers of 
career soldiers, colonial troops, and local labor and conscripts.6  The US observed, 
advised and managed military aid for all three branches of the French and Vietnamese 
forces in Indochina—the army, navy, and air force. 
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The US army’s reports on the French army’s performance in Indochina centered 
on French combat abilities and assessments of the French strategic position.  American 
personnel wrote with a tone of guarded optimism.  They frequently praised the combat 
abilities of French combat units (including colonial battalions from Africa) and found 
France’s employment of American-provided equipment in Indochina acceptable.  
However, MAAG’s Army representatives questioned the effectiveness of France’s 
Indochinese allies, French strategic deployment, and what Americans described as a lack 
of offensive spirit in the French high command.  Overall, US Army personnel considered 
France’s ground forces as strong as difficult conditions allowed, and attributed much of 
their success to the influx of US logistical support.  
 The French Army employed a combined-arms force in Indochina, with infantry, 
artillery, engineering, and armored units throughout the theater.7  In addition to 
metropolitan French and native Indochinese troops (Cambodians, Laotians, Vietnamese, 
and Montagnards), France also used many of its colonial forces, especially from Africa.  
“French” units included metropolitan troops (many of them parachute, mechanized, or 
artillery) as well as France’s colonial troops.  In fact, US Army reports labeled many 
units “French”, if such distinction was unclear, as it may have been for many of the 
African units.  To confuse matters further, most “French” units in Indochina included 
large numbers of Indochinese, serving as either replacements for casualties or as non-
combat support personnel.  The Indochinese (Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese 
                                                 
7
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troops) did field some excellent units, including several crack parachute battalions, but 
most performed poorly.  
MAAG’s army section consisted of around fifteen officers and forty enlisted 
men.8  This small team faced some daunting assignments.  They had to observe and 
grade French units in the field, spread over the huge square mileage of the Red River 
Delta and the Tonkinese and Central Highlands.  The army consumed the lion’s share of 
the overall US support. 9  The vast quantities of various American materiel arriving in-
country included such items as wheeled vehicles, halftracks, tanks, machine guns, 
artillery, field rations, uniforms, and parachutes, and MAAG had to catalog it all.10  
Though most of the US equipment was of World War II vintage, it remained serviceable 
and effective.11 
MAAG’s army personnel held high opinions of French units and personnel, 
especially the officers.  The average French officer, up to the level of battalion, was 
“excellent,” with “a great deal of personal courage.” Many French officers served 
multiple tours in Indochina.  The French handled their US-issued equipment well.  The 
vast majority of inspections found equipment in “satisfactory” or better condition despite 
8 For example, in January 1953: sixteen officers, one warrant officer, and 38 enlisted men. 
9
 “Field Estimate of Effectiveness of French Union Forces,” 6 Feb 1952, MAAG V, Box 1, E HM 1996, 
RG 472, NARA. In early 1952, the French Army consisted of 420,000 troops in the field. In the same 
year, there were 12,000 men in the Navy in Indochina, and 7,440 trained personnel in the Air Force. 
10
 “Field Estimate of Effectiveness,” 6 Feb 1952.  By February 1952, , the US had delivered  to the French 
army 418 combat vehicles (primarily halftracks, armored cars, and light tanks), 3,488 transport vehicles 
(trucks and jeeps), 7,783 automatic weapons, 3,527 radios, nearly 800,000 artillery shells, and 18,000,000 
rounds of small arms ammunition. 
11 With the exception of dry cell battery and some ammunition problems, MAAG personnel rarely 
reported any troubles for the American equipment in French Indochina.  
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“continuous and hard service.”12  Though the French units did not always maintain their 
weapons and gear to levels that the Americans wanted, that equipment nevertheless 
“enabled [the French] to perform their assigned missions in an excellent manner.” 13   
 The Indochinese contingent of the French army did not fare so well in American 
eyes.  Colonel Norman Williams, Chief of MAAG’s Army Section in March 1953, note 
that one battalion’s equipment was “falling far below the desired standard.”  He cited 
rusty and dirty mortar barrels and unserviceable vehicles. 14  Perhaps most damning of 
these reports criticized the 6th Vietnamese Infantry Battalion, stationed outside Hanoi.  In 
“bad shape,” the unit had not even begun routine maintenance on their weapons, despite 
an impending operation against the Viet Minh.  The list of deficiencies continued:  
. . . the Battalion Commander had not inspected nor was he familiar with 
the condition of his equipment, and offered numerous invalid excuses for 
his negligence; neither the Sub-Sector or Zone Commander, nor their 
representatives had at any time conducted any inspection of this unit; the 
majority of the personnel were sleeping or resting on the day of 
inspection .  .  .  Battalion, Sub-Sector, and Zone Commanders, without 
exception, attempted to excuse condition of the equipment and steadfastly 
maintained that the 6th Battalion was one of the best in the Vietnamese 
National Army. 15 
 
 Though the Americans did not judge all Indochinese units so harshly (holding 
several artillery and parachute battalions and some Cambodian units in high regard), 
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they did see several key problems as systemic in the Indochinese forces. Unlike French 
troops, who trained before deployment to Indochina, Indochinese soldiers did much of 
their training after they were assigned to their unit, an uneven system at best.  These 
units also fought in active operations as they tried to train, adding to their difficulties. 
Indochinese officers lacked field experience and the French excluded them from the 
higher echelons of command in Indochina.  The problems did not always arise from the 
quality of the officers themselves; MAAG observers noted many capable company 
commanders.  Some were well trained by the capable French commissioned and 
noncommissioned officers who staffed an in-country officer school, but generally 
Americans criticized the French for their training of Indochinese officers. There were 
few Indochinese above the rank of major and they rarely held staff positions.  The lack 
of Indochinese officers in the French high command meant that, though the Americans 
urged the French to allow the Indochinese greater military autonomy, those forces could 
not function in the field without the French directly supporting and leading them.  The 
Americans worried that, with so little experience in leading themselves in major 
operations, the Vietnamese might be incapable of doing so if they ever gained control of 
their own army. 16  These problems would follow the Vietnamese forces for the next two 
decades, haunting them from the French war until the final 1975 communist offensive 
that seized Saigon. 
Beyond the shortcomings of the Indochinese forces, American complained about 
the French logistical system.  Ammunition storage facilities were often deficient, and 
16
 “Field Estimate of Effectiveness,” 23 January 1953. 
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due to manpower shortages, “coolies” and communist prisoners handled ammunition, 
instead of qualified soldiers.17  “By U. S. standards,” another report read, the French 
supply system “is slow and inefficient.”18  Indochinese terrain also hampered French 
logistics.  Flooding in Tonkin made it difficult to waterproof ammunition dumps, and the 
primitive transportation system damaged many vehicles.  French vehicles quickly wore 
out their shock absorbers due to rough road conditions.19  Rough dirt roads were barely 
wide enough for one way traffic.20   
Army observers also disapproved of French strategic deployment.  In order to 
cover the considerable land area of Indochina, the French subdivided their units and 
dispersed them throughout the countryside.  Battalions split into company- and platoon-
sized posts, and rarely operated as whole units.  The Americans urged French 
commanders to concentrate their forces into regimental, brigade, and division-sized 
units.21  In addition to dispersed deployment, the Americans criticized the ad hoc battle 
groups favored by the French.  “[Organization] is an outstanding weakness of the French 
Union forces in Indochina,” said one report.  French commanders organized their units 
“to fit a situation rather than organized as standard type units and then tailored to fit the 
17
 “MAAG Monthly Activity Report: December 1953.” 
18
 “Field Estimate of Effectiveness,” 23 January 1953. 
19 “MAAG Monthly Activity Report: December 1953.” 
20 “MAAG Monthly Activity Report: May 1953,” 19 Jun 1953, MAAG-V, Box 1, E A1 9, RG 472, 
NARA. 
21
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situation.”22  How different an ad hoc unit was from a “standard type unit tailored to fit 
the situation” is unclear.  
The army observers further perceived a lack of aggressiveness in the French high 
command.  The Americans saw the French as trapped in “defensive strong points,” 
where they waited for battle instead going out into the bush to destroy the Viet Minh.23  
The Americans believed that French and Indochinese morale could only hold for so 
long, and that launching a significant offensive could improve morale.24   
Many army observers argued that the French held on because of the equipment 
granted to them by the United States.  Large quantities of American-supplied radios and 
telephones, wrote one MAAG observer, “has improved combat control.”  Despite the 
famous defeats of French motorized groups in the highlands of Vietnam, this same 
summary praised the new vehicles available for the French as having improved their 
operational mobility. All this, the Americans hoped, improved French morale.25  
Furthermore, French and Indochinese maintenance discipline improved, as the 
Americans saw it, because of the “salutary effect of the MAAG inspections.”26  Though 
they criticized the French army’s logistics and strategy, their overall view reflected the 
22
 Ibid. 
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symbolic argument for military assistance described by Pach.27  The US Air Force and 
Navy, however, came to less positive conclusions than their Army colleagues. 
MAAG’s air force and navy personnel held, with exceptions, negative views of 
France’s small air force and navy (FAF and FRN, respectively) in Indochina.  The air 
force section of MAAG endlessly repeated their grievances against how the FAF’s low 
logistical standards affected its combat value, and that its officers resisted American 
maintenance methods.  Commitments to NATO and draftee laws limited the FAF’s 
personnel strength in Indochina.28  In February 1952, it fielded 7,440 air force personnel, 
303 of them pilots; it remained at approximately this strength for the duration of the 
war.29  The FAF made wide use of indigenous personnel to act as guards and general 
labor on their airbases, but these personnel had no technical qualifications, and could not 
contribute to the FAF’s severe shortage of maintenance personnel.  Because of the 
FAF’s limited manpower, they could only put a small number of planes into the air at 
any given time, regardless of how many fighters, bombers, and transport aircraft the 
United States provided them.30 
The air force section deplored French maintenance standards and logistical 
practices.  FAF’s maintenance was “lax and disorderly” in comparison to the USAF.31  
27 Pach, Arming the Free World, 230. 
28 Windrow, The Last Valley, 171-172. 
29
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30 Windrow, The Last Valley, 268-272.   
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A 1953 Monthly Activity Report included a litany of criticisms for the French, citing 
ammunition storage issues at a FAF base.  The French neither stacked ammunition 
properly nor provided it with dunnage, stored it too close to other structures, and did not 
provide the facilities with adequate drainage. USAF personnel witnessed ground crews 
carelessly handle bombs.32 These issues all stemmed from the MAAG’s belief that the 
French followed inferior maintenance standards, which were “cumbersome, antiquated, 
and overextended through decentralization.” 33  One estimate found that the French 
managed about twenty-five flight hours per month per aircraft. The USAF, with similar 
types of aircraft, could manage seventy five hours.34  
Americans attributed some of the problem to French attitudes, often lamenting 
that the French resisted American training and maintenance methods.  A frustrated 
airman in 1955 wrote, “The problem is summarized simply: Fully qualified MAAG 
representatives say to the French, ‘We believe you can repair with your existing facilities 
and manpower items that have not been attempted.’  The French may say, ‘No, we 
can’t.’  An impasse immediately arises.”35  American personnel were not shy in laying 
the blame, either.  A 1953 document considered that the problems of the FAF, especially 
those of a logistical nature, were attributable to a “lack of aggressive attitudes to correct 
32
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33
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[administrative] malpractices.”36  A January 1954 report used almost the same phrasing 
to describe the problem, saying that a “lack of an aggressive attitude to correct their 
malpractices . . . has a terrific bearing on supply support problems.”37 
 After the negotiations that followed the Viet Minh’s crushing victory at Dien 
Bien Phu in spring of 1954, the FAF’s slip-shod maintenance and supply system 
collapsed. The United States had terminated its support of French operations in 
Indochina in July 1954 as a result of the ceasefire agreement.  The lack of fresh aircraft 
and replacement parts combined with the logistical problems observers had long 
documented and American personnel declared that the FAF had a “complete breakdown 
of combat capabilities” and worried, if fighting broke out again, the French would be 
unable to hold their positions.38   
 The USAF also criticized the FAF’s tactical shortcomings.  Though the FAF 
performed ground-attack, reconnaissance, and airborne operations as well as they could 
with their limited resources, a USAF writer remarked in January 1954 that France’s lack 
of air defense could be disastrous if enemy air forces attacked.39  Another report, in 
1953, warned that the French pilots had minimal training in air-to-air combat.40  Such 
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comments reflected American military planners’ concerns about Communist Chinese 
and Soviet intervention in Indochina, as had happened in Korea in 1950. Even without 
an enemy air force to oppose them, USAF personnel observed in January 1954 that the 
FAF’s losses were “not exactly at a minimum.”  The French had lost fifty two of their 
182 F-8F fighters and ten of their fifty five B-26s, a loss rate (from all causes) of 26 
percent of MDAP-supplied combat aircraft.41  Maintenance failures and Viet Minh 
ground fire caused considerable damage to the FAF.  
The FAF’s manpower shortages also worried the MAAG.  Though the entire 
French war effort starved for manpower, the technical skill requirements of the air force 
made it especially understrength.  Almost every advisory document mentioned FAF 
manpower shortages.  As early as November 1950, a USAF observer considered the 
FAF’s dearth of mechanics and logisticians their “most hampering factor.”42  By 1953, 
MAAG believed “lack of personnel within the French Air Force in Indo-China” was the 
obstacle to improving the FAF.43  Without more technicians and other well-trained 
support personnel, “relief from this situation” of logistical woes was impossible.44   
The USAF’s assessment was well summarized by a January 1954 report:  “Lack 
of trained personnel, inability to formulate long-range logistics and operational plans, 
41
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plus continued utilization of obsolescent accounting and maintenance procedures, 
contribute to the reduced effectiveness of the French Air Force which no amount of 
logistic support can overcome.”45  These problems made French air bases disorganized 
and unkempt, their aircraft run ragged, and left ground forces without reliable support 
and resupply from the air. 
The American airmen also presented some contradictory observations, however. 
For example, a 1954 USAF report praised the FAF for turning the “tide of battle,” 
despite months of previous reports which criticized the French on a wide variety of 
issues.46  With all their new equipment, issued by the Americans, the FAF had turned 
“the tide of battle with timely air support and continued interdiction of enemy supply 
routes.”47  A January 1954 report stated that American aircraft and supplies converted 
the FAF “from a weak, ineffectual force into a semi-modern air arm” that performed its 
duties well.48  At times, the MAAG simultaneously criticized the FAF for heavy losses 
and maintenance and praised it for turning “the tide of battle with timely air support.”49  
The navy personnel of MAAG contributed much less material to MAAG’s 
documents than did those of the army and air force.  What the navy did report was 
mixed.  They praised the French riverine forces, but criticized French maintenance of 
45
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ships and facilities.  The quality of France’s blue water forces also disappointed the 
MAAG. 
 The French navy’s (FRN) conducted riverine operations against the Viet Minh 
and in support of various French outposts, and interdicted Viet Minh attempts to move 
supplies from China by sea to various points along the Indochinese coast.  The French 
also operated several small aircraft carriers during the war.50  To achieve its objectives, 
the FRN had 12,000 men, including unskilled, indigenous laborers.  French naval 
personnel served for eighteen month tours.51  Primarily, the FRN deployed vessels 
suitable for riverine operations, such as World War II landing ships.  With these craft 
they formed the Dinassaut units, detachments of shallow-bottomed craft which patrolled 
Indochina’s many inland waterways and conducted amphibious attacks and hit-and-run 
missions.  French combat operations near the coast could take advantage of fire support 
from their handful of surface ships.  In addition, the FRN operated aircraft from coastal 
bases.  The United States provided them with the vast majority of their boats, ships, and 
aircraft. 
 MAAG’s USN evaluators gave considerable praise to France’s riverine 
operations.  Two thirds of France’s navy personnel were “khaki navy” (by American 
terminology, “brown water”).52  Vietnam’s massive Mekong and Red River deltas were 
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well suited to riverine operations.  France deployed their forces to these inland 
waterways to deny their use to the Viet Minh and to keep them open for French traffic.53  
France’s khaki navy executed numerous successful riverine attacks during the war.54  
The presence of these riverine forces, described one Navy report, made Vietnam’s rivers 
“safe in all areas occupied by friendly forces.”55  Another document reviewed the French 
as “probably better qualified by experience and equipment than any other naval force for 
the particular type of river warfare which confronts it in Indochina.”56  As well as 
combat operations, they performed an important logistical function on the rivers, when 
the Viet Minh or terrain made overland supply delivery impossible. One Navy writer 
described the task as “a constant and heavy undertaking which they accomplish with 
facility.”57  Of all the reviews made by MAAG observers, these assessments of France’s 
khaki navy were the best. 
The Americans did not have strong praise for the French blue water “white 
navy.”  Overall, American observers found French ships functional, but “their long-term 
maintenance procedures are found to be deficient.”58  The Americans ranked several 
ships visited in July 1954 as serviceable, but remarked upon “dirty and unkempt” crew 
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quarters and filthy engine bilges.59  Some French ships received fine reviews from the 
Americans, but most reports emphasized substandard French maintenance.60  They also 
believed the French forces were poorly trained for “orthodox naval warfare” and were 
vulnerable to submarines. 61  Though the Viet Minh did not have any submarines to 
capitalize on this weakness, American planners worried that should the Soviets enter the 
war, their own submarine forces could wreak havoc on the French. 
Unlike the army, both the air force and navy advisors expressed concern over 
France’s ability to resist a conventional, external attack on Indochina.  They appear to 
have envisioned a scenario similar to the Chinese intervention in Korea.  This concern of 
large scale Chinese intervention helps explain why USAF personnel so criticized the 
French.  Despite their admissions that the French fliers could carry out their support 
duties in “an acceptable manner,” they may have worried that the FAF was only a single 
Sino-Soviet intervention away from total destruction.  But why the USAF and USN 
observers focused on such concerns, while army observers did not, is unclear, since the 
army focused so strongly on building a Vietnamese army in the 1950s capable of 
resisting a conventional invasion.   
The MAAG personnel agreed that the French were logistically inefficient and 
paid too little attention to training their Indochinese allies.  But overall, MAAG’s official 
tone was neutral toward the French, and sometimes even complimentary.  The 
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60
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summarizing section of any given MAAG report emphasized the positive effect had by 
US provided equipment and supplies and the status of the materiel.  These summaries 
tended to lean toward the army’s positive assessment of the French rather than the more 
critical air force and navy perspectives.  In some ways, the assessments conveyed an 
optimistic view of the war in Indochina that individual observers may not have shared.  
They disregarded the poor positions of the French and condemnatory reports and instead 
focused on the positive effects of American support, and the need for continued 
resistance against communist expansion in Asia.   
 MAAG reports emphasized improvement in French handling of US materiel and 
the positive effect this materiel had on the war effort.  Though the French did not always 
maintain equipment to high American standards, it was at least maintained in an 
“acceptable manner.”62  This adequately-maintained equipment had, according to 
MAAG, immensely benefited the French forces in the field.63  This positive attitude 
reached an unrealistic peak in in January 1954, when a US observer stated, “. . . it is 
considered that the French Union forces have the capability of destroying the Viet Minh 
in the next few years.”64  In May and June of that year, the Viet Minh annihilated many 
of the best units in the French army, and peace negotiations commenced at Geneva. 
 Some reports by MAAG personnel blatantly ignored the complaints of non-Army 
members of the group.  For example, after his departure from Indochina in April 1954, 
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former-MAAG Chief Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnell wrote that American 
materiel given to the French air force “has converted it into a modern air arm capable of 
performing its combat mission in a highly satisfactory manner. It is an effective 
offensive or defensive combat weapon, the full potential of which has not been 
realized.”65  Trapnell gave this report after years of negative USAF reports, and only 
shortly before the FAF’s post-ceasefire collapse, which many air force advisors had 
anticipated. 
That MAAG’s reports tended to reflect the army’s view of the French not 
surprising, considering the overwhelming majority of materiel the US sent to Indochina 
was intended for ground forces.  Because of France’s limited resources, much of the war 
depended upon the operations of French and French-allied army units.  These units, 
patrolling the swamps, jungles and mountains, decided France’s war in Indochina.  Their 
success in rooting out Viet Minh troops, so it seemed, would determine the course of the 
war.  Furthermore, MAAG chiefs were all army generals, who may have consciously or 
unconsciously believed army reports more than others. 
MAAG report summaries painted an unrealistically optimistic image of the war 
in Indochina, focusing as they did on successful shipments of US supplies, weapons, and 
equipment.  They could be criticized for this assessment, but it must be remembered that 
MAAG-Indochina operated under difficult conditions.  Their small size meant 
tremendous workloads, and thus limited available time per soldier, airman, and sailor.  
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They used their resources to focus on their primary mission, to process and monitor US 
materiel provided to the French.  
Anti-communism, and the assumption that communist nations around the world 
served Moscow, appeared in MAAG writings.  General Trapnell, in his debriefing after 
command passed to General John W. O’Daniel, hoped French Indochina would “occupy 
a blocking position against the expansion of Chinese Communist influence” into 
Southeast Asia, fearing that if the communists were successful there, Burma, Malaya, 
and Thailand would surely fall, followed in time by India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.  He added that “as in Korea, Iran, Malaya, 
and Burma, the war in Indochina is not a separate entity.  It is another tentacle of the 
octopus, another brush fire on the periphery of the iron and bamboo curtains.  The 
problem can only be solved completely if the masters of the Kremlin decide that 
Indochina should be abandoned in favor of more profitable enterprises elsewhere.”66 
MAAG’s assessment of the French tied in neatly to the prevailing sentiments of 
US military aid—that its use could prevent communist expansion around the world, and 
that the very presence of military aid was enough to ensure success, without regard to 
how it was put to use.  The Monthly Activity Reports, field estimates of effectiveness, 
and other documents cannot be used alone to understand the French Indochina War.  
Reports from March, April, May, and June 1954 barely mention the fighting at Dien 
Bien Phu.  The July 1954 report announced blandly that “This month’s activities feature 
66
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a cease fire agreement.”67  Very little of the war’s desperation can be seen in the MAAG 
documents.  To MAAG, the war was a matter of cataloging materiel delivered, training 
visits, and equipment inspections.  What the men in MAAG wanted in Indochina can be 
seen through their reports, an optimistic “can-do” attitude that the communists, through 
application of American materiel and logistical might, could be stopped.  After the cease 
fire, Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, then MAAG chief, spoke at a monthly 
advisor’s conference.  His tone was positive. “All of us, regardless of trials and 
tribulations, frustration, and at times discouragement, must maintain an optimistic view 
point . . . We Americans and French have time to be anti-communist, only.”68 
 
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 
 
After France’s defeat and subsequent withdrawal from Indochina, the United 
States took on South Vietnam as client and ally.  The Americans believed they could 
quickly whip the Vietnamese into shape and defeat any subsequent attack by their 
communist enemies in the north.  The Americans first attempted to cooperate with the 
departing French, through 1956.  The advisors then shifted to training the Republic of 
Vietnam Armed Forces alone, developing them as a conventional force to fight a full 
scale invasion by the North Vietnamese.  Finally, from 1961 to 1963, the MAAG 
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continued efforts to modernize the South Vietnamese forces and made a limited attempt 
to retrain the South Vietnamese forces to fight guerrillas and conduct counterinsurgency. 
Throughout the period, the advisors faced and were sometimes the cause of several 
problems.  American advisors, especially at the top, remained steadfastly optimistic 
about their progress in Vietnam.  They believed that training exercises, leadership 
courses, and better equipment would fix the shortcomings of the Republic of Vietnam 
Armed Forces (RVNAF), but South Vietnam’s deep social, economic, and political 
problems undercut or outright prevented any military improvement.  Further, the 
advisors developed the RVNAF along American lines, which for a variety of reasons 
rarely suited them.  
Following the 1954 Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu, the Geneva Accords 
temporarily split Vietnam in two.  Ho Chi Minh and the communists controlled Hanoi 
and the north, with the French and US-backed Vietnamese government in Saigon in the 
south. Elections scheduled later would determine the country’s ultimate future.  The 
Eisenhower administration believed this was a major defeat and despite resistance from 
some key policy makers, including the secretary of defense and several members of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the president to 
continued US support of the Republic of Vietnam.  Washington chose Vietnam, into 
which it had already sunk so many dollars, as its Southeast Asian bulwark against 
communism.69 
69
 George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2002), 57-58. 
185 
American policymakers believed that above all else, the Republic of Vietnam 
needed a strong leader.  Secretary Dulles and others believed they had found their strong 
leader in Ngo Dinh Diem, an educated southern elite with strong anti-communist 
credentials and some administrative experience.70  Personally brave and dedicated but 
distant and aloof, Diem was “intellectually unsuited” to leading South Vietnam in the 
face of communist insurgency.  His Catholicism made him more attractive to American 
policymakers, but preferential treatment for his coreligionists weakened the South 
Vietnamese state and helped compromise his leadership.  The French and several 
influential Americans including General J. Lawton Collins, argued that Diem was a 
terrible choice to lead South Vietnam, but the Eisenhower administration nevertheless 
backed him with major military and economic assistance.71 
In late 1954, Saigon was in chaos and President Diem’s tenure appeared short 
lived.  General Collins, sent on a special mission to assess the situation, believed Diem 
had little chance of success.  He was unimpressed by Diem and did not believe him 
capable of organizing a government out of the Vietnamese ether. He worried about the 
various armed sects in the south, which threatened to overthrow the nascent South 
Vietnamese government. These criminal gangs and religious cults controlled significant 
forces of paramilitary fighters, potentially a match for Diem’s undertrained Vietnamese 
National Army.72  However, Diem and army units loyal to him crushed the Binh Xuyen, 
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a mafia organization in Saigon, in early 1955.  His troops then swept the nearby Mekong 
Delta areas of dissidents.  Together, these victories appeared to discredit Collins’ 
gloomy assessments.73   
After defeating the sects, Diem consolidated his power in the south and with US 
help delayed and then fixed the elections called for by the Geneva Accords.  Washington 
began what one historian has called a crusade of assistance to South Vietnam, pouring 
military and economic aid in to the country.  In the US, the influential pro-Vietnam 
lobby American Friends of Vietnam drummed up congressional support for the effort.  
From 1955 to 1961, the US spent over $1 billion on Diem’s government, shoring up the 
consumer industry, fighting inflation, and above all supporting the armed forces.  The 
US spent four times as much money on the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 
(RVNAF) than it did on economic, agrarian, and social assistance.74  
On the surface, the aid appeared to work.  Diem’s secret police crushed 
Communist networks across the Country, inflation stayed down, and Saigon’s economy 
boomed.  However, the superficial boon masked serious problems.  South Vietnam never 
recovered from the devastation of Japanese occupation and the French war.  Rice 
production could not reach pre-WWII levels and rubber exports were slow to expand.  
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Along with military aid, South Vietnam came to depend on US economic aid during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s.  US economic aid purchased consumer goods, but was not 
spent effectively on infrastructure, as had been the case in Europe during the Marshall 
Plan.75 
 Furthermore, Diem’s government was corrupt, unrepresentative, and inefficient. 
The Diem still had to bargain with the sects his troops defeated in 1955.  Large ethnic 
minorities held shared resentment with the Vietnamese.  Diem’s pro-Catholic policies 
worsened the divide between them and Buddhists.  All this left South Vietnam with little 
in the way of an identity.76  Diem and his subordinates refused to institute land reform in 
the rural areas, which could have dramatically improved the lives of rural peasants.  
They even replaced centuries-old village councils with provincial governors.77 
 Whatever the problems in the strategic situation or the shortcomings of the RVN 
government, MAAG-Vietnam stuck to its mission of developing RVNAF.  They worked 
toward this goal with the usual methods of American advising: development of schools, 
creation of training cadres, inspection and review of Vietnamese units, and close work 
between advisors and their Vietnamese counterparts.  MAAG advisors hoped that 
Vietnamese officers would accept American military standards and practices, and absorb 
US military habits and ethics.   
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MAAG-VIETNAM 
 
Though MAAG Vietnam trained the RVNAF generally, its focused on the 
development of an effective Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).78  Armies, 
which can control territory, the population, and resources, have political power in a way 
that air forces and navies traditionally do not.  Developing an effective army could help 
shore up the weak RVN state.  Further, the Americans believed that the RVN needed a 
conventional force, capable of standing up to an invasion from the north.  Thus, MAAG-
Vietnam built up the ARVN as one of the many “little American armies” developed 
around the world in the 1950s.  They would help guide the newly independent ARVN—
hitherto only a source of light infantry for the French—into the modern American way 
of war.  It can be noted that this flew in the face of General James A. Van Fleet’s 
suggestions during his 1954 inspection of MAAG units in Asia, as seen in Chapter IV.   
US advising of the Vietnamese began after the defeat of France at Dien Bien 
Phu, and was initially conducted alongside French advisors.  The Franco-American 
Training Relations and Instructions Mission (TRIM) lasted from early 1955 through 
1956 and accomplished little.  US and French trainers and generals clashed on nearly 
every subject, from the organization of the Vietnamese National Army (VNA—the 
predecessor to the ARVN), to its tactical training, deployment, and equipment.  
Vietnamese resentment of the French, and French attitudes toward the Vietnamese, 
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prevented effective cooperation between them.  The language barrier between 
Americans and Vietnamese greatly slowed training efforts, as did the diversion of many 
American personnel to the evacuation of Vietnamese refugees from the north.79  Further 
driving a wedge between the parties was Diem’s war with the sects, such as the Cao Dai 
and the Binh Xuyen, who Diem needed to dismantle before he could consolidate his 
power.  In summer 1955, those French forces remaining in Vietnam began to withdraw, 
and TRIM saw almost half its personnel depart.  This first training effort failed.80   
Before the French had even withdrawn, however, some American advisors 
declared the advisory mission in Vietnam a success.  They estimated that, by 1 July 
1956, the Vietnamese forces would be capable of resisting an external attack long 
enough to withdraw to better terrain south of the 17th Parallel (the division between 
North and South Vietnam).  They were also confident that small, 10-man Self Defense 
units would be sufficient to protect Southern villages from guerrilla attack.  Though the 
insurgent threat was minimal in 1956, MAAG advisors remained mostly uninterested in 
the South’s local defense forces.81   
As early as the TRIM effort, the US pushed for the creation of a conventional 
force—the obvious inclination of a military power more comfortable with large scale 
battle rather than the thorny issues of guerrilla war.  For this mission, the US and South 
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Vietnamese compromised on a force of 150,000 troops, organized into ten divisions (six 
“light” and four “field” divisions), supported by territorial regiments.  The field divisions 
were similar to US infantry divisions, though more lightly armed.  The light divisions 
were pure “leg” infantry, intended to fight against guerrillas.  Compromises between the 
two sides meant that though the divisions were organized along American lines, with the 
idea of using them to face a cross-border assault as had happened five years earlier in 
Korea.   As a concession to the RVN, which wanted their armed forces to establish 
control in the countryside against the underground communist party and various criminal 
organizations, the divisions were based regionally, operating within a certain part of 
Vietnam.82   
This had major implications.  The divisions, tied down logistically to their base 
areas, could not move easily to other parts of Vietnam, which called into question the 
entire American concept of creating division-sized units for conventional combat.  
Second, they helped to create regions of military control, where Vietnamese officers and 
generals became closely tied to the politics of their particular division area.83  That these 
characteristics could have been a benefit during a counterinsurgency did not occur to the 
Americans, who believed the real threat came from the north. 
Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams took command of the MAAG in 1955 
and led the unit through 1960.  His resume was impressive.  A career infantry officer, 
with ample combat and leadership experience in both world wars and Korea, Williams 
82 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 20-24, and Spector, Advise and Support, 263-264. 
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believed that the main threat to the Republic of Vietnam was a conventional invasion 
from the north, as had happened in Korea.  The communists could also support their 
attack with infiltrators sent down the Ho Chi Minh trail.84  He focused on creating 
division-sized units.  Under his command, MAAG taught the ARVN how to fight like 
Americans, with motorized and mechanized infantry, armor, artillery, and truck-borne 
logistics.  Williams and the advisory group ignored various paramilitary and local 
security units and concentrated on the ARVN. 85   He reorganized Vietnamese forces in 
1956, urging that the Vietnamese strengthen the “light divisions” with heavy weapons 
and support, and disband the territorial regiments so they could reinforce the divisions.  
Shuffling of troops, weapons, and units continued well into 1960, by which time the 
ARVN had reorganized into seven infantry divisions, more similar to American units.  
Though Williams argued to the contrary, the new divisions were roadbound, much like 
the defeated French before them.86   
Throughout 1956 and 1957, the advisors made “Training Visit Reports,” in 
which senior MAAG officers—usually the Deputy Chief and a small staff—visited 
ARVN units and assessed their strengths and weaknesses.  They examined organization, 
morale, the appearance of the troops, their living conditions, lines of communication, 
missions, and general combat readiness.  Some units were in dire shape, but overall the 
Americans believed the units improved.  
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The Americans saw logistics as one of the main problems for the nascent 
Vietnamese army.  General Williams blamed the French for failing to train their 
Vietnamese forces how to manage their logistical trains and maintain their weaponry. To 
make matters worse, the equipment left to the Vietnamese by the French had been used 
hard and put up wet by the French forces. 87  In almost every Training Visit Report, the 
Americans found logistics and maintenance sorely lacking in Vietnamese units.  The 
703rd Ordnance Ammunition Company exemplified the ARVN’s shortcomings in this 
area, with dismal, flooded ammunition storage facilities. Entire rows of ammunition 
were unserviceable.  Rounds of live howitzer ammunition were placed decoratively 
around the facility.  In the 3rd Field Division, only 25% of their 700 vehicles were 
usable, the remainder out service from mechanical failure.88 
Vietnamese units also had generally unmilitary behavior.  In June 1957, a 
MAAG visit to the 1st Armored Battalion found that the unit maintained its vehicles 
well, but neglected its training and had lax discipline.  Their barracks and motor pool 
area were messy and disorganized.  They kept their equipment stowed away in buildings, 
rather than on their vehicles so that they could move out into the field at a moment’s 
notice.89  Some Vietnamese units appeared broken beyond repair, such as the 130th 
Territorial Regiment.  The regiment had no interest in training or maintaining its 
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equipment.  The unit’s officers did not bother to try and improve their base area’sterrible 
drainage, leaving the troops to live in a swamp. The unit never concentrated to train as a 
regiment, leaving the Americans to comment on further training of the unit as “futile.”90  
Reports like these confirmed Williams’ belief that the territorial regiments drained 
manpower from ARVN divisions. 
 These reports described a year in the life of one of the ARVN’s major units, the 
4th Field Division, and show the kind of problems encountered while trying to develop 
the Vietnamese force.  In July 1956, the visiting advisory team found the 4th Field 
Division short many of its vehicles and best infantry weapons, like mortars and 
recoilless rifles.  The division also had a high desertion rate, mainly because of the low 
pay for the enlisted, who could not support their families.  Desertion and shortages of 
personnel left the unit with 7,968 men instead of its authorized 8,500.  They lacked good 
housing and other facilities.  Several of the division’s infantry elements were deployed 
elsewhere in combat operations.91   
When visited again a year later, in June 1957, the division’s strength had fallen 
even further—they were now short 1,018 men, including 99 officers, many of them from 
transfers and an influenza epidemic.  They were still short half of their vehicles. They 
had finally started housing construction for the troops, but elements of the division’s 
regiments remained on operations against insurgents, despite requests by the American 
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advisors that the division be concentrated for training.  The visiting team observed an 
attack exercise which showed numerous tactical mistakes.  Though the division’s 
chronic shortage of manpower had gone unaddressed by the ARVN command structure, 
Major General Earl Bergquist, Deputy Chief of the MAAG’s training branch, 
acknowledged some problems were outside of the division’s control (their maneuver 
elements conducting operations and the outbreak of disease) and considered the 
division’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ngo Dzu, a sharp, capable officer.  He also 
observed amicable relations between the division personnel and their American 
advisors.92 
Another visit four months later, in October, found the 4th Field Division 
numerically even weaker, now short 1,500 troops.  However, the desertion rate had 
improved since 1956, and discipline, morale, and troop appearance were all good.  The 
division was “seriously short” of field radios and still at only half strength in vehicles, 
but cared for its equipment.  Most importantly, from the American perspective, the entire 
division was now concentrated at Bien Hoa and could finally begin training together.  
Major General Bergquist noted that the division’s 10th Regiment, trained in “accordance 
with American tactics and utilizing American Field Manuals,” and that another unit 
conducted a battalion attack with aggressive advances and “orthodox” squad rushes.  He 
92
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described their training center is “one of the best in the country.”93  Bergquist 
emphasized the importance of following American tactical practices. 
By the end of 1956, MAAG-Vietnam was confident that the ARVN could 
maintain internal security and offer a few weeks of resistance against Northern attack.  
The advisors were worried about the lack of a corps-level command structure and the 
ARVN’s continued operations against dissident sects, but believed that training could 
correct these shortcomings by the end of 1958.94  MAAG also worked to improve the 
ARVN’s officer shortage, a hold-over from the army’s heritage as a source of enlisted 
for the French forces.  Vietnamese officers attended schools in the United States, 
including the Command and General Staff College and various branch schools.  They 
believed that ARVN officer quality had improved generally, through duty experience 
and “advice and guidance” from their advisors.95 
MAAG reported, by the end of the 1950s, that the Vietnamese forces were 
improving.  ARVN units finally began completing their basic training cycles.  The 
Americans and Vietnamese developed a school system, inspired by the US Army’s, 
which included a center for technical and service training; an infantry school; centers for 
a medicine, intelligence, and psychological warfare; a military academy for officers; a 
military school for staff work; and a replacement center.   The ARVN established 
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eighteen schools under US direction by 1958, and thousands more ARVN officers 
travelled to the continental US for training at American schools.96  Some of these 
officers even attended classes to study atomic weapons and operations on a nuclear 
battlefield.97 
These improvements concealed a number of problems.  First was the paradoxical 
organization of the Vietnamese divisions.  They were quite light in comparison to 
American units of WWII, on which they were modeled.98  Experience in Korea had 
shown that the lighter ROKA divisions had fared poorly against the Chinese and that the 
superior performance of the American divisions had been at least partly due to their 
much heavier firepower.  How well these light divisions would have performed against a 
conventional North Vietnamese attack in 1960 can never be known, but the limits of 
American material support, and the inability of Vietnamese infrastructure to support 
heavier divisions, suggest that MAAG Vietnam had failed to even equip a viable 
conventional army, let alone train it to fight.   
President Diem created some of the RVNAF’s problems.  He insisted that the 
army remain mostly regional rather than mobile, so that army units and officers could be 
used to control those areas politically, and was reluctant to deploy any units into the 
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countryside or away from their training areas.99  He relied on the military to stay in 
power, but Diem roughly handled his officers, promoting and demoting based on loyalty 
rather their military skill.  He frequently changed the army’s command structure to suit 
his political needs.100  His religion also affected his military decision making.  He 
promoted General Ton That Dinh when the general converted to Catholicism.  Few of 
Diem’s favorites had strong nationalist credentials, having been administrators for the 
French or trained by the metropolitan forces; one of his favorites spoke better French 
than Vietnamese. Despite his obvious shortcomings, Diem enjoyed the support and 
respect of General Williams, Secretary Dulles, and other significant American leaders.101 
The problems with the RVNAF’s senior leadership trickled down to the colonels, 
majors, and captains in the forms of corruption and apathy.  Some sold military 
hardware on the black market and trafficked drugs and prostitutes.  Many did not take 
training seriously.  MAAG advisors found instruction courses run without any sense of 
urgency or professionalism and taught by incompetent political appointees.102 
The corruption of Diem’s government and armed forces had profound effects on 
the common South Vietnamese enlisted man.  Government officials and commanding 
officers embezzled soldiers’ salaries or forced them to pay for their food and uniforms.  
Constant delays slowed housing construction, especially for dependents—the 4th Field 
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Division’s housing travails described earlier were an example of this.  The RVNAF 
issued American military rations instead of paying for fresh Vietnamese food.  
Conscription tore sons away from their families and left them unable to financially 
support their loved ones.  During the 1950s, the government and armed forces totally 
failed to instill national spirit and esprit d’corps in the troops.  All of these factors sapped 
Vietnamese morale and ruined ARVN units.103  It should have come to no surprise to the 
Americans, then, when ARVN units performed badly in combat.  But the advisors were 
essentially blind to the damage wrought on Vietnamese society by heavy handed 
conscription policies. 
MAAG reports remained positive through the 1950s.  More junior advisors in 
Vietnam spent most of their time in the field, with their units, attempting to convince 
their Vietnamese counterparts to adopt certain practices or procedures.  General 
Williams and the senior advisors mostly remained with higher headquarters and in 
Saigon.  At quarterly Senior Advisers’ conferences, Williams heard briefings by corps 
and division advisors.  Junior advisors who sat in on these conferences, lieutenant 
colonels who spent their time in the field and not in Saigon, sometimes expressed 
dismay at the optimism of the reports.104  Williams maintained that all was well in 
Vietnam, especially when it came to US-Vietnamese relations: “Vietnamese reaction to 
the American advisors was and is excellent.”105 
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While Diem’s government absorbed millions in US aid and MAAG trained for a 
conventional war, serious problems developed in the countryside.  In one of South 
Vietnam’s few successes, Diem had nearly eradicated the underground communist 
network left after the war with France, leaving the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 
shambles.  However, North Vietnam began more serious support of the south in 1957.  
Revolution restarted as mix of local revolutionaries and transplanted northerners. 
Diem’s oppressive government, which had ignored the peasant’s plight, helped produced 
volunteers for the movement.  Violent action by insurgents increased from 700 
assassinations of government officials a year in 1958 (hardly a small number) to 2,500 
killed in 1960.  In 1959, the insurgents began significant military operations.106  The 
ARVN, into which the US had poured so much money and effort, performed poorly in 
combat against the derisively nick-named Viet Cong.  For example, one NLF battalion 
repeatedly ambushed ARVN units in late 1959 and early 1960, inflicting scores of 
casualties and capturing numerous weapons.  In one instance, they even penetrated the 
perimeter of an ARVN post.107  By 1960, it was clear that the south faced more threats 
than just an invasion by the north. 
106 Herring, America’s Longest War, 80-82. 
107 Eric M. Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1991), 22. 
200 
THE PARTIAL SHIFT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY 
By 1960, the strength of the communist insurgency forced the Americans and 
Vietnamese to reassess the ARVN.  Lieutenant General Lionel McGarr took command 
of MAAG-Vietnam in 1960 and tried to shift the ARVN from a conventional force to 
one capable of dealing with an insurgency.  The Americans instituted anti-guerrilla 
training, tried to make better use of RVN’s various paramilitary- and security forces, 
rotated the training periods of many ARVN units, and generally reorganized the armed 
forces.  
McGarr, more attuned to the problems of insurgency warfare than many other 
American generals of the period, gathered his senior advisors for a frank discussion of 
the new mission they faced.108  McGarr saw major obstacles to overcoming the 
Vietnamese insurgency.  He believed that the US advisors were largely alone in the task 
of teaching counter-insurgency, because the political solutions to the guerrilla 
movement—closing the porous borders with Laos and North Vietnam, and correcting 
the major internal problems of South Vietnam—were out of MAAG’s hands.  Even 
though guerillas had serious disadvantages, such as dependency on the local population 
and limited weaponry, the ARVN was too weak to take advantage of these 
shortcomings.  McGarr believed that the RVNAF needed full command of the hitherto 
paramilitary Civil Guard and other, local security forces, and needed clearer internal 
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lines of command, to better control the RVNAF’s geographically dispersed and highly 
territorial units.  On the battlefield, McGarr hoped that instilling a greater offensive spirit 
in the Vietnamese, through better individual, leader, and small unit training could finally 
give the RVNAF the edge it needed to crush the insurgency.109 
By September of 1961, McGarr reported positive news: the ARVN units were 
training to fight guerrillas; the air force had new, better aircraft to replace their elderly 
prop-driven planes; and ARVN artillery had gotten out into the field, away from the 
bases, where it could effectively support ARVN operations.   McGarr saw “heartening 
indications of improvement in the all important areas of self confidence and offensive 
spirit.”  But there was still much work to be done—“It should not be inferred from the 
above ‘laundry list’ of achievements that the optimum or even in many case, the desired 
degree of excellence, has yet been attained.” He nevertheless remained confident that the 
RVNAF could defend Vietnam if given more training.110    
McGarr even managed improvements to the RVNAF command structure, 
making “real progress” toward command and control reorganization.  Through 
organization, the ARVN now had command of all the territorial troops, critical for 
defeating an insurgency.111  However, the, the problems of regionalized commands—
tied logistically and politically to specific areas of Vietnam—continued.  As late as 
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December 1961, General McGarr continued urging the creation of more mobile reserve 
units that could be deployed to any part of Vietnam, because the RVNAF airborne and 
marine units had been overstretched by their constant deployment.112  ARVN 
commanders, almost feudal in their territorial assignments, were reluctant to release their 
units to other leaders. 
McGarr also downplayed the South’s rampant political problems.  At a January 
1961 meeting with the senior American advisors, he reminded his troops they were to 
stay out of any Vietnamese conversations about the state of the RVN government and/or 
President Diem.  McGarr argued that such criticisms of the South were “normally 
instigated by dissatisfied politicians, misled intellectuals, Communists or certain 
elements of the foreign community,” and that corruption in South Vietnam was actually 
less than in other, similar countries, because President Diem’s leadership had stamped 
out corruption.113   
Further, McGarr proved an aloof leader of MAAG-Vietnam.  He rarely visited 
the field or even his staff, remaining in his quarters for days at a time.114  He seems to 
have had knowledge of counterinsurgency techniques—understanding the importance of 
the population, of guerrilla mobility, etc.—but focused on the combat aspect, believing 
that the military’s main goal was to destroy the insurgents in battle.  The shift to 
112  Lieutenant General Lionel McGarr to the Honorable Ngo Diem, 28 Dec 1961, F 0220, Box 0020, 
Vietnam Archive. 
113
 Lionel McGarr, “Remarks by the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam 
(McGarr), Saigon,” Jan 30, 1961, F 12, Box 01, Pike Collection, Vietnam Archive. 
114 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 57.   
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counterinsurgency in Vietnam was limited at best.  Though some US special forces units 
were sent to develop special guerrilla units—which was really a separate issue from 
counterinsurgency—the US Army, and MAAG, believed that an army capable of dealing 
with a conventional threat was surely capable of dealing with a low-intensity insurgency 
threat.115   
The advisors were not universal believers in the conventional threat, however.  
Advisors’ writings after their time in country suggest that at least some of them held 
nuanced views of the conflict and advising the South Vietnamese.  Colonel John L. 
Erickson wrote about MAAG-Vietnam while a student at the Army War College and 
urged the advisory group to improve its guerrilla training efforts.  He believed they had 
effectively created a force capable of conventional warfare, but still lagged in 
counterinsurgency capabilities.  He described typical COIN methods the MAAG and 
ARVN could use: “Military units of sufficient strength to avoid defeat by Communist 
guerrillas must be located in areas where they can provide protection and security to the 
local inhabitants. . . . In addition to their security mission, these units must integrate 
themselves into the local communities and assist in the conduct of schools, the 
improvement of health and sanitation, and the improvement of local economic and social 
conditions. . . . They should be used to improve and construct roads, communications, 
and to survey and map sparsely inhabited areas of the country.”116  Along similar lines, 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Thebaud argued that the advisors could directly participate 
115 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 126. 
116 Erickson, “Impact of the United States.”  
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in counterinsurgency.  Because GIs were known for kindness and generosity, he argued, 
they were natural as counterinsurgents: “spread throughout the  hamlets and villages of 
Southeast Asia as advisers, [they] are a formidable force in being that can, through 
leadership, tact, persuasion and friendship, do much as part of their advisory duties to 
counter Communist insurgency.”117 
Lieutenant Colonel Clayton Moore, who had been in MAAG-Vietnam from 
1956-1957, did not suggest increased counter-insurgency training, but did identify 
enemy guerrilla units operating in the jungles and mountains as the primary problem in 
Southeast Asia.  The advisors working there needed “language, counterguerrilla, ranger, 
and other specialized training courses.”  He argued that the Military Assistance Institute, 
described in Chapter II, had greatly improved the quality of advisors.  Moore’s opinions 
were likely colored by his time as an advisor and by second-hand information: he had 
served in Vietnam before the communist insurgency in the south became effective, and 
would have limited opportunity to directly observe MAI graduates in the field, because 
that institution had not existed when he had been an advisor.  However, his belief that 
guerrilla forces were the main threat did come much closer to reality than what MAAG 
Vietnam espoused.118 
In 1958, Colonel Norman H. Bykerk wrote a critical review of the advisory 
mission in Vietnam.  He worried that MAAG-Vietnam, and groups elsewhere, were used 
to occupy “incompetent personnel” unwanted elsewhere.  Few advisors understood 
117 Thebaud, “MAAG Adviser.” 
118 Moore, “MAAG Duty.” 
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Vietnamese history and culture.  Americans arrived in Vietnam with preconceived 
notions about their job because of what they had heard in the military’s grapevine and 
were “almost totally unaware of US interest in the area, the magnitude of the money 
being spent and the responsibility of a MAAG with respect to both.”  Some were 
unaware of their duty as an example for the Vietnamese to follow. 
Bykerk also argued that the RVN government needed serious overhaul before it 
could effectively lead the country.  President Diem had great difficulty communicating 
with the common Vietnamese.  His characteristics affected the entire country, because 
“actual leadership remains largely in his hands and a very small immediate group around 
him, who he trusts.”  Diem had to get rid of the government’s “medieval and colonial” 
policies, by enacting “drastic” land reforms and involving minority groups, like the Moi 
and Cambodians, into government and society. 
Unlike many military reports of the era, which barely mention the Vietnamese 
other than to criticize their failures or praise their success in learning US techniques, 
Bykerk wrote in detail about the South Vietnamese officers.  He did not disparage them 
as amateurish or overly politicized, noting that many had more recent combat experience 
than did their American advisors.  He believed that Vietnamese officers sized up their 
American advisors and respected the hard workers and disregarded the lazy or 
ineffective.  This reflected the problems of the “bad advisor” emphasized at the Miltiary 
Assistance Institute.  He also argued that the Americans simply did not understand 
Vietnamese concerns, who questioned US intentions in Vietnam.  They did not want to 
be “made tools of what they regard as a new form of imperialism which is no more 
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appealing than the old familiar colonial imperialism, nor less fearsome than what they 
know of Communistic imperialism.”  The timing of Bykerk’s writing, in 1958, was 
before the insurgency worsened and the weaknesses of the American-trained ARVN 
became more obvious.119 
Though advisors like Erickson, Thebaud, Moore, and Bykerk held different 
views than did the MAAG at large, the historical record suggests they were a definite 
minority.  Even famously contrary advisors like Colonel John Paul Vann, present for the 
Ap Bac disaster in 1963, only became strongly critical of the advisory effort later in the 
early 1960s, after the chance had long to past to either train the South Vietnamese to face 
an insurgency, convince Diem to change his policies, or leave the ARVN to its own 
operational devices. 
CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF ADVISING IN VIETNAM 
The inability of the ARVN, even after its supposed counterinsurgency and anti-
guerrilla training, to defeat the communist insurgency drove the Americans and South 
Vietnamese to drastically increase the size of the RVNAF.  It also pushed the Americans 
closer to introducing direct support and combat units into Vietnam, which in turn 
encouraged the creation of a new American command in Vietnam, the Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam, MACV, under command of Lieutenant General Paul D. 
119 Bykerk, “MAAG Vietnam.” 
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Harkins.  He was a conventional commander with little interest in counterinsurgency.120  
Harkins wanted a military solution to the Vietnam problem. Decades later, he remained 
convinced that South Vietnam’s internal problems were relatively minor and that 1963 
had been a good year for the advisory effort, with the situation “pretty well under 
control.”121  Only in this final phase before direct US intervention did American advisors 
drop the veil of optimism.  Several senior corps and division level advisors, including 
Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, expressed serious doubts about how the US had 
trained the ARVN to face the communist insurgency and what, if any, strategy the US 
planned in the war.  MACV and the army largely ignored their dissention.122   
Support for Diem finally waned in 1963, when a combination of events made 
evident the president’s shaky control of South Vietnam.  Senator Mike Mansfield, 
longtime member of the American Friends of Vietnam and supporter of Diem, visited 
South Vietnam and left the country with a much-changed assessment of Diem’s 
leadership.  The ARVN suffered a humiliating defeat at Ap Bac, despite its years of US 
training and heavy American weaponry.  The Buddhist-Catholic divide came to a head 
when Thich Quang Duc self-immolated in the middle of a Saigon street.  Diem doubled 
down on his anti-Buddhist policies and placed South Vietnam under martial law.  This 
act was too much for the Americans, and President Kennedy and his policymakers 
gradually removed support from Diem and tacitly encouraged a coup by several ARVN 
120 Nagl, Learning to Eat, 131-132. 
121
 “Interview I of Paul D. Harkins by Ted Gittinger,” 10 Nov 1981, F 02, Box 05, Rufus Phillips 
Collection, Vietnam Archive. 
122 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 81. 
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generals and their troops.  Diem and his brother were murdered by coup conspirators on 
2 November, 1963.123  With Diem gone, American combat units, including special 
forces detachments, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft units, and eventually ground troops, 
entered the fray, and the advisory effort in Vietnam shifted to secondary status, less 
important to the US that the growing war between American and communist troops in 
the country.   
The Americans trained the ARVN to fight a conventional war, but the ARVN 
eventually faced an insurgency.  It would be unfair to entirely blame the MAAG for this 
error, however. In 1950, the Republic of Korea Army had been crushed by a 
conventional assault by the North Koreans, which the Americans had read as a case 
lesson for getting a mission backwards: they had trained the ROKA to face guerillas, and 
it had ended up facing tanks.  The North Vietnamese were seen as every bit as dangerous 
as the North Koreans had been, and the Americans were mostly unaware that  the North 
was going through a painful, resource-draining transition into communism, and had 
decided to focus on diplomatic rather than military means to take control of South 
Vietnam.124  What was more damning of the American effort was not that it had gotten 
the mission wrong, but that through inadequate funding and ineffective training, the 
MAAG had not even prepared the ARVN to fight a conventional war. 
The Americans trained the ARVN to fight like them because it was what the 
Americans knew how to do.  Even though President John F. Kennedy’s emphasized 
                                                 
123  Jacobs, Cold War Mandarin, 136-142, 147, 153-154, and 169-172. 
124 Anderson, Trapped by Success, 136-137. 
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unconventional forces and counter-insurgency, and some advisors clearly believed the 
South Vietnamese needed more than straight combat training, little beyond conventional 
training trickled down to the ARVN.  Even had the Ericksons and Bykerks of the 
advisory effort been greater in number, or a general like McGarr less flawed and more 
dedicated to counterinsurgency, it seems unlikely that Diem’s government would have 
instituted the kind of deep changes needed to derail the communist effort.  Also 
problematic were the disagreements between the US and the RVN on how exactly to 
train and organize the armed forces.  The compromise solution, creating divisional units 
tied to specific regions, created an army intended to perform conventional and counter-
insurgency missions but incapable of both.  Frequent reorganizations, often initiated by 
the Americans, exacerbated these problems.  It should also be noted that even in the late 
1950s, US planners did not consider Vietnam a strategic priority.  For Fiscal Year 1958, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated a military assistance budget of just under $50 million 
for South Vietnam, but estimated more than $215 million for Italy.125  Before 1965, the 
US spent more on Taiwan than it did on Vietnam. 
It appears, with hindsight, that the American advisory effort in Vietnam was 
probably doomed from the start.  Whatever strengths and abilities MAAG could help 
develop for the RVNAF were of limited value if South Vietnam, as a nation, could not 
shake its problems, to say nothing of the North Vietnamese and the southern rebels’ say 
in the matter.  But the MAAG advisors in Vietnam in the 1950s and early 1960s do not 
appear to have shared that sense of historical inevitability.  They exuded much of the 
125 Condit, Joint Chiefs, vol. 6, 264. 
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same positive, American attitude seen in other advisory missions, and it left their 
assessments of the Vietnamese problematic at best, and misleading at worst.  Some 
advisors, as seen in War College student papers and elsewhere, understood the key 
problems in Vietnam, and viewed ARVN officers as having military strengths, but they 
appear to have been in the minority, and still believed that the problem was solveable.  
Lieutenant Colonel Bykerk, for instance, believed that something as small as extending 
tours from eleven months to twelve could make a real difference.126  Only near the end 
of the advisory period did individual advisors voice criticisms.  
The advisors worked very hard to develop these forces, but seemed to have lost 
sight of the proverbial forest.  Ronald Spector described how the positive “‘Can Do’ 
attitude” of most officers and noncommissioned officers, “who tended to see all faults in 
the army as correctable, all failures as temporary,” contributed to dangerously optimistic 
reporting on the struggle in South Vietnam.127  MAAG-Vietnam shared the same 
optimism as MAAG-Indochina had years before, and this contributed to the disaster of 
the Vietnam War. 
126 Bykerk, “MAAG Vietnam—Manacled by Geneva.” 
127 Spector, Advice and Support, 379. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Few absolute statements can be made about the military assistance advisory 
groups.  They conducted many different kinds of missions during the first twenty years 
of the Cold War, with varying levels of success.  In the broadest terms, the advisors were 
better suited to conventional missions, such as preparing NATO allies for a possible war, 
than they were toward unconventional assignments, like fighting insurgents in Vietnam.  
However, there were many exceptions to even this general overview.  This conclusion 
summarizes the successes and failures of the advisory groups.  It reemphasizes that the 
advisors worked within the limitations of the military assistance system, which had 
limited funds to achieve major objectives, and against the limitations of their own 
training and organization.  
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 
The MAAGs did best when training and equipping conventional forces in Europe 
and Asia, where the American military model of resource-intense, high-firepower 
warfare was more easily applied than in counterinsurgency.  In Denmark, the 
Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, and Greece, the advisors improved the tactical 
training of the armed forces and pushed them towards adoption of American tactical and 
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logistical practices.  This included realistic combat training, the effective use of artillery, 
and improved command and control at all levels.  The Republic of Korea Army suffered 
major defeats in the first year of the Korean War, but returned to battle in 1951 a far 
better force, thanks in large part to the advisory group’s rigorous training.  In Greece, US 
training helped the National Army destroy the guerrillas in set-piece battles. 
The advisory groups also succeeded in missions focused on logistics and force 
development.  In Spain, the MAAG primarily managed equipment deliveries, improved 
airfields, and converted the air force to jets.  MAAG-Spain, under the capable leadership 
of Major General August Kissner, capably performed this mission.  The Spanish Air 
Force made effective use of its jets within only a few years of aid’s start.  In West 
Germany, the advisors convinced the Bundeswehr that routine maintenance and attention 
to logistics were important attributes for a modern army.  Advisors in Japan oversaw 
major equipment deliveries and helped organize the Self Defense Forces.  By the early 
1960s, this had established some armed forces for Japan and reduced the need for US 
troops to remain on the islands. 
Several of the advisory groups were very well led.  James A. Van Fleet and 
August W. Kissner behaved as ideal soldier diplomats, performing their operational and 
diplomatic duties with skill and enthusiasm.  Van Fleet also proved open to the human 
side of advising, emphasizing close interaction with the host nation’s population and 
realistic appraisal of its military abilities.  His suggestions that armies in less developed 
nations be armed and trained to their strengths, as light infantry, rather than be built up 
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as mechanized forces was probably the best course of action the assistance program 
could have taken, but went mostly unheeded. 
 The MAAGs did less well when they operated in underdeveloped countries.  
Many impoverished nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, some suffering from 
the legacy of colonialism, had limited education for their general population.  Teaching 
partly or fully illiterate enlisted men from these countries how to repair trucks, operate 
radios, and maintain modern weapons was a daunting task and not accomplishable 
within only a few years.  Furthermore, basic mechanical knowledge was limited in many 
countries.  Whereas the typical US army recruit already knew how to drive a car and 
conduct simple vehicle maintenance, even the basics had to be taught to a conscript in 
Turkey, Iran, or Ethiopia.  Cultural differences compounded these problems.  The 
advisors believed that many Third World nations had too many holidays and generally 
looser work habits than did Americans. According to the advisors, the officers in those 
countries would not delegate authority, failed to act on their own initiative, and 
squabbled over their bureaucratic fiefdoms.   
 Language was a major barrier to success.  Few advisors could fluently speak the 
host nation’s language.  This forced the Americans to rely on interpreters.  It also 
weakened the advisors’ classroom lecture and reading assignments.  Inability to speak 
the local language, combined with trainees having varying levels of literacy, resulted in 
greatly slowed training schedules. 
The advisors also struggled with what they saw as overly political officers, 
especially in Thailand, Vietnam, the Republic of China, and Ethiopia.  MAAG personnel 
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worried their counterparts put their nations in jeopardy when they cared more about 
political aspirations than soldiering.  However, US policy makers valued many of these 
nations for their anticommunism, often under dictatorial leadership.  These dictators 
used their armed forces—supported by American military assistance—to maintain 
power.  Therefore, officers’ political loyalty was vital to the upkeep of the state.  It was 
highly likely for the officers in these armies to become politically involved.  From the 
standpoint of US foreign policy, this could even be seen as desirable.  
Many of the problems in the advisory missions were really the fault of military 
assistance as a whole.  As shown in Chapter II, the United States probably never 
committed the amount of aid necessary to develop allied armed forces as the Americans 
intended.  Creating new armies and air forces needed more than just tanks, jets, and 
rifles; it required training programs, improvements to infrastructure and education, and 
the development of officer corps.  Five or ten years of military assistance was rarely 
enough to achieve these long term goals, considering the small size of advisory groups, 
their short tours of duty, and the training problems incurred by the language barrier.  
However, the advisors shared the blame in the Republic of Vietnam, where their 
emphasis on conventional warfare, and disinterest in the country’s political problems 
and its armed forces’ specific needs, ultimately met with disaster. 
Even if the United States had committed more, better trained officers and enlisted 
men to the advisory groups, for longer tours, it is uncertain they would have made a 
difference in some of the more challenging advisory missions.  Limited assistance 
budgets would have restricted the amount of materiel available for allied countries.  
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More advisors probably would not have solved the problem in South Vietnam, where the 
Americans made several key mistakes born out of cultural ignorance and their own 
military training.   
The biggest weakness of the advisory effort was the advisors’ emphasis on 
training and equipping allied forces to fight the American way.  This placed heavy 
emphasis on firepower, mobility, and logistics.  For such a way of war to work, the 
military in question needs an educated population to operate the equipment, and a 
modern infrastructure to move and maintain the equipment.  Some countries possessed 
educated populations and modern infrastructure, and needed only the weaponry; others 
lacked the roads and harbors to quickly process incoming aid.  Still others lacked both 
educated populations and infrastructure.  The sticking point of American assistance was 
that all three of these all of these countries would receive essentially the same weaponry, 
equipment, and training.  This rarely produced useful results. 
The understaffed MAAGs, without special training in advising, worked diligently 
to modernize, expand, and strengthen armies, navies, and air forces in countries much 
different than the United States.  The officers and enlisted personnel who made up the 
military assistance advisory groups of the Cold War, for the most part, believed in what 
they were doing.  The financial and political restrictions of the era, the economic and 
social state of host nations, and the advisors’ own concepts of warfare limited the overall 
success of advisory and assistance missions during the Cold War.   
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